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Multiple Personality Disorder: Implications for Education 
October, 1994
This thesis examines Multiple Personality Disorder, about which there 
appears to be little educational literature, introducing important reasons for 
professional concern, and ways in which it is involved in the learning process,
A survey of the literature reveals characteristics and range of the 
disturbance, a brief history of what is known, causal theory, skepticism and 
therapy.
A deeper appreciation of the disorder, more complex issues and larger 
questions arise in the context of a broader knowledge of ways of knowing; ways 
personality develops and becomes distorted, in theory, and in relation to groups 
of others. This appreciation begins with an examination of the work of William 
James, who discusses how we know ways of thinking, what an individual may 
know of himself and others, and the limitations of psychology. The paper 
explores ways in which personality develops, through the work of Salvatore R. 
Maddi. The work of R.D. Laing reveals ways in which the person and others 
form the Self, and determines the nature of splitting of personality. Multiple 
Personality Disorder involves sexuality, whose nature and involvement in 
personality development are investigated in a review of the work of Sigmund 
Freud, who, though not recent, shows sexuality to be a lifelong and 
encompassing element of development. The theories of Émile Durkheim submit 
ways in which thought and the person develop in the context of society.
Common themes of the authors related to development, need and coping 
strategies are categorized in the conclusion, in order that educators appreciate 
that development and disorder involve complexity, context and limitations which 
may determine educational response.
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Chanter 1
Part I; The Importance of Investigation
Information about Multiple Personality Disorder (referred to hereafter as 
MPD) has been forthcoming In scarce measure only in the past three decades, 
and just in the past two decades has a significant body of information been more 
widely available (Kluft, 1987. pp. 363 - 373). There was marginal attention paid 
to MPD until 1974, when eleven investigators reported their experiences with it. 
Discussion accelerated after 1983 when journals devoted special issues to the 
subject, and International Conferences were held (1984-1986). Increased 
interest has been attributed to our increased knowledge of sexual abuse, which 
is believed to be associated with the disorder; notice drawn by the distinct 
physiological changes between personalities within the same person, and by the 
impact of feminism upon the fields of medicine, psychiatry and psychology (Kluft, 
April, 1987, pp. 363 - 364). We presently find a significant body of discussion 
on the subject in professional journals, and in the public media. It is worthwhile 
to seek and identify valid information and distinguish it from media hype.
Examination of this topic is not only a matter of interest, but important for 
many reasons. Since the disorder affects youth (Peterson, March, 1990; Rivera, 
1988. p. 44; Rivera, 1991. pp. 7-8), then it is, by virtue of area of professional 
obligation, a concern of education. It does not seem, however, to have received 
recent broad professional discussion at Nova Scotia in-service sessions. In fact, 
an ERIC search revealed little research in the area of education, with only a few 
media articles related to MPD. The issues at hand are far more than medical in 
nature. The potential impact to our classrooms may be serious. For example, if 
we look at only one aspect of the study of MPD, this seriousness becomes 
evident. The ramifications of abuse is manifested in Important ways related to 
MPD, and also in valid ways to the student population in our province; ways
which illustrate the wisdom of professional awareness, MPD involves 
dissociative behavior. If we consider that dissociative behavior related to abuse 
is parallel to that of post-war, combat and holocaust victims (Rivera, 1991, p. 1) 
then we may rightly suppose that academic performance will be affected. If 34% 
of girls, and 13% of boys (Badgely Report, 1984, in Rivera, 1991, p. 9) are 
victims of sexual assault alone [not including the other five types of abuse 
categorized by Wilbur (pp. 3 - 4)], then in a school of 1000 students, a possible 
175 girls and 65 boys may be affected (or approximately 7 girls and 3 boys in a 
twenty - student classroom). If there are a projected one in one hundred 
persons who may exhibit MPD (Rivera, 1991, video), then a possible ten of 1000 
students might exhibit MPD. These figures applied to provincial populations 
may have significant implications. Though caution must be taken in applying 
sets of projected figures to any given population, it is dangerous to ignore a 
potential problem for a crucial portion of it. As Wilbur states (in Multiple 
Personalities and Child Abuse: An Oven/iew, p. 6), "The loss of health, 
opportunity and education to the individual is severe. Certainly as serious is the 
loss of bright, talented individuals to serious illness and crime."
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders (ill-R) 
describes MPD as "the existence of two or more distinct personalities or states, 
each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to and 
thinking about the environment and the self. At least two recurrently take full 
control of the person's behavior" (Curtis, February, 1988). Often confused with 
schizophrenia (Banks, Spring, 1993), it develops as a psychological /behavioral 
disturbance (Kluft, 1987; Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3-31, #5), while 
schizophrenia is a biological/organic disorder (Wallis & Willwerth, July, 1993, 
p.39). Within a person, the presentation of alternate personalities is a recurrent
pattern stemming from a traumatic event. Alternate personalities may be 
amnestic to, or not aware of the other(s), may take the form of a helper or 
rescuer, or may be violent and express anger (Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3-31 #5). 
It is not always apparent and observed when present (Graves in Curtis & Fraser, 
Draft F3-31 #5) and, in fact, many high-functioning individuals can hide the 
disturbance seemingly indefinitely (Kluft, Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease. 174. 12. 722-726).
The disorder is believed to be authentic (Bliss in Curtis and Fraser, Draft 
F3 - 31 #5), "not rare" (Ross, 1990. p. 355) and has received legitimacy in 
professional and public discussion, especially in the last five years (Dunn, 1992. 
p. 22). As well, it has received its share of sensational attention in the media. 
Consumers of this information have an interest in distinguishing valid findings 
from hype, and in discovering that which appears genuine, to determine its 
effects.
The effects of MPD are clearly suggested by some to be very intense. 
Rivera (1991, video) proposes the incidence at one in one hundred persons, a 
significant portion of our population. Wilbur, in Multiple Personalities and Child 
Abuse: An Ovenriew, describes the Individual's health, education and social 
damage as "severe". Personal debilitation is in direct conflict with maximized 
potential; that which we are bound to foster in our capacity as professional 
educators. In the same article, Wilbur offers that the loss to society in intellect 
and talent through related illness and crime is "serious". Rivera cites Bliss
(1983) in her discussion of significant incidence of "multiple personality in 
...criminal population" (1988. p. 44). Human health, education and legal costs 
always translate into short and long-term financial costs, and, legally, losses 
extend to that body of the population who become the victims of crime. Human
expense In loss of potential Is Inferred. Should MPD be a legitimate factor In 
such expense, Investigation is warranted.
MPD has been found to correlate highly with Incidence of childhood 
sexual, physical and/or psychological abuses (Curtis, 1988, p. 85; Rivera, 1991, 
p. 10; Ross et al, March, 1991, pp. 97-101; Coons & Milsteln, 1986 In Sandberg 
& Lynn, 1992, p. 717). It Is necessary to determine the significance of this 
correlation, Its place In the complete entirety of personal development, and an 
appropriate reaction to It.
The literature presents Inconsistencies and problems with wholesale 
acceptance of MPD medically and generally. Ross (July, 1990) discusses 
Issues concerning the stylization of MPD personalities; their function In the 
disavowal of Inappropriate behavior. He notes the observations of those who 
contend that the disorder Is confused with others which are similar, or with 
regular variations in personality—that it is a myth; that it is created 
experimentally or deliberately either by therapists or maintained by patients 
eager to please therapists, and is reinforced with treatments. He challenges that 
those who submit high incidence of created childhood abuses have constructed 
same. Dunn (1992) calls for further active investigation of MPD citing 
questionable effectiveness of treatment, lack of empirical data, varying and 
Inconclusive results. He indicates that prediction of numbers to the population in 
general Is difficult because of the nature of test populations, and because of 
inconclusive results. He takes Issue with the lack of follow-up data. Important is 
his Interest in why some persons develop MPD while others In similar 
circumstances, do not.
Leavitt and Braun (1991, p. 509) state that there Is "evidence of a distinct 
diagnostic disorder among a subgroup of patients", but conclude that "the
possibility that patients presenting dramatically inconsistent histories are also 
fabricating alter personalities cannot be discounted".
Dunn also presents questions about culture-relatedness of the disorder, 
as do Dale, Witztum, Mark and Rabinowitz (1992). Of Interest here is the 
significance, negative or positive t>iat the community places upon the behaviors, 
thereby making the perception of the situation subjective.
Rivera (1988) suggests that significant rates of presence of male 
personalities in female patients, and female in male patients reflects gender 
conflict in the larger social setting. She discusses our perception of male and 
female roles, and how the conflict within the MPD patient is a microcosm of a 
larger societal conflict.
The course of investigation will begin with a review of the contemporary 
literature, which will compose Chapter 2, and will unearth current opinions and 
findings in detail about MPD, revealing a complete picture of the disorder as we 
presently know it, its effects and issues for consideration. In spite of a number 
of conflicts, we know that there is a group of characteristics displayed which we 
call a "dissociative state", that it disturbs, and that it is associated with other 
problems, (Sandberg & Lynn, 1992) personal, societal and medical. We know It 
affects "normally integrated functions of identity, memory, or consciousness"
(rev. 3rd ed.; DSM - III - R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), and 
therefore may have some association with learning process.
Problems seem to be created by this state. Certain experiences seem to 
correlate with the state, but care must be taken not to confuse correlation with 
causation. There appear to be similarities with other disturbances in behavior of 
persons, and for this reason, it is necessary to examine MPD In a larger context. 
What constitutes wholeness in a person, and what forces enable the
development of wholeness? What alienates, splits and mutates the 
development?
Chapter 3 will undertake to address the larger Issues, in five parts. A 
review of the v/ork of William James will examine the nature of thought and 
reality; what constitutes thought; how it is driven, and how it becomes illusory. 
The nature of the “self" will be sought, with the view that limitations oxist in our 
capacity to know of these things.
Inquiry will be made into the way in which personality develops, in 
exploring the theories of personality developed in the last century. Components 
of growth; motivation for and aims of development; that which seems to 
enhance and that which seems to pen/ert growth will be pursued primarily in 
review of Salvatore Maddi's Personality Theories: A Comparative Analysis 
(1968).
The individual exists in the context of other groups of persons, and is 
shaped and formed by the dynamics of these groups. The self with the self, the 
self with others and the self in the context of the family will be scrutinized 
through the work of R. D. Laing, particularly in The Self and Others: Further 
Studies in Sanity and Madness (1962) and in The Politics of the Family and 
Other Essays (1969). The nature of splitting will be sought in a review of The 
Divided Self {^2eO).
MPD states correlate with experience of abuse, including sexual abuse. 
Though it is wise to examine the disorder in a broader view than just sexuality, it 
is necessary to include an understanding of sexual development. Though not a 
contemporary theory, that of Sigmund Freud through both his own writings and 
the commentary of others will be discussed in a way that may provide an
understanding of the encompassing nature of sexuaiity in our lives; how it 
contributes to wholeness and to conflict.
Émile Durkheim's social theory and theory of pragmatism will be 
considered to obtain a view of the individual in society, to see how, in society the 
person develops securely or is alienated. How people and societies know, know 
truth and reality, and where distortion, fragmentation and unhappiness fits in this 
context,
It will be the role of Chapter 4 to provide an overview of main ideas, 
common themes in areas of positive development, areas of human need and 
conflict. A return to MPD will take place to examine questions for future 
examination in the area of education with respect to MPD.
The end of this paper will hopefully provide the reader with a deeper 
awareness of, knowledge of and appreciation for MPD, the complexity of the 
issues surrounding its manifestations, and significant reasons why it is 
imperative to examine the issue as it relates to the field of education and the 
people we serve.
Chapter 2
The Disorder; History. Causal Theories. Range. Characterietlce.
Skepticism and Therapy
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders (Ill-R) 
describes MPD as "the existence of two or more distinct personalities or states, 
each with Its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to and 
thinking about the environment and the self, At least two recurrently take full 
control of the person's behavior" (Curtis, February, 1988), Although it is most 
often confused with schizophrenia (Banks, Spring, 1993), It develops as a 
psychological /behavioral disturbance (Kluft, 1987; Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 
31 #5), while schizophrenia Is a biological/organic disorder (Wallis & Willwerth, 
July, 1992, p.39). Within a person, the presentation of alternate personalities Is 
a recurrent pattern stemming from a traumatic event. A personality may be 
amnestic to the others: that is to say that the primary personality is not aware of 
the other(s). The alternate personality may take the form of a helper or rescuer, 
or may be violent and express anger. (Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3-31 #5) It Is not 
always apparent and observed when present (Greaves in Curtis & Fraser, Draft 
F3-31 #5) and, in fact, many high-functioning individuals can hide the 
disturbance seemingiy Indefinitely (Kluft, 1G15, Journal of Nen/ous and Mental 
Disease. 174. 12. 722-726). There is skepticism regarding Its existence as 
described (Curtis, February, 1988) but it has been shown to be authentic and 
not a rare phenomenon (Greaves in Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 31 #5). Rivera 
proposes the incidence (1991, Video) at approximately one in one hundred 
persons.
There was marginal attention paid to MPD until 1974, when eleven 
investigators reported their experiences with it. Splits of personaiity have been
mentioned, however, as early as 1876, in the case of Felida X. (Azam, May 26, 
1876 in James, 1891, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 245), and also by Ribot in James 
(1891, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 244), Discussion accelerated after 1983 when 
journals devoted special issues to the subject, and international Conferences 
were held (1984-1986). increased interest has been attributed to our increased 
knowledge of sexual abuse, which is associated with the disorder; notice drawn 
by the distinct physiological changes between personalities within the same 
person, and by the impact of feminism upon the fields of medicine, psychiatry 
and psychology (Kluft, April, 1987, pp. 363 - 364).
Questions arise about the distinctive qualities of the disturbance. If 
persons display, at given times, dominant personalities embodying the 
characteristics of aggression or protection, etc., then how is this different from 
normal human individual diversity? Are we not all angry at some point, or do we 
not all display activities of care-taking periodically ? What makes the attributes 
of the disorder different from the normal range of human expression ? Curtis 
and Fraser (Draft, F3-31 #5) explain that the personalities in MPD do reflect the 
varying traits of the normal, well-rounded person. However, normally these traits 
are fused. Multiples reduce the personalities to basic elements (referred to as 
“subpersonalities" or “alternates", depending upon the literature) and these 
elements function as "dissociated parts of a whole person, as opposed to a 
whole person with varying expressions. They are seen by the individual as 
separated entities rather than integrated parts of a whole, and the person will 
consider different expressions as belonging to different “people", separate and 
dissociated from the self, as opposed to an activity of which the self Is in charge.
On a continuum, (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986,728; Kluft, 1987, p. 293) 
the intensity of the dissociation of the self from the states of expression is seen 
to begin at the "normal" integrated state, in which the individual displays varying
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aspects of a diverse personality, and is responsible for them -  sees them as 
"his/her own self" doing or being. Most people experience a type of "trance" or 
dissociative state from time to time. We may not remember passing the last exit 
on a routine daily drive home, or we become "lost" in thought, or a novel. The 
intensity of the dissociation and separation of characteristics proceeds by 
degree from this "everyday" type of experience to the opposite end of the 
spectrum, where there is embodiment of characteristics into separate entities, 
acting as individuals within the person, and seen as same by the person. 
Bernstein and Putnam indicate that at this end of the spectrum lie major forms of 
psychopathological disorders.
As well as confusion resulting from subtleties in degree and range, there 
has been difficulty in identifying differences between MPD and other 
disturbances, because of parallel or similar behaviors, and because other 
disturbances can coexist with MPD (Horevitz & Braun, 1984, in Kluft, High - 
Functioning Multiple Personality Patients: Three Cases, p. 722). MPD 
has been mistaken to have been such disorders as depression, sexual 
dysfunction, personality disorder, substance abuse, bulimia, anorexia, or panic 
disorder (Fraser & LaPierre, 1986, in Kluft, 1987, p. 90). It is sometimes 
overlooked because of subtleties in the individual, especially in high-functioning 
persons who have worked out a coordinated system among their substates. 
"Clinicians expect to see dramatic phenomena, and don't" (Kiuft, 1985, p. 205 in 
Kluft, "High Functioning Multiple Personality Patients: Three Cases". The 
Journal of Nervous end MentaiDisease. Vol. 174. No. 12. p. 724). It goes 
undetected in many males because they less often present for treatment, and 
many males become involved with the criminal justice system before diagnosis 
can be made (Kluft, April, 1987, p. 370).
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As well, MPD has been confused with acute neurological Intoxication, 
mixed neurotic disorder, marital maladjustment, alcohol use and fatigue [the last 
two are said to be facilitators of dissociation and precipitate the emergence of a 
multiple (Curtis & Fraser, 5th Draft, F3-31 #5, p. 3)]. Most often, In the lay 
person's conversation, MPD appears confused with schizophrenia, and has 
been misdiagnosed professionally as well (Curtis & Fraser, 5th Draft, F3-31 #5, 
p. 3; Fraser & LaPierre, 1986 In Kluft, 1987, p. 90). However, schizophrenia is 
biological, with research indicating a hereditary factor, appearing to be 
somewhat manageable with drug therapy according to Wallis & Willwerth (July, 
1992, p. 39). MPD, however, according to Rivera (1991, video) Is a created 
psychological reaction to trauma, appearing to respond to "talk" therapy.
How does the disturbance originate ? According to Curtis and Fraser 
(Draft, F3-31 #5. p. 4), two conditions must be present for the development of 
MPD. There must be a pre-disposltlon to dissociation or auto>hypnosis. This is 
the ability of the individual to shift the consciousness to altered state •• to "trance 
out". There Is suspicion that this Is a genetic quality, and also discussion that 
the parents of persons with MPD may themselves have had MPD (especially the 
abuser), therefore modeling the behavior. There must also be the repeated, 
continued presence of a significant stressor, which presents itself often (Rivera, 
1991, p. 10) In the forms or combined forms of child abuse, usually between the 
ages of four and nine.
The developing process appears to be one In which a coping strategy 
employed for survival evolves as a skill, employed to deal with other, less life- 
threatening events. Kluft (April, 1987, p. 366) discusses the "Four-Factor 
Theory" of the development of the disorder. In the Four-Factor Theory, the 
child is first exposed to stimuli which Is overwhelming to her/him. Being unable 
to cope with less drastic measures, the child dissociates the contents of the
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stressful event, and experiences them in this dissociated state. Survivors of 
abuse have stated in conversations that they experienced the episodes from 
different positions, both special and temporal: as if far away, or in a dream 
state, or from a position in the future, as the adult self. Some have dissociated 
to the point of amnesia. The dissociated experience becomes linked to a 
substate - a being not the original personal state, if there are not adequate 
stimulus barriers or restorative experiences for the child, if the ovenwhelming 
stimulus is allowed to continue, and/or if there are double bind messages 
created for the child which prevent her/him from learning how to interpret and 
process reality (for instance, abuse has happened to the child and then the child 
is told it hasn't happened, or that father really loves her/him after father has 
beaten her/him repeatedly), then MPD can result.
Curtis and Fraser ( Draft. F3-31 #5. pp. 4-6) explain a similar origin, but 
add detail to the process, and identify state evolution. There exists, before 
trauma, the original person. When this person is in' reduced to traumatic stress 
which he/she cannot process straightforwardly, a temporary dissociative state is 
created in which the event is experienced. The state and its contents are then 
forgotten (though according to Prince, 1909, in Hale, 1975, In Bernstein and 
Putnam, 1986, p. 728, there need not be amnesia always; rather, a co­
consciousness develops, in which the state Is "remembered" in varying 
degrees). Following the trauma, the original person returns. Over time, it the 
trauma, or similar trauma is repeated, the dissociated state is invoked to cope, 
and develops a reason, an "existence" with a role, a time, and an environment. 
The non-dissociated state is amnestic, according to Curtis and Fraser, because 
the amnesia is an essential defense for the psyche of the person. In the event 
that the dissociated state Is experienced as a co-conscious state, as mentioned 
before (Prince, 1909, in Hale, 1976, in Bernstein and Putnam, 1986, p. 728)
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perhaps there is still a degree of "removal" or lack of full experience which, while 
not amnesia, nevertheless acts as a defense.
As repeated stress occurs, and resulting dissociation is practiced, the 
phenomenon becomes a skill, and may be then transferred as needed when 
other situations of stress arise. The nervous system keeps constantly alert to for 
the recurrence of the original danger, and hyper-aroused perceptual and motor 
response systems can reply to the most subtle of cues (facial features, voice 
tones, etc.,). When the cues are perceived, trance and dissociation recurs 
(Curtis, 1988, pp. 85-95).When this stage is reached, many or most stress 
events then trigger an automatic dissociative state, which has become adept 
with stress. The non-dlssociative state is left to non-stress environments. The 
original person has now developed into two new states; the primary personality 
(amnestic or co-conscious state left to non-stress situations) and the dissociative 
personality (which is able to handle stress without amnesia). The skill of 
dissociation, having been developed and strengthened, may now be used more 
diversely. Subsequent divisions of other subpersonalities emerge from these 
two main personalities as unique situations arise to require them. In fact, the 
higher the dissociative ability, the further splitting is possible (Curtis & Fraser,
5th Draft, F3-31 #5, p. 12).
The Curtis and Fraser Draft (F3-31 #5, pp. 1-12) describe the roles and 
characteristics of the subpersonalities as quite identifiable. The primary 
subpersonality, or that altered primary individual left after the dissociative state 
is created from trauma, and after the original person has "split” seems moral and 
concerned in nature. It is the one who seems to present the person to society, 
and who most often presents for treatment, and who "tries to do the right thing". 
Either amnestic or having some degree of awareness (Curtis and Fraser 
describe it as possibly a "bemused" awareness). It organizes, maintains
14
behavior standards, is upset and muddied when things go wrong. It appears 
very concerned with consequences and Is often "too good to be true" (p. 6), 
carrying honesty to extreme, seeming unable to be dishonest. Things and 
feelings are apparently blocked by this subpersonality, and passiveness is a 
characteristic. It has a sense of time passage and maturity.
The dissociated subpersonality appears to be the proverbial alter-ego. 
and appears to experience things at the visceral level. The one who has dealt 
with stress and trauma, and the one whose job it is to continue to do so, it is 
assertive and possibly aggressive. Neither concerned with morals nor social 
conformity, it does the "fun" things, and can split into further violent and anti­
social subpersonalities. Identified by Curtis and Fraser as the "I want" part, it 
pursues pleasure at all costs with high levels of self-confidence and esteem, 
energy and courage. Sometimes this is carried to destructiveness.
In the event of some emergency, where the survival of the being is 
threatened, there sometimes emerges a third main subpersonality called the 
"Executive Subpersonality". The role of this sub is apparently to take charge 
and monitor events and other subs if there is conflict. Not amnestic, it knows 
and organizes the other subpersonalities, and is informed of their memories 
even if others are amnestic. It is not a "person" as such, and does not 
experience emotions. It merely observes, watches, monitors and applies logic, 
rescuing or protecting the person, and acting sometimes as co-therapist, 
directing and evaluating. It does not have the sense of being a person, but 
rather the sense of just being. Curtis and Fraser explore the possibility that this 
is a part that is in all of us - the "survivor" part. Other subpersonalities can spin 
from this subpersonality as well.
Characteristics of the person him or herself vary, and can depend upon 
how amnestic the subpersonalities are, The lives of persons with amnestic
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subpersonalities can be, understandably, quite chaotic, as control, awareness 
and sobriety is handed over to varying other states ("Inner Faces of Multiplicity". 
Investigation - A Research Bulietin. Institute of Noetic Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. 
pp. 3-6). Other individuals function quite highly in a smoothly run coordinated 
system state (Kluft, 1985, Vol. 174. No. 12. p. 724; Kluft, Apr., 1987, p. 367), 
observing, negotiating jobs, academics, domestic tasks, rest and other 
tasks ("Inner Faces of Multiplicity", investigation - A Research Bulietin. Institute 
of Noetic Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. p. 6).
Some characteristics displayed include amnesia (for periods of hours to 
days), trancing off, staring and daydreaming, sudden mood and behavior shifts, 
impulsive and self-harm patterns. Sometimes there is a change in writing style 
as subpersonalities assume control, and at times, writing content is 
uncharacteristic. Persons may at times destroy writings complete f in another 
state. (Curtis, 1986, pp. 85-95). Indeed, sometimes there is physical dual­
handedness evident as alters emerge and "exist". (Sager & Smith, September, 
1971, pp, 717 - 719). Other physiological changes occur as alters exchange 
control. Varying ability levels are present, such as in the case of Garry, a 
spokesperson in the video Multiple.Personality Disorder: Putting Many Faces on 
Child Abuse (Rivera, 1991), who could speak blllngually at times, only French 
at others and still only English in other states, in the same video, Rivera 
mentions that at times, patients' needs for prescription eyeglasses will change 
from state to state. They display the apparent ability to heal more rapidly ("Inner 
Faces of Multiplicity". Investigation - A Research Bulietin. Institute of Noetic 
Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. p. 6), and may retain certain learned behaviors or 
talents (such as the ability to play piano) in only one or some states (Wilbur, 
Multiple Personality and Child Abuse: An Overview, p. 5).
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Migraines are common, perhaps precipitated by the stress induced when 
personalities are in conflict for control or because of the "change" 
process (Kluft, 1987, p. 90). Often, persons are bright and talented (Wilbur, 
Multiple Personalities and Child Abuse: An Overview, p. 6) and may display a 
"perfect memory" ("Inner Faces of Multiplicity", investigation- A Research 
Bulletin. Institute of Noetic Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. p. 6), perhaps because they 
experience perceptual stimulation from and with a number of different states and 
perspectives. They display high hypnotizability, being the "highest group on the 
median scale score, scoring considerably higher than all other groups" including 
alcoholics, normal, phobic, agoraphobic, schizophrenic, and other persons with 
post-stress disorder (Bernstein & Putnam, March, 1986, p. 732).
They may be "unusually sensitive to Interpersonal worlds", have a 
profound sense of Inferiority and worthlessness, and experience difficulty 
orienting to internal and external cues ( Speigel, 1984, p. 101).
It is Important for professional to become aware of certain characteristics 
which may be cause for concern In patients or students, but, as with any check 
list, caution must be used. The list compiled (Petersen, March, 1990, F3-23 
#80) and available at the Medical Science Library, Nova Scotia Hospital, 
includes contributions from Fagan and McMahon, Kluft, and Putnam. Although 
characteristics listed are characteristics of children and adolescents with MPD, 
they are also characteristics displayed by children without MPD, and must be 
used in context, with professional collaboration, and with great prudence. Fagan 
and McMahon list such criteria as "numerous injuries; hurt taking chances; 
markedly careless; lies; schoolwork goes from good to bad; age/person 
inappropriate sexual behg.vlor; truant for as much as five days; loss of feeling". 
Kluft cites "currently active Imaginary companionship; dissociators In family; 
hallucinated voices; fluctuations in abilities; passive influence experiences
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[events happening to the Individual without their awareness (such as automatic 
writing)]: inconsistent school behavior". Putnam cites "sustained repeated 
abuse; self*mutilator; marked variation in ability; hysterical symptoms; refers to 
self in third person". Out of context, many of these displays can be seen In other 
children (and adults) for various reasons. Though such lists are helpful in 
putting together clusters or patterns of characteristics, they cannot be used 
alone, nor in piecemeal, unrelated ways.
Because the disorder is highly individualistic, is subtle or may overlap 
other disorders in many ways; because the disturbance resembles others, there 
is skepticism regarding the actual existence of the dysfunction (Curtis, 1988, pp. 
85-95). It is proposed that if patients with MPD are very highly suggestible [high 
scores were obtained on the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale Form (p. 
86)], then perhaps the states or alters are therapist-induced. Ross (July, 1990) 
proposes that the disorder is a myth, perhaps created experimentally by 
therapists, and I or patients in collusion with therapists maintain the myth. Dunn 
(1992) questions inconclusive results in proof of the existence of MPD. Leavitt 
and Braun (1991, p. 509) acknowledge the existence of a distinct disorder, but 
caution there is probability of fabrication due to inconsistencies. Kelly and 
Kodman ask what difference lies between normal changes of ego-states and 
MPD, and ask for further, careful, scientific study.
However, it is argued that therapists do adhere to sets of professional 
ethics which do not include this type of behavior, at least not in the large 
numbers in which the disorder seems to be appearing. Studies have been 
undertaken to determine if states could be deliberately created. These attempts 
were unsuccessful. "It is abundantly clear that it is quite easy to induce a 
subject to manifest many of the phenomena of MPD, but it is equally
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demonstrable that the transient enactment of such phenomena does not 
constitute clinical MPD" ( Kluft, September 1991, 607).
Whether the perception of the disorder might be subjective and cultural is 
proposed by Dunn (1992) and by Dale, Witztum, Mark & Rabinowitz (1992) who 
discussed the case of a Druze patient with symptomatology of MPD. Meaning of 
cultural healing practices to the patient and cultural interpretations (in this 
instance, the belief in transmigration of souls) of the phenomenon are important 
to consider.
It has been more forthrightly proposed that the disorder just "doesn't 
exist". Curtis states that the history of the patient conforms to criteria for 
diagnosis, and is collaborated by friends and family. There has been 
unsuccessful treatment of other misdiagnosed disorders, until successful 
treatment has occurred for MPD, thereby ruling out the proposal that MPD is 
merely "something else". Professional observations of the patient, and 
collaboration with other professionals have supported the existence of MPD, as 
has the eliciting of the subpersonalities or alters to confirm observations and 
diagnosis. According to Rivera (1991, video) the numbers of sufferers may be 
as high as one person in one hundred.
Therapy is regarded with optimism. Usually taking the form of "talk" 
therapy (Rivera, 1991, video) the goal is the reintegration of "parts" into a whole 
individual who operates as a unit with varied expressions, as opposed to several 
independent "entities". This could take the form of more compatibility and 
cooperation, progressing in degrees through reintegration (Kluft, "Multiple 
Personality Disorder". Review of Psychiatry. Vol. 10. pp. 176-177). Curtis and 
Fraser (5th Draft, F3-31 #5, pp. 10-11) describe a developmental process of 
treatment, wherein observation by the therapist determines the maturation level 
and status of all of the person's alters. Face, voice and behavior of the person is
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noted; social, family, personal etc. histories are studied, and the age and state 
of the emotional and skill development of each subpersonality is determined. In 
a process designed to assist maturation of all, the "selves" are provided with 
guidance to grow, and to practice skills. Through hypnosis, the "selves" are 
interviewed to assist in the exercise.
Becky Frye (Nov., 1990, pp. 1013 -1022) describes a process by which 
Art is used as the framework of expression in therapy. It is especially helpful 
because those with MPD have In most cases been abused in some way, and 
may be afraid or unable to verbalize the experience or their feelings about it. 
Those people who were threatened when ordered not to tell about the abuse find 
that drawing their feelings and experiences Is a "safe" way to express without 
"telling" verbally. Through visual images, patients may see the process 
unfolding through a visual chronicle, and eventually be able to create a whole 
picture. Patients can see their terror transforming to strength and beauty.
Being symbolic, it is a safe tool for those with MPD to vent anger and 
aggression.
Frye identifies four stages In the process of therapy, for which the 
acronym D.A.R.E. was created. The first is the stage of denial in which the 
person disbelieves the knowledge of his/her condition, but yet very much needs 
to know. There Is resistance to change and a clinging to the familiar system 
(using altered states) to cope. In the second stage, there is an intellectual state 
of awareness, which persons have not yet internalized, but accept as a 
conscious knowing of the truth of their situation. In the resolution stage, roles 
change, and conflicting emotions exist. In the final stage of emergence, there is 
an internalization of their state, a reconnecting of internal psychic processes, 
control and insight.
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Thus far, we can see that the disorder Is debilitating, and requires serious 
and long-term efforts to regain control and order, or even an approximation of 
cooperation within the person, in order to command some structure. In many 
cases the proper diagnosis takes years to obtain. Kluft ("Multiple Personality 
Disorder". Review of Psychiatry, Vol. 10, p. 170) cites studies by Coons
(1984); Kluft (1987b, 1988a); Solomon and Solomon (1982); Putnam et al.
(1986); Ross et ai. (1989c) and Coons et al (1988) which showed that "a series 
of MPD patients averaged 6.8,7.1, and 7.0 years, respectively, between their 
entry into the mental health system and their receiving MPD diagnosis. They 
usually have had more than three prior psychiatric diagnosis". It may be 
assumed that many are never diagnosed at all, especially the males who may 
have found themselves involved with the legal and criminal systems before the 
opportunity to present for treatment would have arisen (Kluft, 1987, p. 370; 
Rivera, 1991, video). Children, especially if their parents are the abusers whose 
actions precipitate the disorder, will probably not be brought for treatment. This 
is unfortunate in that much less treatment time is necessary if the disorder is 
discovered in childhood (Kluft, 1987, p. 370). Hornstein and Putnam, Journaiof 
the Americarr Academy of Child and Adoiescent Psychiatry, 31:6, Nov., 1992, pp. 
1082 -1083) found trends for adolescents to be more symptomatic, and higher 
incidence of diagnosis in adolescents was significant (p = .001). It was 
suggested that perhaps the disorder may evolve with time, which suggests in 
turn that early diagnosis is probably beneficial.
Given that this time spent in debilitation may be the greater part of an 
individual's life spent in diminished capacity, and, given that educators are in the 
business of maximizing potential, awareness is necessary.
The literature is rife with links to abuse as a major causal factor of MPD. 
Wilbur {f\/lultiple Personality and Child Abuse: An Overview, pp. 3-4) describes
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six categories of abuse. Emotional neglect and physical neglect include 
behaviors which deny the child necessary survival and safety materials and 
processes. Sexual abuses include chronic exposure, rape, and fondling.
Trauma is maximized by conflicts created when the child is punished for 
displaying sexual behavior which had been encouraged during the abuse, in 
other situations. Physiologic abuses include such activities as sleep deprivation, 
or medicating unnecessarily (laxatives). Demeaning, denigration, ridicule and 
humiliation are ail actions of psychological abuse. Physical abuse encompasses 
injury with bruises, bone breaks, tissue tears and damage. In consultation with 
Faythe Banks, ritual abuse was cited as that involving harmful or frightening 
activities
surrounding "occultish" practices. Curtis and Fraser (5th Draft, F3-31 #5) cite 
the presence of "a significant stressor" as the primary stage in their description 
of the evolution of the disorder. Bernstein and Putnam (1986, p. 727) note a 
"strong linkage between the development of dissociative symptoms and 
traumatic experience". Studies have shown that abuse (in MPD patients) takes 
place before the age of eight, and that 97 of 100 show 3.2 types of abuse, the 
other three experiencing other forms of trauma such as war veterans may 
(Curtis, 1988, p. 85). Of the 185 individuals mentioned by Rivera (1991, p. 10), 
96% experienced sexual abuse; 97% experienced emotional abuse and 89% 
experienced physical abuse. Many were victims of a combination of abuses. 
Kluft (1987, p. 367) states that Multiple Personality Disorder is "a post-traumatic 
pathology". "Most multiples, as children, have been physically brutalized, 
psychologically assaulted, sexually violated, and affectively overwhelmed. A 
small number may have experienced one of these forms of desecration" (Wilbur, 
Multiple Personality and Child Abuse: An Overview, p. 3).
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In a study completed by Ross & Miller et al (March, 1991, pp. 97-101) 102 
individuals were involved in four centers (Winnipeg, Utah, California and 
Ottawa). The Dissociative Disorders Interview was used and persons were 
diagnosed as having MPD. It was found that 90.2% had been sexually abused, 
62.4% physically abused and 95.1% experienced one or both forms of abuse. 
Over 50% of these people encountered abuse before the age of 5, and endured 
the abuse for an average period of 10 years. In many cases numerous 
perpetrators were identified, and there was the likelihood of abuse by mother 
and father. Though abusers were more often male, there was a substantial 
number of female abusers. It was concluded that MPD is a response to a 
vulnerable childhood time.
The collective responses characterized as MPD are labeled through 
obsen/ation, investigation and comparative analysis. The associated 
environments and activities are seen to correlate. Declarations cannot be made 
absolutely; causation cannot be pronounced. How can we know what these 
characteristics mean? What kinds of knowing about students with MPD can be 
possible with respect to identification and helping in the education setting? How 
can we evaluate the thoughts of another? Why does this phenomena seem to 
present itself, and how is it that a person may find himself or herself involved in 
its presentation? The work of William James will be reviewed in the following 
chapter in order to examine ways of knowing one's own thoughts and those of 
another. Also, some discussion will take place regarding the limitations of the 
field of psychology regarding this knowing.
’ÇhflBterS
How Can Wavs of Thinking Be Known? • The Work of William Jame>
Understanding the way in which a person knows himself or herself, his or 
her own life, truths and others is important In any context, Whether we are 
trying to come to know about a person experiencing MPD, or any other person, 
what are the things we need to appreciate about the complexities involved In this 
process. What awareness do we need about how people know of their own 
lives, and just how much can others know about that? An investigation of 
William James will provide an appreciation of the complexity involved in 
knowing: knowing truth, knowing self and knowing others. Through James, it 
will become apparent that no declaration about that knowledge by anyone can 
possibly approach an absolute understanding. For purposes of this paper, and 
especially concerning persons with MPD, an understanding of such knowledge 
is limited indeed, and cannot be moreso. This is crucial to remember when we 
think that life decisions are made by, for and about these people, based on such 
supposed knowledge. James' writing is "weighty" at best, and the reader may 
find this is so. It is hoped, however, that within, the reader will find some 
explanation for such limitation of understanding involved in knowing,
Human thought is discussed in William James' The Principles of 
Psychology (1891) found In the collected works of James in Hutchins (1952). At 
the work's end, he expresses that the ways of human thought can be given no 
absolute account, rather can be postulated only; that ways in which we 
understand the world seem to be ways that are useful and necessary to our 
lives. Throughout the work, he reminds his audience that ways of knowing are
The spelling of "phantasy" or "fantasy" shall alter throughout this paper, and Is a 
reflection of the source authors' spelling.
* The use of "he" or "she" throughout the paper reflects the source author's use, and is not 
Intended to negate either gender.
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subjective. These things, he expiains, are those which make Psychoiogy a field 
of non-absoiutes (Chapter Vlli), and that any attempt tc discover phenomena of 
the mind are limited. We are obliged, however, to know something of it, so we 
must ask what the nature and extent of that knowing may be.
This section will discuss thirteen questions. What is psychoiogy, and how 
is it limited? Connections between physical and mental states will be examined, 
as well as what James refers to as causal efficacy. The unity of the thought 
process and how sensation is related is discussed by James. He also examines 
the Idea of the whole brain as opposed to distributed parts. The Stream of 
Thought, or how thought comes to be is important, and following from this, an 
attempt to determine how thought thinks of the self. The status and role of the 
soul, and an accounting of psychosis are postulated by James. There is a 
proposal concerning how it Is that we perceive reality, and the related idea of 
category. Finally, the chapter will deal with James' account of instinct and 
origins of our mental categories (judgment, imagination, etc.).
Psychology is defined as "the science of mental life, both of its 
phenomena and of their conditions" (p. 1). Psychology (mental acts) must take 
into account the experiences of the body both as antecedents to the mental acts 
and as resultants of mental acts. It must also account for those automatic and 
instinctual, yet purposeful acts (such as buttoning one's coat), and examine the 
mental acts in these contexts.
He sets about to explain how the activities of the brain functioning are 
related to the mental activities or mind activities, declaring the postulates of 
spiritualists and associationists. The spiritualists, he says, declare that there is 
a "soui" which is present before the experience and enables the experience to 
be thought, whereas associationists begin with the experience, and through 
processes of ever-increasing complexity, the experience impresses itself as a
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thought, impressing itseif upon our mind. The Ego arises out of these 
experiences. James argues that the memory works not absolutely, but 
conditionally, and so the task is to look for the conditions. He argues that the 
memory can be stimulated by an idea, but that it can be interrupted, (by fever, or 
drug, etc.) and so that one cannot apply absolutisms to thought. Conditions of 
the body affect memory and how we undergo memory.
He says, citing Ladd, that a "certain amount of brain physiology must be 
pre*supposed or included in psychology" (Ladd, 1887). Mental activities can 
stimulate physical activities, such as when memories of fear can stimulate heart 
rate increases. People differ from things, in that if one alters the conditions of 
things, one also alters the ends, but if one alters the paths of people, the ends 
may still be kept in view and remain fixed, intelligent performance is distinct 
from mechanical performance in that in humans there can be "pursuance of 
future ends and choice of means for their attainment" (James, 1891 in Hutchins, 
1952, p. 7).
Antecedent and resultant intellectual behavior is discussed In accounts of 
experiments on frogs (by today's standards, ethically questionable). Aold, 
poured upon the leg of a headless frog, was followed by the leg being wiped by 
the other leg of the frog (James, 1891 in Hutchins, 1951, p. 12). The frog, says 
James, responded to the antecedent (acid). Certain muscles (leg movements) 
were Just as stimulated by the neurological activities of the lower spine as in the 
higher cortex. A brainless frog set In a container of water seeks air, a resultant 
behavior, says James, used as a means to find an end. The acts of all centers 
of the brain involve the same muscles, the lower level of the spine obeying the 
present stimuli (acid, airiessness). Only the higher center obey absent stimuli, 
such as education or memory, etc. (pp. 12-13). Cerebral hemispheres are the 
seats of memory, and the higher the animal, the more cerebrum necessary. "In
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all ages, the man whoso determinations are swayed by the most distant ends 
has been held to posses the highest intelligence " (p. 15), He uses a tramp / 
saint analogy to illustrate this point, and to lead into a discussion of the "scope 
of vision" held to be more far-reaching in the more cerebrally developed.
Machines, he says, perform from "laws from behind" (Leibmann, p, 489 in 
James 1891 In Hutchins, 1952, p. 6) working correctly or Incorrectly, with no 
consciousness of error. People, on the other hand are conscious of error, 
operating from "laws from the front" ( the ends, the "purpose or Ideal from which 
the brain should act whether it does so or not) (p. 6). Acts therefore that are 
done for an end and illustrate a choice of means can be called "indubitable 
expressions of the mind" (p. 7).
He cautions against separating the lower nervous system too sharply from 
the higher, in separating the functions as being distinctively mechanical in the 
lower, and distinctly higher order in the higher cerebral areas. Meynert (1874, in 
Sachs, 1885, in James, 1891, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 47) explains that lower 
sensorial excitement spreads to arouse a higher idea center, and James argues 
that the organs of Intellect have "native tendencies" (p. 50) at birth (Instinct and 
emotions, modifiable by experience, this experience and resultant thought 
having the power to modify other ideas; to "educate themselves" (p. 48), He 
uses examples of experiments with birds and animals to show that those 
deprived of hemispheres do perform acts which are driven by purpose (p. 48), 
and shows that damage to higher systems may result in inability to perform lower 
level actions.
Sometimes, he says, the hemispheres are treated as the "Seat of memory 
and ideas" (in the psychic sense) and sometimes as a "complicated addition to 
his reflex machinery" (p. 84), He takes on the question of how the physical 
thought process is to be reconciled with the psychic thought process; of what
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the conscious thought process is in the “Automaton Theory" discussion (pp. 84 - 
95).
James argues the points of others to determine that the mind and the 
brain are more intimateiy connected and less absolute than is thought. Huxley 
(cited only as having been cited in 1869 by James in James, 1891 in Hutchins 
1952 p. 86) says that emotion is like a train whistle in that it is the result of 
machinery, and not a causal phenomenon; that mental conditions are symbolic 
only of organic activity. Clifford (cited as was Huxley, James 1891 in Hutchins, 
1952, p. 86) says that the brain is physical and mechanical, and that mental 
facts only parallel the physical. Hodgson (in James, 1891 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 
87) states that feelings are "correlates of nen/e movements" and are not the 
result of causal phenomenon.
James says that there are good reasons why theories like this exist; that 
the spinal cord argument can be "leveled" up or down (P. 88), that physical and 
mental events are separate and independent, in a way that is easy to explain. 
The consciousness, he says, is not scientific enough to explain, and that we 
can't form an image of it, and that if we become too metaphysical in our attempts 
to define mental process and its relation to the brain, It becomes difficult to 
explain the proofs. If we allow physical causalty, however, he says that 
metaphysical causalty must be allowed.
The “particulars of the distribution of consciousness point to its being 
efficacious" (p. 90). Consciousness, he says, comes because of its efficacy in 
man's struggle, and it does influence body history. Man chooses what to notice 
and name, and selects; each individual being unique and different, chooses 
what to select, and this is unlike “just" reflex. The instability of man allows 
adaptation of conduct, and man is capable of responding to an infinite number of 
stimuli as opposed to being able to respond to just a few determined responses.
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The brain Is physical, and It Is consciousness that "loads Its dice" (p. 92) or 
makes efficaciousness, allowing for more than survival, being a "fighter for ends" 
(p. 92). Our brains have parts which take up the duties of parts lost without 
being persuaded by those parts to do so. The conscious self corrects, It is 
therefore more than a system of symbols, more than a result of machinery or a 
parallel. It Is a process of "causal efficacy" (p. 93)
So, we may entertain the Idea that physiology is Involved In mental 
processes, and that there are characteristics separating higher order thought 
from lower. We may be justified in looking within the metaphysical to find 
causalty, and not be obliged to look absolutely outside of the realm.
How Is the mental state constructed? In the attempt to discern what the 
mental state is (James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, chapter VI), James discusses 
the "Mind - Stuff Theory" or the theory that states of consciousness are 
composites of smaller states.
There is seen to be a chasm between inner and outer worlds, and that 
there is some type of passage from the physical activities of the brain to the 
"corresponding facts of consclousness"...that the "nervous system...parallel 
phenomena of sensation and thought" (Tyndall, p. 420 in James, 1892 In 
Hutchins, 1952, p. 96). Spencer (Psychology, p. 195 In James, 1892 in 
Hutchins, 1952, p. 97) speaks of a "nascent conscious" wherein ganglion 
coordinating the stimuli form the raw material. Pick (1862, p. 29 in James, 1892 
in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 98 - 99) asserts that there are psychic units which 
correspond to the physical, and that, for example, pain units would be different 
than heat units. Spencer (§ 60, In James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 99 -100 
) uses the analogy of the changing of beats to tone to pitch saying that feelings 
integrate from the minute and individual to the compound. - an elementary
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consciousness ["primordial element" (p. 100)] which combines and recombines 
Itself in many ways. Physical processes, he says, fuse in the mental world.
James argues that there is consciousness needed to begin with, that it is 
not some product that comes up out of nothing — that there is "consciousness in 
the nebula" (p. 101). The brain is there first to receive, so that arguments about 
where reception takes place are just that — arguments. Increasing cause he 
says (In response to Spencer) will not necessarily mean that the effect is 
increased, and uses the example of the note increasing too much in loudness 
ceasing to become a note at all to illustrate his point. He argues that the 
physical things do not "fuse" in the mental world, rather that they integrate 
outside or below the threshold of the consciousness and then are perceived "as 
a whole" (p. 103) "simply and totally". Integration, he argues, must take place 
before the consciousness because otherwise the integrity of the consciousness 
would be broken. One cannot, he states, mix feelings to get new feelings, as 
one might mix materials (such as shades of red) and get new materials (new 
reds).
If there were units of consciousness corresponding to the pnysical, they 
would not compound without a medium or a vehicle, says James. They cannot 
"sum themselves together" (Montgomery, pp. 18 -19 & 24 - 25, in James, 1892 
in Hutchins, 1952, p. 104). Unity must "exist for something besides itself" 
(Royce, p.376, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 104). Private minds, says 
James (p. 105) do not "agglomerate into a higher compound mind". We know 
many different things together, and we know them as they are separate and as 
they are compound; we identify and name them. A higher state, therefore, is 
"not a lot of lower states; it is itself" (p. 106).
If we agree with James, we may assume that there is a wholeness of 
thought.
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How can thought experience in different ways? In addition to examining 
the connections between the physical and mental states of mind, and how 
sensations become thoughts, James discusses the various states of mind 
(pluralism of consciousness), asking whether states of unconscious are possible 
and If so, how can they exist. Leibnitz (cited here by name only, in James, 1892 
In Hutchins, 1952, p. 108) postulated that whole sensations were made of many 
"minimum" sensations of which we were only conscious of the whole and not 
conscious of the smaller. James argues that the whole is what it is, and that all 
is necessary to have all. There is no need, he says, to divide the 
consciousness, and says that it is a fallacy of division to assume that that which 
is true of a collection Is necessarily true of parts distributively. He argues 
various proposals:
Stewart (Elements, Chapter II, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 109) 
says that all consciousness is automatically unconscious and are results of 
unconscious deliberation, to which James refutes that they are conscious, but 
we have no memory of them. It is argued that links between associations are 
unconscious, but James says that they are either instantly forgotten or the brain 
track is adequate enough to handle the link without arousing It to awareness. To 
the postulates that unconscious thought presides over somnambulist thought or 
thought during epileptic seizure, he says that as in a hypnotic trance, it is 
forgotten, though conscious, or is victim of rapid and complete "oblivescence" (p. 
109). As for the mind unconsciously counting the vibrations when we hear 
music, James says, simply, that we don't. That we know more than we can say, 
that there is potential knowledge or "unrealized principles" in an unconscious 
state (p. 110), James dismisses, saying that we look at past things in a different 
way, having learned more as learning changes the way in which we look at 
things. Therefore, when we look at something past and suddenly see something
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new in it, it is due to the fact that we have learned something else which causes 
the review and new knowledge of the past thing. To the idea that instincts are 
unconscious, James says that they are actions of the nervous system 
"mechanically charged" by stimuli to the senses. Results of sense perception is 
said to be unconscious inference from data given to senses. James responds 
that It is a rapid reasoning, not like familiar reasoning, but not unconscious. It is 
argued that we may have a more intense sensation about something which we 
had at some unconscious level before, but James responds that this is not one 
thought becoming more intense, this is two thoughts or ideas about the same 
thing, or something not attended to before or named, has been attended to now 
and named. It was still in the realm of the conscious, and not unconscious.
He says that there is a felt need to reduce thought to some empirical 
explanation of the connection between the brain event and the mental 
counterpart, but that the thought is the thing, and it cannot be reduced. This is 
difficult to accept because there is a tendency to say that the thought process is 
composed of parts (aural, visual, etc.) and so composed is the world of objects 
of thoughts (that heard, that seen etc.). James says the "whole brain" (p. 116) 
must act together if thoughts occur, and that consciousness responds to the 
entire act of the brain.
To the theory that there is a cell or group of cells which is the keystone to 
the whole process (Multiple Monadism or Theory of Polyzoism) (pp. 116-119), 
James says that no such cell or group of cells is to be found. The whole brain is 
as much of a unit as a cell or group of cells, so there is no need to find one, 
moreover. To the theory that there is a soul cell ("pontifical cell" or "arch 
monad") where the "manifold brain process" combine effects, James says if 
there were a soul it would be separate and we would not need to explain It 
physiologically. The brain is unitary so we don't need to say how it combines.
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We cannot explain it, he says, so it is safe to say that the mind and the brain are 
parallel, and leave it at this until more is known (p. 119).
We can allow then, that the mind experiences things according to how it 
notices presently, and what it knows of the thing heretofore. It can therefore 
display various ways of knowing and various reactions to things, creating 
different states. How we know now, what we notice and focus upon, and how we 
process the object are involved.
How can psychologists determine things of the mind, and to what extent? 
We do not know exactly how the mind considers what the brain experiences, 
cannot reduce it to empirically observable facts, cannot formulate absolute laws 
about the conscious. James cautions that to the psychologist, the minds he 
deals with are not his own, but those belonging to others, and so are merely 
able to be seen as objects (much like Laing here). He must judge from what he 
finds in his own mind objectively, being not only outside of the other mind with 
which he is dealing, but outside of the objects observed by that other mind as 
well. He must study knowledge of "men about other things" (p. 120) as opposed 
to knowledge proper, and must analyze knowledge of "particular men" of 
particular places and things at particular times, and must trace reasons why this 
knowledge because one thing or another. He must report them without being 
able to say how he can in an objective way dealing with subjective facts 
(Robertson, p. 1 1n Ward, p. 153, In James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 120).
James examines three methods of investigation used in Psychology and 
discusses the fallibility of each. The use of introspective observation 
distinguishes mental states from objects where persons must look into their own 
minds to discover what Is there. Though fundamental to psychology, there are 
many obstacles with this method, not the least of which is nomenclature 
regarding certain states of consciousness. Some of the language Is clumsy,
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subjective, vague, and there are a lack of terms for certain states. Moreover, the 
introspective observation is subjective and as such cannot be open for public 
check. Being Inaccessible to direct knowledge, it is Incompetent. Some claim 
(Uberweg, Logic, § 40 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 122) that it needs no 
explanation or defense because it "exists only in" the person, and others 
(Bretano, Psychologie, §§ 1,2, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 123) say 
that it cannot, by its nature be denied or doubted, and so it is superior to 
physical science. Comte argues (Cours de philosophie positive, pp. 34 -38 in 
James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 123) that we cannot have knowledge of our 
mental states because they are in conflict with a state of observation from the 
outside or from ourselves in that we cannot divide ourselves in two, with one part 
doing the observing and one part doing the experiencing. Mili counters (1882, p. 
64 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 124) that we can however remember 
experiences, and then directly observe them for information as to their nature. 
James agrees that this is practical but cautions that memory Is fallible, that we 
observe then in a state that is removed from the experience Itself, and therefore 
alter the experience, and finally, that naming the experience detracts from its 
"force" (p. 124), but this is the only way open to us. Even if all of this is so, we 
are not in serious doubt about our states (Mohr, 1882, p. 47. in James, 1892 in 
Hutchins, 1952, p 124). We know we are angry and we don't doubt it, for 
example. James warns that there is error and doubt about "order...quantity... 
degree ...motive... ingredients ...longevity... complexity or simplicity of " our 
feelings and therefore "introspection is difficult and fallible" (p. 125), but that is 
simply true of all observation of any kind. He says that the best we can do is be 
aware of this, and keep testing later views and knowledge against the original 
observation, test, revise and compare.
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The experimental method, he says, studies "elements of life" (p. 126) 
and attempts to reduce them to quantitative states by connecting conscious 
states to the physiological process; by analyzing space perception to its 
"sensational elements" (p. 126); measuring duration of processes; creating from 
accurate memory, how states influence each other; determining the numbers of 
facts discerned simultaneously; and trying to compose elementary laws of 
obliviency and retention. James passes argument against these goals, stating 
that not enough has been done in the field with them as yet to comment, but that 
"each year" would produce new Information.
The comparative method, he says, supplements the other two, and 
involves comparing one mental state to another (animals with children, for 
instance) (p. 127). Sources of error in this method include the misleading 
influence of speech. It is a subjective process, to begin with; in addition, a lack 
of words to describe such states may lead to overlooking a phenomena simply 
because words do not exist to amply define same. In assuming ideas are 
separate and subjective entities, the mental stream flow, (further discussed 
later) relatedness, may be overlooked. The "psychologist's fallacy" may be in 
effect (p. 128) In the "confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact 
about which he is making his report" James says he must see the thought of an 
object as another object seen through his understanding of it. He also warns 
that others and their experience must not be treated as if they know themselves 
as psychologists do (p. 129).
The psychologist can test whether something Is thought and known or just 
thought only by his testing It against what he thinks and knows (p. 141 ). This is 
all we can do with the finite brain.
In further discussion of the nature of thought, James talks about the 
"Stream of Thought" (pp. 146 • 187) calling it the study of the mind from within.
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and saying that the only postulate that can be made of it is that some sort of 
"thought goes on” (p. 146), There tend to be characteristics of thought.
Every thought tends to be part of apersonal consciousness, There is a 
personal self, and thoughts are associated with it; this personal self is organized 
with habits, memory and a sense of identity,
in each personal consciousness, thought is always changing, even the 
second and third thoughts about the same thing, though they are of the same 
thing, are different thoughts The second and third and following experience of 
the same thing are changed experiences. Hodgson {The Philosophy of 
Reflection, pp. 248,290, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p, 149) calls this 
change the "sequence of différents".
In each individual conscious personal thought is "sensibly continuous" (p. 
146). Thoughts in the conscious are joined by memory, and even gaps such as 
sleep dû not break the continuity as the consciousness has been part of the 
whole self and continues. Changes in consciousness are more transitional than 
abrupt, says James, (he uses the analogy of the joints in a bamboo stick to 
illustrate continuity versus breakage),. He says that the important thing about 
the train of thought is its conclusion and that "transitive" parts (p. 158) lead from 
one conclusion to another; that "consciousnesses melt into each other" (p. 161).
He says that thought always appears to deal with objects that are 
independent of itself (p. 179) and that however complex the object, the thought 
is an undivided state of consciousness.
Thought has the capacity to select and choose, to reject or repress from 
endless possibilities. It has the capacity of will In this selection and of naming 
the items it selects.
The stream of Thought has the characteristics of having halting places, of 
coming to final or provisional substantive conclusions, and of relatedness.
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Can Thought know Self, in what manner, and to what extent? Thought is 
conscious of a self, and James discusses what the nature of the self is (pp. 168 - 
259), from a broad view to small subtleties the "sum total of all that he can call 
his" (p. 188). He talks about the constituents of self, the feelings and emotions 
they arouse and the actions prompted. The Empirical Self, referred to as "Me", 
he says, is composed of the material self, the social Self, the spiritual Self and 
the pure Ego. The material Self is composed of the innermost body plus 
possessions (which can include preferences and Interests). The social Self 
consists of the recognition one perceives one gets from one's mates, and, 
depending upon the nature of the mates, there can be several "Selves" in this 
category (i.e. the sailor, the professional, the neighbor, etc.). This "club opinion" 
(Locke, Essaye. Human Understanding, Chapter XXVIII, § 12, in James, 1892 
in Hutchins, 1952, p. 190) is, James says, an important force in that lack of any 
notice at all would constitute annihilation. The spiritual Self may be thought of 
as abstract in that it is divided into faculties (will, sensibility, conscience, etc.) or 
concrete (stream of personal consciousness); both of these being reflective and 
inward. It is more than empiricai, more than sensible and transcendent, and 
thinks of its own existence along with the rest of "stuff", judging, willing and 
thinking. James calis this “sciousness" the "Thinker" (p. 196), but is unable to 
define just what the nature of the Self is any further than this. He discusses the 
pure Ego after talking about the feelings and actions aroused and prompted by 
the Selves.
He says that feelings aroused by the Selves are those of self- 
complacency (for example, pride) and self-dissatisfaction (shame, for example), 
and that these feelings are physionomically expressed (with a smile, for 
instance). These feelings prompt actions of self-seeking and self-preservation. 
Self-seeking is futuristic in a sense, in that there is an end in involved, and
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includes those actions for each Self: for the physical Self they may involve 
hunting or making of tools; for the social Self, they include actions that please 
others, or attract notice from others; in the spiritual Self, they involve psychic 
progress that may be of a moral, spiritual or intellectual nature. The seeking 
actions are aligned with growth, invention, creativity, while the preservation 
activities are aligned with defense and protection.
The different Selves may be in conflict with one another, says James. 
Everything that is added to the self is a burden as well as a pride. Nothing can 
affect the selves unless it touches a potential or actual self; that Is If something 
is not part of self, it can have no power over self. The Selves form a hierarchy 
subordinating the lower selves to the higher, depending upon the priority or 
situation. All of the Selves can be immediate (active) or potential (remote), and 
all progress from the lower to the higher (ideal). All progress is a substitute of 
the higher for the lower, and all is for some Self. He discusses the impossibility 
of absolute social unselfishness in that even actions of saintliness involve a 
notion of a reward for the higher spiritual self.
In his discussion of self-love, he addresses the question of who the Self is 
that is the loved. When self-seeking is developed, he says, selfishness is a 
characteristic, the kind of which varies with the Self that is sought, and the 
nature of which is the "direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of 
individual existence" (p. 265).
With regard to bodily Self-love, Me and Self, says James, are all things 
objective that "excite feeling", that have the power to produce a stream of 
consciousness, an excitement (p. 206); is a collection of "objective facts" (p.
207) about which the Self Is excited. The Self may be the condition of the love 
as well as the object of it, as the present Thought in the Stream of 
Consciousness apprehends all other Thoughts and makes them a memory of
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itself, then gives up itself to the next present Thought, so may the love be 
actually the nature of the Thought as Is presently felt, and therefore, the Self as 
the Thinker is the condition of his love as well as the object of it (pp. 206 - 207).
Social Self-love is the interest in the opinion and images “other men have 
framed of me" (p. 207), but is only the subjective interpretation of other men's 
thought. Shame, says James, for instance, is just my perception of your image 
of me that has changed. The body is the vehicle of this thought. The love of the 
Spiritual Self involves love, hates, sensibilities, and these too, says James are 
not the real self, but the changing sets of consciousnesses (p. 208).
In coming to a decision about who the Self is that is loved in Self-love, 
then, James says that perhaps Self-love is not a love of conscious “identity" (p.
208), but a love for those things associated and are really objects of the mind. 
Lotze {Med. Psych., pp. 498 - 501, in Microcosmos, Chapter V, §§ 3,4, in 
James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 208) calls these things "objects to the subject" 
(Thinker). Altruistic passions, he says, are as primary as other love. Egoistic 
(utilitarian) and sympathetic interests can both arouse passions which occur at 
the same psychologic level. Our egoistic interests form a "larger mass", so that 
love of self objects (utilitarian) are more, but are no more primary than 
sympathetic interests.
Horwicz {Psychologlsche Analysen auf Physiologischer Grundlage, Pt. II, 
2d half, § II, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 209 • 210) proposes that the 
feeling and the thinking self may be the same thing. Those things that are of us 
(our warmth in a chair, for instance, or our own fluids, for example) may not be 
disgusting to us, not because they are ours but because we "know them better " 
and realize them more intrinsically. We live "closer to them".
In judging ourselves and others, James says that our knowledge of self is 
applied to a standard by which the Self judges other men, and then measures
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himself. Bain ("Emotions on Self", in James, 1892 In Hutchins, 1952, p. 212) in 
explaining how we judge, discusses how we categorize our thoughts of others 
according to values, etc,, and says that our thought of self accompanies our 
thought of another. He says this cannot happen to an isolated person. We 
"decide between the self and other men... under the bias of our own desires".
James then returns to a lengthy discussion of the nature of the pure Ego. 
What Is the Self that Is "Self", that which some call the soul....what part of us Is 
the "seat"? We have, James says, a sense of personal identity in that the 
thoughts we have belong to one thinker and not another, and we have a sense 
of personal sameness which we treat as a subjective feeling, or an objective 
truth. He speaks of thought with respect to this identity; essential to thought Is 
the "bringing things together into the object of a single judgment" (p.213) or the 
thinking things together. This thinking part of the thinking things together is 
called "subjective synthesis" and Is as opposed to "objective synthesis" which Is 
the union of things as the object of consciousness (p. 214). Things, In other 
words, united In thought are related to objective synthesis and the unity of 
thoughts involved are related to subjective synthesis. He says that in the same 
way we have perceptions of sameness about any other phenomena, we have 
perceptions of sameness about our personal identity. "It Is a conclusion 
grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the 
continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared" (p, 215). With respect 
to the Self, James says that there are united thoughts of Self In that all of our 
Selves have continuity and continuously grow. They're not the same selves, but 
a continuous line of related selves with intimacy ["a feeling of warmth" (p. 214)] 
assimilated to the thoughts of the present self. Where this sense of unity is no 
longer felt, then the sense of continuity leaves us, as in the time gap interruption 
of our childhood selves separated from our adult selves.... these selves, he
40
says sometimes feel like another person. The continuity is interrupted. Another 
way in which interruption in self occurs is through dimly recollected experiences, 
or where feelings have "evaporated" (p. 216), and are therefore different from 
those now, and therefore can have no judgment cast upon them. Their 
resemblance is therefore missing, or interrupted.
The personal identity which we feel is then the resemblance among 
continuous feelings and ail things associated with them over time. The vehicle 
of the judgment of that identity is the section of consciousness which is the 
"pulse of thought", the "owner" (p. 217); the part that makes the "self's 
constituents stick together" (p. 217). Because of the existence of these thoughts 
about ourselves, says James, there is knowledge about ourselves, but because 
of the knowledge of these thoughts about ourselves there is our existence; each 
is dependent in a way upon the other. There must be a something else beyond 
the thoughts and the unity of the thoughts .... something responsible for the 
coming together of these thoughts. The unity is only and ideal until the owner 
provides a center to hold the constituents together. Things do not fuse without a 
medium, and the "something else", the self, is what does the "gumming" The 
medium, the Unity of Consciousness, says James is the "judging thought" or the 
"identifying section" of the stream of consciousness (p, 218).
Like the Thoughts (present apprehending all past) in the Stream of 
Consciousness, something owns the thought. It may be the soul or the Ego. 
There cannot be one owner changing from time to time, but there are a 
succession of owners, (like the succession of thoughts in the Stream), passing 
ownership on from one to the next as there are changes, and so the Self 
becomes a "collective self" (p. 218). Each new "owner collects and knows all 
the previous owners, standing representative of them, adopting all others. The 
Thought appropriates all other thoughts and objects of those thoughts. The
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Thought Is the agent and is the vehicle of choice and the vehicle of cognition; 
cannot appropriate Itself, but it can appropriate all others to itself and the 
present self can only really be known after past and appropriated.
He discusses three types of theories related to The Pure Self or The Inner 
Principle of Personal Unity (pp. 220 • 240); the Theories of the Soul; the 
Assoclationist Theories and the Transcendentallst Theories.
What is the role of the soul, and is it necessary to explain thought? The 
postulation of a theory of soul, he says, was necessary because, objectively, 
something was needed to explain the characteristics of the self In terms of 
simplicity, substantiality and metaphysics; subjectively, because we have an 
idea of ourselves as more than a brain, so we must be. The principle of 
individuality is substantial. Psychic phenomena are activities, and so they must 
have a concrete agent; therefore, this concrete agent must be the soul. The soul 
Is not, however, just of brain and matter, because it must be of thought as well 
as of brain and matter; unlike brain and matter it Is spontaneous and simple, and 
can turn "against [the] corporeal" (p. 221). It Is thus required to be immaterial 
and simple as well as substantial, and therefore must be the soul. We grasp 
ourselves, or have an Idea of ourselves, which is something that no material 
agency could do. James says, if we were a brain, we would grasp ourselves as 
a brain; if the brain could grasp itself, it would grasp Itself as a brain. We grasp 
ourselves as more than a brain; however, and therefore, we need the idea of a 
soul as our "self" (p. 221), with the characteristics of being immortal, 
incorruptible, individual and responsible.
James disputes the need for discussion of a soul, however, and says that 
we do not need It to explain Thought as we have explained it; as a "changing" 
thing, appropriating other past thoughts. It can, he allows, be something 
"behind" (p. 222) the Thought, but there Is no reason why we cannot have just
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the phenomena and nothing more. We and psychologists need only to iook at 
the Thought - at the phenomena - and nothing more. The idea of the soul does 
not add to the purposes of psychology, and is not necessary to it. When the 
brain acts, a thought occurs, and we need not be metaphysical about this. He 
allows that even if the concept of soul is demanded, then it must borrow the form 
of the stream of consciousness and duplicate it, as this is the way we act, and if 
the soul is us, then this is the way the soul must act. Therefore, it wouid be a 
copy of the stream. Furthermore, we do not need to know the essence of the 
mind for purposes of psychology. He quotes Elements of Intellectual Philosophy 
to explain that by the actions of the mind we know the mind exists. By the mind 
we are cognizant of the actions of the mind. We do not have knowledge of the 
"essence of which they are predicated" (Wayland, Elements of Intellectual 
Philosophy, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 224). He argues the soul upon 
the merits of its characteristics saying that if the soul were immortal, it would not 
be a desirable state without the stream of consciousness, as we could not 
recognize its immortaiity; neither could the soul be held responsible without the 
stream, as it would not recall for what it was responsible. He also argues the 
idea that the soul is a closed unity, saying that even if there is unity in 
consciousness, separate selves are created (such as the child separate from the 
adult self), and that we can have a sort of unity in a way that is individual and 
connected without doing it metaphysically. Therefore, he says, successive 
thoughts are the only verifiable thing about the soul, and the only thing with 
which psychology needs to be concerned or can be concerned. Psychology 
cannot do any more than empirically "ascertain" (p. 225) the correlation of 
successive thoughts with the brain process. Psychology, he says, does not 
need the metaphysical process.
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He explains and argues the Assoclationist Theories. The Assoclationist 
theory is a psychological theory (Flew, 1979, p. 29) indicating that association Is 
the fundamental principle of mental life.
Hume responded to the notion that the Self is Unity abstract and absolute, 
by saying that there is first of all no Impression of the self that Is constant and 
Invariable, and furthermore, we are not even always conscious of the Self (as In 
sleep). We do not have a simple and constant view of ourselves, but just a 
collection of perceptions, and because of this, the Self is Diversity, and not 
Unity. James says to this that Diversity Is also connected In the Stream of 
Thought. Herbart (not cited by work or year, merely by name) says that a 
conflict of ideas can fuse into a manner of representing itself "which can be 
called an T (James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 228). New feelings, says 
James, can differ from the old but are "cognizant and approprlatlve" of the old 
(James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 228), which Is to say that diversity. In the 
appropriation also becomes a part of the unity of the self.
Thompson (1684, p. 114, In James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 228) 
proposes that the Ego is an unknown substance whose attributes are states of 
consciousness. It eludes cognition but is postulated by cognition, but James 
argues that this is the same as Thought.
Taine (1876, In James, 1892 In Hutchins, 1952, p. 229) proposed that 
what we call our "I" Is a web of conscious Internal events "abstracted and 
Isolated by mental fiction", but James argues that character does not abstract 
itself.
James Mill {Analysis, p. 331 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 229) 
submitted that the self is a "train of ideas continuously connected first to last" 
and declared by memory, saying that memory and self are different modes of the 
same thing, and that psychologists can refer one to the other. I can remember
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something that I did, sense it was my own and know it was Myself who had the 
series of sensations, but i cannot know anything of myseif. The bond among the 
series of sensations is my Ego (later called "something in common" ) {Analysis, 
Vol. II, p. 175, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 130). James argues that the 
tie or the link is not a real tie, but just the remembering Thought appropriating 
the old thought, and that resemblance, continuity and appropriation is the tie 
between them; he reminds us that the Thought can also disown as well as 
appropriate the old thought.
He exposes, in his exploration of Self, the Transcendentallst theories to 
discussion (pp. 232 - 240). They postulate, he says, that material is given by the 
lower faculties to the Understanding (Kant, 1787, § 13 in James, 1892 in 
Hutchins, 1952, p. 232) and then connected. There is a known that "I" think it, or 
at least, this is capable of being realized, and this awareness is implied in all 
experience. Therefore, one cannot have a consciousness of anything without a 
consciousness of Self. James points out here that Kant only says that we are, 
not what we are or what we are about. He says also that the Pure Ego of 
(Kant's) Apperception is only the subject corresponding to the object, and that 
without the object we cannot know the subject. The subject can only be known 
in the sense that it knows the object, and psychology cannot deduct from this.
He agrees with Kant that Reality is outside the mind, but he finds difficulty in the 
way Kant brings the multiplicity inside the mind, and would rather the multiplicity 
be left outside, and the mind remain simple. Bringing the multiplicity inside, he 
says, leaves the objects empty, and does not explain the mind. The outside 
multiplicity can be known by the present passing "Thought". The "Thought" is 
the principle by which the Many is simultaneously known (p, 233). He says that 
if we are absolute or sollpsistic, then we destroy psychology as a distinct 
science. Our thoughts, he says, are finite.
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We do not need a metaphysical explanation of great complexity about the 
"Me" or the Self. The "Thought" is the only thinker that objects require, and one 
can use "Me" or "I" for both the empirical person and the judging "Thought", 
whose identity is loosely constructed of memories with facts and thoughts 
appropriated.
How do these ideas account for psychosis? Some comments are made 
regarding what James calls the "Mutations of Self" (pp. 240 - 258), and attempts 
are made to explain them. He says that alterations of the memory are 
manifested in several ways. There are, in the changing "Me", losses or false 
recollections; as well, memory losses can be normal occurrences. Abnormal 
alterations, he says, are "alterations in the present self" (p. 241), and present 
themselves in the form of insane delusions, alternating selves, and mediumships 
or possessions. Insane delusions occur, James says, when there are new 
sensations and a loss of the old personage. He uses the metaphor of a 
caterpillar, having metamorphosed, being not the same as it was, and having 
now the sensations of a butterfly, and none left of a caterpillar at all, though it is 
in some sense the same being it was, no longer, in another sense. Is, and is 
without the sense of what It was before (Taine, 1878, p. 462, In James, 1892 in 
Hutchins, 1952, p. 242). He says that alternating selves are a result of 
inconsistencies of a person with himself and are a result of changes in the 
memories of a person. Mediumships and possession, he says, are special types 
of alternating personalities, and are taking place within the person, as opposed 
to true possession from another source, as the utterances by the person in the 
trance are only as complete as the person's abilities will allow. He says the 
trances behave as would hypnotic trance, and the behavior appears as Is 
expected by situations.
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He concludes from this that, as Janet says {Revue Scientifique, 1888, p.
84, In James, 1892 In Hutchins, 1952, p. 249) there "exist precise, constant and 
necessary relations between the bodily and the mental state, such that It Is 
Impossible to modify the one without modifying the other In parallel fashion". We 
must, James says, when these mutant states occur, be capable of abandoning 
association paths for new ones, and thereby "successively changing all modes 
of action" (p. 258). It could, as well, be that organized systems of paths are 
thrown out of gear with others, producing simultaneously existing 
consciousnesses.
Psychosis may be accounted for by the Stream of Thought proposal if we 
allow that metamorphic conditions of the stream, changing or parallel paths of 
consciousness may take place.
How do we perceive reality, and what is reality? There are two ways In 
which we investigate psychic states; by analyzing he constituents, the 
composition of the state and Its nature, and by understanding its history, the 
conditions under which it exists, its genesis and how it links to facts. Three 
categories relate to reality: that of belief and disbelief, of the same category; 
the opposite category of doubt and inquiry, and the category of unreality. James 
says that the state of belief is characteristic of Itself and that is how we know we 
have It. If one disbelieves, one must hold up something for belief and then reject 
it, therefore bringing disbelief into the same category as belief. Doubting and 
Inquiring, however, he says are opposite to belief, and concern conflicts in 
reality (pp. 659 - 660). Unreality Is unlike either the first or the second category.
He cites John Mill's discussion about belief (James Mill, Analysis i, pp. 
412 • 413, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p 637). Mills identifies belief as 
that which is the difference between memory and imagination. He tells us that 
Bretano (Marty, 1884, In James, 1892 In Hutchins, 1952, p. 266) sees belief as
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more than thought in that belief is thought plus acceptance or denial. James 
calls Bretano's judgment about thought, "belief, and states the four elements of 
belief as a subject, a predicate and their relationship plus a psychic attitude. 
Belief occurs under certain conditions wherein it is not contradicted, in that its 
perceptions are related to the world, its propositions are similar to other 
propositions and don't clasfi with other beliefs. All of this depends upon the 
capacity for diversity of ways to thinks about things and our human ability to 
choose or reject objects.
We have, James says, two primary worlds: the world of Reality and the 
world of illusion. Related to these worlds are a number of "sub-universes" (p. 
641) which are categories into which are placed illusions, errors individual and 
collective and absolute; reality which is absolute, abstract, relative, ideal; the 
supernatural, and so on. These categories for us are (p. 642) a sense of things 
and forces; scienoe; ideal relations; idols of the tribe; supernatural; opinion 
and madness. "Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or 
another of this or of some similar list" (p. 642). We compare objects until the 
object compared finds those with which It is not in conflict, and we categorize the 
compared object here. Our propositions concerning the different worlds (into 
which we categorize) "are made from differing points of view" (p. 642) and each 
of these worlds has reality while attention is paid to It.
Concerning these categories, James says that each thinker has habits of 
thought and often selects and attends to the same world rather than the others 
to be the ultimate reality. How do we determine reality? Things of sense usually 
have a stronger reality than those of concept, but they are no less than equal to 
those other things (for example, the Christian reality of faith is a less real reality 
than things of sense, even though it may be strong). To have practical reality or 
"reality for ourselves" (p. 643) an object must appear, must appear Interesting
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and must appear important. To have relative reality the object must be real in 
relation to our emotional and active life. If it is In conflict then it will be 
disbelieved and will be unreal. Hume calls this (Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, sec. V, pt. 2, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 644) having 
the idea in a "lively and active manner"
Adding reality to an object, says James, does not add to the object itself. 
We are always outside of the object giving it the attribute of existence (Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason translated by Max Müller, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 
1952, p. 644). The original source of reality is us who give reality and give a 
higher degree of reality at will. Realities are threaded together making a 
continuity of realities forming the corpus of our living reality. We feel our own 
reality and attach reality to those things of our needs, and thread those other 
things related to that until all realities are anchored in the Ego (p. 645).
For some however, James says, there is nothing awakened, and no 
reality can be felt. This relates to the "dead and empty" world (Griesenger, 
Mental Diseases, §§ 50,98, in James, 1892 In Hutchins, 1952, p. 646) of 
insanity and depression.
Things are connected to the Ego and felt as real. What are the stirrings, 
the connections we give to other things to make them real? Any relations to our 
mind Itself makes an object real, James says (p. 646). Children and those with 
undeveloped minds have chaotic and sense minds, but as items become more 
permanently fixed and categorized, discrepancies and contradictions are felt 
between their realities, and they have characteristics which make them 
"stirrings" They have the power to possess consciousness, vividness and the 
ability to excite. They have the capacity to arouse active impulses and 
emotional interest a(such as love and desire), and they have congruency with 
our favorite forms of contemplation (p. 647).
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With these characteristics in mind, we see that sensations are usually 
more lively, and are usually judged more real. However, there are exceptions. If 
a concept is connected with a sensation that is more real than the first 
sensation, then it will be judged more real than the first sensation, though it is 
conceptual and not sensory in nature, The more interest and excitement 
something has, the more real it is deemed to be. Conception then, though it may 
remain conceptual, must, to be accepted as real, terminate in the sensible world. 
Objects must pass the sense test, or be disbelieved. Connections must be 
sensible, vivid and important to be judged real. Associations with reality, he 
says, make fancies more real (he gives the example of children and dolls). He 
addresses the importance of language as it relates to those discussion In that 
words serve a sensible purpose, and is essential to thought in that it stands for 
an idea and makes it therefore sensibly real (pp. 649 - 650). He says that 
selected sensations of appeal or woe, pleasure and pain are very belief 
compelling.
With respect to the influence of emotion and active impulse on belief, 
James says that we are able to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally 
exciting idea. We are also able to believe because a thing is conceived with 
passion and that we believe an action will occur. This is often related to 
delusion and insanity (he gives the example of burning witches, Jbjects that 
are arousing and exciting, are tested by the senses, and reach the self, and are 
believed to be real.
We take beliefs and realities and structure them into systems of belief. 
Systems which are conceptual in nature (belief in objects of theory) are able to 
exist but must include objects of reality and the attempt to explain them. Those 
conceptual systems which most appeal to our aesthetic, emotional and active 
needs are those which are most real. We select the realities in the same way as
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we priorize the sensations into hierarchical systems of paramount reality.
Those conceptual systems most accepted are those most rich In content and 
most organized and simple (Royce, 1885, pp. 317 - 357, in James, 1892 in 
Hutchins, 1952, p. 658).
He briefly discussed belief and will, saying that they are two names for the 
same phenomenon. We can believe, or we can believe by will, and the latter 
takes more time than the former, often involving acting as if a thing were real; 
because it then becomes connected with our life, it then becomes real.
Reality involves belief, which involves our capacity to choose and reject 
and test. It is structured according to relatedness and similarity into categories.
Where do our mental categories originate? What are instincts? James 
focuses upon psychogenesis in a discussion of how and how much the outside 
world can effect the way we react without prior experience; he questions how 
much of our thinking is inherited human or race event, the nature of our 
instinctive reactions, and whether there are features of our organic mental 
structure which occurred accidentally. To proceed, he distinguishes between 
the mind and the objects outside of it, saying that that which we experience is 
not the same as the objects outside the mind; that which we experience is a 
duplication of the objects (p. 852), and therefore there is some sort of harmony 
between the nature of the mind and the nature of the things outside it. He 
indicates that the empiricists postulate that the awakenings" in the mind occur 
from the outside; the a priorists determine that some of the "awakening" is 
internal, and that no amount of experience can alter this.
A characteristic of experience, says James, is that it is supposed to 
impress us. We experience things in a certain order and sequence, and this 
occurs as an habitual thing, thus enabling us to predict or divine the future from 
the present. He turns to the work of Spencer (Principles of Psychology, § 207,
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in James, 1892 In Hutchins, 1952, pp. 853 • 854) to explain that the empiricists 
say that experience should be the "sole fashioner of the mind" (p, 853), and that 
following from this, the experience of ancestors fashion the minds of those 
present as well. Experiences which have occurred for "numberless generations" 
(p. 853) register and cause "automatic physical reactions" (p. 853). As these 
experiences are multiplied, they gain strength, and as a succession of 
generations can have an Infinite number of experiences, tendencies are 
induced, and this is the genesis of instinct. This accounts for hereditary 
development of the Instinct. Those things "constantly and "infinitely repeated"
(p. 854) become automatic elements of thought or forms of Intuition.
He says that all knowledge is not from without. Experience teaches us 
something of order in which we perceive experience, which Is not the same as 
the objects nor the same as the order In which these objects occur In reality, He 
says that some knowledge can come from hereditary processes, that is the ways 
people react being conditioned from numberless similar experiences throughout 
generations. However, some knowledge and ways of thought are those which 
he names "back door". There may be Incidence of experience causing 
accidental changes in molecular structure, or unintended effects on brain tissue. 
Higher Intellect perhaps was such an Incident. Therefore, the two modes of 
origin of brain structure can be direct or indirect and accidental (Spencer, 
Principles of Psychology, § 207, In James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 857 - 
858). James calls these modes "front door" and "backdoor knowledge".
He explores the genesis of elementary mental categories, asking what are 
the natural origins of ways of knowing things (sensation, emotion, time, space, 
difference, causalty, judgment, etc.) ?
If, says James, we are long enough exposed to experiences, familiar 
ways of cognition and consciousnesses may evolve into new ways of becoming
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familiar, but exposure is not enough by Itself to being about a knowledge of 
them, Perhaps, he says, we came upon them by luck. Our ways of 
consciousness do not resemble objects, but the reacting brain determines the 
nature of objects, because that is the only way we have to experience and know 
them, Judgment comes about when the experience of one thing leads to an 
expectation of another thing. It Is a secondary form of knowing after the original 
Impression, in which the idea of one term engenders another more detailed Idea 
once more attention Is given it.
Regarding imagination, James says that It Is a subjective response to 
sensation, and is as much a single fact as a "sharp picture" (p. 483).
From where came our ability to "know" natural sciences and pure 
sciences? What ways of knowing enabled us to know things in these ways? 
James says that we cannot view things in total....cannot think the plenum (p.
862) but must take parts of things and generalize, thereby forming hypothetical 
laws and data. Thinking in this way Is not an immediate result of experience but 
it can be applied to reality, and can "correspond to" (p. 864) outer relations. 
Moreover, experience used to show scientific truths are more aggressively 
sought than those simpler truths derived in a more passive way, and scientific 
truths are derived In a more artificial way. The order of such truth is incongruent 
with the order of passively received experience. The ideal and inward relations 
among our thoughts and outer objects are in no way reproductions of the order 
of outer experience. They are received and ordered In a different way by us In 
our way of knowing them in the scientific way, but the order into which we place 
them does not conflict with the order In which objects occur outside or in reality. 
Therefore, experience lends itself to a translation into scientific forms that are 
not necessarily like the ways they are experienced. We have the capacity to re­
order and categorize.
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Pure sciences reflect even less than do natural sciences upon the real 
order. The "relations of resemblance and difference ... have nothing to do with 
the time and space order In which we may experience the latter" (p. 867). He 
uses the metaphor of the colors black and white to Illustrate his point in saying 
that the outer frequency of shades between black and white experienced Is 
explained by an Inward structure, and that the things we do to reorder these 
structures occur for subjective reasons, The "back stairs" way of knowing Is the 
only thing which would account for the way we structure our experiences of black 
and white and shades thereof, as In no way can shades between black and 
white ever have consistently been experienced in the order In which we place 
them. The mind notices Itself experiencing differences and similarities between 
things, and calls this comparison. These differences and similarities exist for the 
person and what he means by them.
How does the capacity for comparison occur? He comments further upon 
how differences, similarities and comparison take place. The operations of 
knowing and comparing over time give results of categorization. The Axiom of 
Constant Results stated by James; "the same operated In the same way gives 
the same" (p, 869) Comparisons can be compared, giving up comparisons of a 
higher order, and in this way the mind Is able to create series and sets of 
comparison placed In a structure. In this way we are allowed to classify, and 
James says if nature lets us do It, it must be natural; we need to see the world 
this way.
Regarding logic, James says that we apprehend and predict from it. We 
may take things that are, ["relationships of 'Is'" (p. 872)] to relations of 
substituted possibilities. This process of systematic classification and 
substituting Is an Incidental result of our capacity to discern differences and 
likenesses and compare. It Is a mental arena not directly related to experience,
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and is subjective. It is useful and necessary to our life, and we are allowed to 
say that we cannot give an account of it; we can only postulate.
Mathematical relations and our ways of knowing them are also 
independent, he says, of our experiences of the world, involve choice, and 
subjective meaning (p. 875). We can know a sand heap as a number of different 
things mathematically; as many pebbles of sand, or as one pile, as one thing or 
as twenty thousand things. We can interrupt our counting, and it doesn't matter, 
as we can carry right on with it. Experience does not present itself in this same 
way. We are, he says, "the masters of our meanings..." (p. 876) making more 
meaning than we find, and making relations between things.
The same is true of our ways of knowing aesthetic and moral principles. 
We judge according to the ways things are for us or for someone eise, and after 
a while see, by comparison, etc., that what is right for me in certain ways may 
also be right for someone else, and vice versa.
With regard to instinct then, we may accept that similar, hereditary things 
consistently and infinitely repeated become instinctive forms of knowing, over 
the centuries. Accidental alteration of molecular structure may be involved. 
Because we have the capacity to know, compare and order over time, our ability 
to categorize follows.
To summarize; James has proposed that the physiological is involved in 
the mental, and that something separates the higher order of thought (human) 
from the lo *'er (seen in our capacity to delay, choose, select, etc.). He maintains 
that the metaphysical can explain itself without the need for duality, reduction, or 
external rules of causalty. There is a wholeness and unity to thought, and that 
within this unity can be experienced different states. We categorize related and 
continuous experiences and knowledge of things, including knowledge of our 
selves, in various contexts. Access to knowiedge of this process is limited. The
55
Stream of Consciousness proposal can effectively explain knowing, including 
distorted and psycfiotic ways of knowing and cfianging, and needs no outside 
agent, such as the soul, to do so. Reality is related to belief, selection and 
categorization, which involve instinctive ways of knowing.
With respect to MPD, several ideas of James are especially important. 
Knowledge of self is not absolute. It is the best we can make of it in our 
situation, according to our environment; that which we categorize as real, and 
that which we believe. A convoluted environment, then, may influence a 
convoluted reality, and support a distorted knowledge of self. Further, since it is 
difficult for the person himself or herself to know the truth and knowledge of self, 
then it is difficult (and impossible in an absolute way) for psychiatrists, 
psychologists, counselors, and others, to know. It may be wise, therefore, to 
search in a diverse way for information concerning persons with MPD, or any 
other persons. It may also be well to avoid absolutes when trying to know 
others.
James best expresses the essence of this section (1891, p. 93), saying, 
"The brain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no certainties."
How do ways of knowing evolve to create the person? How are patterns 
of belief and reality for people different and how are they similar? Following will 
be discussion of personality theories in the work of Salvatore R. Maddi.
Chapter 3
How Does Personality Develop? • The Work of Salvatore R. Maddi
MPD is thought to be a coping strategy. It is helpful to our understanding 
of the disorder to appreciate how it is that personality develops, and through 
this, come to see how coping strategies, and MPD itself may evolve. The work 
of Salvatore R. Maddi will provide an overview of various personality theories. 
This information is crucial to educators, as it will remind us of the complexity of 
personality, and therefore of personality disturbances. It will also provide an 
awareness that any person must be considered in light of his or her development 
over time, and within a specific environment.
Persons meet, observe and interpret their world, then act accordingly. 
Persons interpret depending upon certain circumstances, each person therefore, 
developing uniquely. In spite of the individuality involved in development, 
certain aspects of development can be categorized, and knowledge can be 
accessed about human personality development in general. How are theories 
developed? What is known and how?
Salvatore Maddi discusses personality theory from twenty-five main 
perspectives, with emphasis on the work of seventeen theorists, through a 
structure definitive of adequate theorizing, categorized through three main 
philosophies of human behavior. Not only does this offer a comparative, 
evaluative, wide view of explanations of human personality, but it provides a 
knowledge of theorizing and evaluation of theory as well.
He discusses the works of the theorists In light of three theory types: the 
conflict theories, which regard development as a process of avoiding conflict; 
fulfillment, which basically regards development as a process resulting from the 
move toward maintenance and fulfillment; and consistency, which involves 
balance. Each theory is investigated in light of a core, or more inherent aspects
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of personality, which are common to many, and which influence behavior; and is 
investigated in light of a periphery, which includes aspects that are more 
individual, and involve a learning from those experiences of the behaviors 
influenced by the core aspects,
The personoiogist, an "expert in the study and understanding of 
personality" (p. 5), is restricted in that human personality is difficult to pinpoint, 
and is not open to reductivism as animal life cannot be observed subjectively. 
Personologists can, however, search for commonalties among people through 
diagnosis, research and psychotherapy in order to make generalities 
representative of all. He can categorize aspects of personality which are 
separate and distinct to individuals, and which are separate and distinct from 
social or biological influences, flushing out that which is of psychological 
importance; identifying also that which the person brings to the environment. 
Aspects which display continuity, which are distinct to human beings can be 
Identified. In that the study of personality is has restrictions, the findings may 
not be absolute, but can approach a comprehensive understanding of how we 
become.
The personoiogist studies a "stable set of characteristics and tendencies 
that determine those commonalties and differences in the psychological 
behavior (thoughts, feelings, and actions) of people that have a continuity n 
time, and that may or may not be easily understood in terms of social and 
biological pressures of the immediate situation alone" (p. 10) Characteristics 
seem to be more instinctive in nature, and account for repetitiveness and habit, 
whereas tendencies appear more aggressive, directional, and account for the 
drive to serve a goal.
The personoiogist understands and formulates theory with three kinds of 
knowledge; the empirical, the intuitive and the rational. The theory Is first
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created from an idea (intuitive), then rationalized and finally, attempts are made 
to prove. It follows that analysis must take the same forms: a search for an 
intuitive reaction, logical assumptions and consistency, and any empirical proof 
(though Maddi indicates that due to the nature of personality, we are limited 
empirically).
Theory must account for a core of personality, which is distinct from the 
periphery of personality. The core consists of those aspects that are common 
across persons, which are inherent and influence behavior. Core tendencies 
determine in which direction and toward which goals people will travel; core 
characteristics explain the content of the goals, or the "inherent potentialities" (p. 
16). They are assumed to be present in all persons. The periphery of 
personality consists of those aspects that are learned, as opposed to being 
inherent, and which influence behavior. Concrete peripheral characteristics are 
used to determine individual differences as opposed to commonalties; are 
relevant to a style of life and are relevant to some portion of behavior (obstinacy, 
for example). It can mean a trait, or it can mean more than a trait. The 
expression of the core characteristics and tendencies in one's living, brings 
about reward or punishment, and from the experience of core plus reward and 
punishment experienced by the person, the periphery develops.
Individual characteristics of the periphery are categorized to determine 
personality type.
Theories are categorized into three types; conflict, which accounts for a 
striving for balance , both between man and society (psychosocial), and within 
man (intrapsychic): fulfillment, which accounts for the human desire for growth, 
both in being the best he can be (actualization) and in a reach for the ideal 
(perfection); and consistency which accounts for man's attempts to use
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feedback from his world for maintenance both by avoiding discrepancy (cognitive 
dissonance) and by balancing comfortable levels of stimulation (activation).
Maddi discusses the works of a number of theorists to explain the core of 
personality, and again to explain the periphery of personality. He compares the 
perspectives, and analyses for intuitive, rational and empirical validity before 
postulating the contents of an effective theory. He concludes with a number of 
substantive characteristics of personality which adhere commonly, and which 
have been seen to have validity.
He first treats the core of personality, first offering discussion of the 
conflict model which postulates that conflict is inherent in man both between 
man and society, as developed in the psychosoc/a/version of the model, and 
within the psyche, as developed in the intrapsychic model. The concepts of the 
core are general in nature and concern basic and long-term attributes. The 
work of Sigmund Freud and Henry Murray are presented to illustrate the 
versions of the conflict model.
Freud postulated (1925) that conflict between the individual and his 
society is at the center of a person's life, and the tendency of the person is to 
maximize the instinct (individual) while minimizing punishment and guilt 
(societal). All behavior is motivated by instinct and is all defensive. Sexuality, 
according to Freud, pervaded all behavior and marked the stages of 
deveiopment of a person. The instincts are the core characteristics of the 
person, are biologically rooted and all have a source, an energy, an aim and an 
object. These somatic processes are mentally represented. The source of 
energy is from within and expresses a need (for example, a dry mouth expresses 
thirst); deprivation is expressed as tension and is indicative of how much is the 
need; this phenomenon is constant. The aim of the instinct, though never 
reached in its Ideal, is to reduce tension through the object, or vehicle of
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satisfaction. The source and object are expressed by a wish; tension and aim 
are expressed by an uncomfortable emotion. Three kinds of instincts (self 
preservation, sexual and death instinct) are collectively called the id, and the 
structure through which the id may be satisfied most effectively within societal 
demands is known as the ego.
Conflict is created when the person attempts to satisfy his instincts and 
finds himself confronted by societal expectations, and punishments. When 
these punishments are internalized, there arises guilt. The superego is the 
internalized set of rules idea imposed through guilt and punishment.
Defense mechanisms (in the sense that defense Is the debarring of 
mental content from awareness) are employed to maximize gratification and 
minimize punishment and guilt. Conflict raises alarm which raises anxiety, and 
the person employs compromise to reduce the anxiety in the form of defense 
mechanisms (by necessity of their function, unconscious). At their most 
effective, these defense mechanisms are a minimal distortion of instinctual 
reality; at their most psychopathic, they become gross distortions of reality, in 
order that the perceived reality will come close to the acceptable, and therefore, 
reduce guilt and/or punishment.
Conflict is eternal, and there is no alternative to it.
Murray's position (1938) like Freud's, postulates conflict, but includes 
motivation such as love and achievement which may be more social and net so 
restrictively biological in nature. This, according to Maddi, changes the original 
meaning of the id which Freud intended. Murray's superego is not just a set of 
taboos but a more sophisticated, less absolute set of ideals Behaviors such as 
rational thought and accurate perception, according to Murray, can exist in the 
absence of conflict, and the ego can exist and have its basis in part. In a nature 
more Informative and separate from the id. Unlike Freud, he indicates that
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tension can be increased to heighten pisasure. Murray's complexes exist as a 
result of fixation at a stage, which means that If one experiences tension and 
anxiety, one regresses to a stage in life more pleasurable or filled with less 
tension than the existing stage.
Also dealing with psychoanalytical conflict, Maddi mentions the ego 
psychologists (Hartman, Kris & Loewenstein, 1947 In Maddi, 1968, p. 42), who, 
like Murray, endorse the existence of a conflict-free ego sphere coming up out of 
energy not derived from the Id. Functions like rational thought and accurate 
perception have their basis In a predisposition and an Independent course of 
development from the id. As well, they endorse intellectual and psychosocial 
goals that are not psychosexual in nature [such as Hendrick's (1943, in Maddi, 
1968, p. 43) need to master], and some Instincts that are not opposed to society 
(love, for Instance). Unlike Freud, the ego psychologists sanction change 
throughout life, into adulthood. Defense and non-ideal states for these theorists 
involve distortion of reality when messages conflict with reality.
The modifications made away from the pure Freudian view, in Maddi's 
opinion, give rise to the fulfillment model of personality theory.
The final psychosocial theory considered by Maddi Is that of Harry 
Sullivan (1947), whose account of core tendencies involves the pursuit of 
satisfaction and the minimizing of insecurity, and whose theory Is a variant of the 
conflict model. His treatment of sexuaiity is less broad than Freud, and is 
related to intercourse and orgasm. According to Sullivan, the nature of the core 
personality involves a biological element, the deprivation of which increases the 
tendencies, inducing a need for tension reduction. The psychological element of 
the core involves the need for security, which is more complex than the need for 
satisfaction, and is interpersonal in the need for approval. The Ideal state 
Sullivan calls Buphoria, which is a state of blissful absence of tension.
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Between the needs for satisfaction and security there is a dynamic 
interaction, which is the basis of the core characteristics, among which, there is 
interrelatedness, in that the physical needs determine a "significant force" (p.
49) in interpersonal relations. The manner in which the energy of the needs 
manifest themselves in "characterizable processes" (p. 49) in interrelatedness is 
referred to as a dynamism. In addition to the core characteristics of biological 
nature (needs for food, etc.), there exist both a power motive, which is 
biological and psychological in nature, as well a need for biological and 
psychological touch (loneliness).
Conflict arises in that the pursuit of satisfaction and security, selfish by 
nature, faces disapproval inherent in society (Maddi questions why such 
disapproval should be assumed to be automatically and consistently present). 
Social interaction leads to self-dynamism, which is a state learned rather than 
inherent, and is a kind cf combination of ego - superego combination. This 
combination Is, in nature, defensive plus something more (p. 51), and is a 
structure by which we live, both satisfying the tendencies and avoiding tension. 
Classes of defensive behaviors used to manipulate the tension levels and 
accomplishment of the goals are three: dissociation (avoidance common to 
people), parataxic distortion (an avoidance and renaming of reality), and a 
sublimation (an exchange for approved goals, and a rendering of personal aims 
unconscious).
The intrapsychic version of the conflict model is distinct in that the conflict 
is seen to result from opposing forces within the person. The theory of Otto 
Rank is the first discussed. He accounts for the human tendency to minimize the 
fear of death (in the sense that death is total conformity and subsumation by 
others), at the same time to minimize the fear of life (the separation, individuality 
and distinctiveness of the person). There is a desire to surrender and a desire
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to separate, yet a fear of doing either too much. The conflict created can be 
minimized, according to Rank, in any of three ways: achievement, regression or 
compromise.
Rank (1929,1945) uses the term fear as opposed to the term anxiety, to 
name the force or tendency leading to the object and actions taken as a result of 
that fear. He sees anxiety as being a more diffuse state. The two fears he 
names are tension states. He says that the desire to separate is inherent in all 
of us, even in the nature of the cell; but this nature causes trauma, beginning 
with the first separation of birth. Avoidance of such separation, however, leads 
to an avoidance of life, in which separation is inherent. The extreme avoidance 
of life, being death, involves fear of the avoidance itself.
The Rankian equivalent of the ego and self-dynamism is the wilt, which 
organizes and integrates the experience of the person into a sense of being for 
that person, and is distinct from the ego in that it is conscious. His equivalent to 
guilt is the counterwill. By way of adding to the discussion of Rank, Maddi adds 
the opinions of May (1958) whose approximation of Rank's compromise is rather 
a push to go on with courage in the separation process (p. 57) in order to avoid 
guilt. Whereas Rank associates separation with guilt. May tenders that 
avoidance of separation is the only tendency to produce guilt, Rather than 
focusing upon defense. Rank indicates that the will helps to ease the fears, and 
determines that lovb helps with the balance involved.
The positions of Andras Angyal (1941,1951) and David Bakan (1966) 
are included as intrapsychic conflict theories, though they are more growth 
oriented and less defensive. Angyal posits a tendency to maximize both 
autonomy and surrender, while Bakan affirms a tendency to maximize both 
agency (individualism) and communion (interrelatedness). Both theories adhere 
to the view that we must separate both from others and separate the parts of
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ourselves In order to achieve a state of differentlatedness and Independence, 
while at the same time being obliged to join and Integrate both with others and 
the parts of ourselves to become a person "organized" (as a whole and with 
others). There Is conflict resolved by a compromise of representing both 
tendencies as much as possible through the expression of love. The ideal state 
is the simultaneous expression of each tendency, but it must be recognized that 
there will never be a transcendence of the conflict. The failure to compromise 
results in the disproportion of one of the forces. The defense is a creation of a 
symbolic self as opposed to a true self.
The fulfillment model distinguishes Itself from the conflict model in that 
there Is only one unfolding force at work, versus the two opposing in the conflict 
model. The two versions treated by Maddi are the actualization version, in which 
there is a force to express ever greater humanistic potential, and the perfection 
version, In which there is a force to strive for the ideal or complete life. The 
actualization version expresses the greater reality, and the perfection, the 
greater idealism.
The work of Carl Rogers (1959) and Abraham Maslow (1962) is used to 
investigate the actualization version. Carl Rogers asserts the purpose., or core 
tendency of man to be one force fulfilling a genetic blueprint [the qualities of 
which are not expressed exactly, but can be seen in the skills and preferences of 
the person (p. 70) ] ; and the maximized expression of the true nature of the 
person. This force is not in conflict with anything, because when one is 
expressing and maximizing the unlimited potential of one's true nature, then one 
is in harmony with self and with society. Hurting others Is a distortion of nature, 
and a destruction of the self.
There are two core tendencies, to actualize all capacity to serve arid 
maintain and enhance life, and to actualize the self-concept. In the latter
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tendency is the need for positive self-regard and the need for positive regard, 
which Is more interpersonal in nature. The ways in which the tendencies will be 
expressed are defined by two characteristics: the genetically determined 
inherent potentialities, and the socially determined self-concept. The inherent 
potentialities, according to Maddi, must be explained further, but are explained 
by Rank in their ability to be seen in behavior (skills and preferences) 
expressed. The potentialities together with the tendencies will Interact. This 
interaction will produce either a state of congruence or incongruence (less 
positive), Congruence can be achieved only through unconditional positive 
regard , since through this, the person learns positive self-regard, and achieves 
a positive self-concept which embraces all potentialities. If there is only 
conditional positive regard, the person grows with conditions of worth approved 
and monitored by society (external to the person). Guilt, denial, distortion, and 
"crippling" (pp. 76) defenses result, and the true nature of the person is denied. 
The person achieving congruence will be, in Roger's view, a "fully functioning 
person", and will display a respect for all manifestations about himself; will be 
conscious of all that there is to know about himself, and will be flexible and open 
to new experience (p. 77).
Maddi adds variation to the theory by way of discussion of the work of 
Kurt Goldstein (1963), whose theory Is parallel to Rogers', but is one of the 
organism, versus one of personality (pp. 77 - 80). Goldstein . '.rr ‘o the 
tendency as the self-actualizing tendency (p. 77) and Includes no theory of self- 
concept. Society's function, he says. Is to provide a context for the fulfillment of 
the person, or to interfere with the actualization. Danger or damage results in 
catastrophic anxiety in which there exists only maintenance instead of 
actualization, and only survival instead of growth.
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A two-force variant of the fulfillment model is that of Abraham Maslow 
(1962), who submits that fulfillment Is important, but Is accompanied by the goal 
to satisfy survival needs, which must happen first before the push to fulfill may 
take place. There is a tendency to actualize one's potential (physiological) and 
a tendency to choose what satisfies (psychological concomitant).
Maslow speaks of two types of tension; that coming from deprivation, for 
which the goal Is satiation (maintenance), and that coming from growth 
motivation, for which the goal is to Increase the tension and expand (enhance). 
Maslow's personality core characteristics consist of the needs of physiologic 
nature, safety, belonging, love, esteem, self-actualizing and cognitive 
understanding. Fulfillment and self-actualization will happen if the survival 
needs are satisfied. Maslow Is distinct from Rogers In that Rogers Includes 
maintenance in his notion of fulfillment, whereas Maslow's fulfillment exclusively 
Involves enhancement.
In the perfection version of the fulfillment model, the motivation is to 
overcome Inferiority and strive for a rather external Ideal of perfection (as 
opposed to internal growth). Maddi examines the theories of Adler, White, 
Allport and Fromm to Illustrate this concept.
In the proposal of Alfred Adler (1930, social and Individual sides are both 
Inherent and without conflict In the tendency to transcend limitations to a state of 
superiority. The goal of the person is the will to fully realize the ideal life, to 
achieve completion. The will to achieve this goal Is r,ever satisfied, since the 
goal Is an Ideal, and so the core tendency is said to be towards fictional finalism 
(p. 90), or the fictional (ideal) completion of the goal. The core characteristic Is 
striving (innate) and perfection. Feelings of inferiority are important in that they 
stimulate the tendency and Increase the tension, making the growth and striving 
more powerful.
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When the tendencies are expressed, a style of life Is developed, as well 
as are habits and traits resulting from inferiority and compensation. These 
results of expression are different among individuals, and therefore are 
considered to be peripheral characteristics, to be discussed later. Destructive 
habits and traits (such as jealousy and competitiveness) and constructive habits 
and traits (such as cooperation and striving) are said to be results of family 
atmosphere.
Robert White (1959,1960), by comparison, considers tendencies of 
effectance motivation (to produce effects) and of competency motivation (to 
become competent). If the effectance is biologically motivated, stimulation for 
the nervous system Is Involved, and tension will increase. White does not 
distinguish, but rather assumes survival needs and their requirement for 
preliminary satisfaction.
Gordon Allport states (1955) that the first of two tendencies is to "function 
in a manner expressive of the self" (p. 97), whereby the self Is called the 
proprium and where full satisfaction of the tendency is called propriate 
functioning, the higher order of the two, The lower order of the two is called 
opportunistic functioning, and involves the tendency to satisfy biological and 
survival needs.
Propriate related functions are individual, but are common to all persons. 
Specific propriate and opportunistic functions involve any reduction in tension. 
Propriate functioning involves self-meaning where the self is a collection of 
executive functions which are phenomenological (in that they follow what the 
person believes is significant). The propriate functions are not necessarily a 
complement to the opportunistic functions, but they can be.
The core characteristics of propriate functioning Intermingle, are future 
oriented, proactive and psychological. They include self-esteem, self- identity,
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sense of body, self-extension, rational coping, self-image and propriate striving 
(pp. 98-103).
Propriate functioning develops through a simultaneous increase In 
differentiation and integration, manifested in a maturity which is seen in the self, 
the relationships, emotional security, problem centeredness, realistic perception, 
self-objectification and expression of philosophy and values. Lack of affection 
and succoring will result in the opposite of maturity and in mental illness (pp. 103 
-105).
Erich Fromm's position (1941,1947,1955) entails the antagonism 
between the animal and human natures inherent in man, and the attempt to fulfill 
the human. Man's nature is unique to man, and achieves expression according 
to his environment. Core characteristics express the need for relatedness, 
transcendence, rootedness, frame of reference, and identity.
The consistency model is distinct in that it allows more compatibility 
between the aspects of the content of personality, which is largely learned. It 
involves information needed in dealing with the outside world of the kind which is 
best for the person. The personality is determined by the feedback from the 
experiences and the outside world. Two versions of this model are considered 
by Maddi: the cognitive dissonance version (in which discrepancies between 
cognitions determine the energy for direction to avoid anxiety), and the activation 
version (which entails matches and mismatches between actual and customary 
levels of activation and tension). The work of George Kelly (1955), Leon 
Festinger (1958) and of David McClelland (1951 ) is considered as a structure 
through which to discuss the cognitive dissonance version of the model,
The elements of the cognitive dissonance model concern what the 
person and his world are like, and what is going on with each, and both together. 
The theory of George Kelly contends that people operate to avoid disruptive
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surprises, the core tendency being to attempt to predict and control the events 
he experiences. From experiences, persons deveiop core characteristics called 
constructs, which are the mental representations of the experience, formed 
inductively. Constructs are subjective (depending upon the experience of the 
person), bipolar (i.e., good-bad), and are categories of thought. Constructs are 
formed into hierarchical systems with some being superordinate to others, some 
being subsumed by others, and forming different groupings.
Constructs and construct systems are used to deduce future events, and 
direct expectations and action. The significance of events for the person will 
determine whether or not it will be subsumed into the construct system, and 
where on the hierarchical system it will be placed. This will determine future 
expectations and action. Also, there are favored poles of constructs (for 
example, in the construct "dependent-independent", the person may favor 
"independent") which will determine certain lines of expectation and action. 
Bruner (1956, in Maddi, 1968, p. 123) says that persons also make choices and 
act according to avoidance and emotion. Persons may make two types of future 
choices: elaborative (made for the purpose of expanding his system, and adding 
experience), and conservative (made for the purpose of maintaining the system).
Action is taken by the person in a manner consistent with choices, and, 
the person, behaving as scientist, then tests his experience against his 
constructs and expectations. If anticipation turns out to be inaccurate, then 
constructs are changed, and new predictions tested. If there Is a lack of 
consistency between the construct of an individual and his world (cognitive 
dissonance), then there will be anxiety. Hostility is created when a person 
continues to choose from predictions already recognized as a failure, and guilt 
arises when there Is an awareness of the removal of the self from the structure.
70
Maddi adds observations made by Leon Festinger (1958, in Maddi, 1968, 
pp. 126-127) to compiiment the work of Keliy. Festinger submits that people 
will try to reduce cognitive dissonance when they encounter it, because of 
anxiety. Festinger speaks of elements called cognitions (which are like Kelly's 
expectations), which are relevant to consistency. The change, according to 
Festinger, will be either with cognitions (expectations) or with the relations 
between them (there may be distortion, he says): therefore, the change is 
interactive within the person between cognitions, and not interactive with the 
world, as there seems, with Festinger, to be no concern with congruence with 
the real world.
The suggestion of David McClelland (1953) is that of cognitive 
dissonance, however, McClelland maintains that only large discrepancies 
between actual and expected events lead to anxiety, and therefore, the tendency 
is to minimize only large discrepancies. Minimum discrepancies, he says, are 
necessary for novelty, and the tendency therefore, is to maximize those. Core 
characteristics are both Innate (underlying tendency to avoid large 
discrepancies, and to seek small discrepancies), and learned (the techniques for 
avoiding and seeking).
Several elements are unique to the individual: the avoidance-of-boredom 
effect of moderate congruence; the emphasis on action, the constructs and the 
motive.
By contrast, the activation version of the consistency model focuses upon 
the relationship between the person's customary and actual levels of activation 
and tension, as opposed to the relationship between constructs and experience. 
Maddi examines the theory of Donald Fiske and Salvatore Maddi (1961) to 
illustrate this concept. There is, according to Fiske and Maddi, a discrepancy 
which arises between a person's accustomed level of activation, and the actual
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level of activation which he experiences, which determines behavior. Activation 
refers to the level of excitement, awareness, alertness or energy. The tendency 
of the person is to maintain the level of activation to which he has become 
accustomed, or which is characteristic of him. Activation is neuropsychologically 
characterized: psychologically by the tension, awareness, subjectivity, etc., and 
neurologically by the state of excitement in a postulated brain center (similar to, 
yet differentiated from, tension) (p. 135).
The determinants of activation are three sources of stimulation and three 
dimensions of stimulation, subsumed "under the term impact' (p. 135). Three 
sources of stimulation are exteroceptive (external), interoceptive (internal) and 
cortical [the cortex itself is considered a source of stimulation (p. 136)]. 
Stimulation has the dimensions of intensity, meaningfulness and variation (of 
which change, novelty and expectedness are aspects). Impact is an attribute of 
stimulation, and is determined by the significance of the stimulation. In turn the 
impact determines the activation level.
Customary levels of activation are decided (Kleitman, 1939 in Maddi, 
1968, pp. 137 -138) by averaging numbers of curves of activation of the 
individual over a period of time. The average activation curve (a core 
characteristic) averaged with other averaged activation cun/es taken at other 
times from the same individual determine the "cycles of existence" (p. 137). 
Individual characteristic curves of activation are formed from experience, though 
the person may be predisposed to high or low levels, The Impact of early 
stimulus has the formative influence on the person, as opposed to the content of 
the early stimulus, according to Maddi and Fiske. As the person grows, the 
curve of activation solidifies, enabling the person to use it as a tool to correct 
and anticipate his actual experiential levels; ways of Influencing become 
habitual. Although the content of the curves of activity are individual, the
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concept of discrepancy between actual and customary Is common to all, and 
general. If a person experiences unusual long term impact [ as In period of 
battle experience (p. 140)] then the characteristic curve may be shifted, 
otherwise, the curve tends to become more entrenched as a person grows.
If discrepancy occurs between the customary level of activation and the 
actual level of activation, the aim Is to return to homeostasis. Consistency Is 
maintained in two ways; anticipation and correction. Anticipatory attempts may 
include the adaptation of behavior to maintain the curve, a continual shift of 
anticipatory levels. Balance must be maintained so as to not allow repetitive 
experience to become boring. Nor can new experience be permitted to 
overwhelm. One must take these experiences and apply them across the 
spectrum of one's experience to step back and see how the new is parallel to the 
old, and in so doing, lessen the impact. As growth takes place, so too does 
progressively greater differentiation and integration (Maddi and Propst, 1963 in 
Maddi, 1968, pp. 142 -143) New things will be learned and modified into the 
whole.
Corrective attempts tend to be the less ideal manner in which a person 
will respond to impact and discrepancy. When anticipation fails, the adult 
appears to take an emergency mentality, and apply impact-increasing and 
decreasing behaviors when the levels are already too low or too high. These 
behaviors Involve distortion, not In the sense of Freudian defense where reality 
Is debarred from conscious awareness, but In the sense of exaggeration or of 
underestimating.
Concluding the core personality discussion, Maddi emphasizes Issues 
raised by the models, and Investigations undertaken to empirically show how 
aspects of the theories can be said to be valid.
73
The concept of "gating" is of particular interest in this section. Introduced 
by Bruner (1957 in Maddi, 1968, pp. 175 -176) and involves the "central 
nervous system control of stimulation coming into the organism" (p. 176), thus 
translating the defense concept to sensible terms, Hernandez-Peon ef al (1956, 
In Maddi, 1968, pp. 177 -178) showed "gating" In work with cats, and Qalambos 
ef a/(1956, in Maddi, pp. 177 -178) found that there was central nervous control 
of outside stimulation. The finding of inside systems of defense as well as 
outside indicates more "widespread effects of defense" (p. 177). Maddi 
speculates that gating involves something like a template. If the outside 
stimulation matches the template, then all is well, and if not, conflict arises and 
defense is summoned. He says that this solves the problem of how the mental 
content of defense is not available to awareness, and solves the problem of 
"parts" of us knowing and "parts" of us not knowing.
The periphery of personality is next considered. This is the learned, 
individual part of the personality which is specific as opposed to general in 
effect. It is composed of concrete peripheral characteristics (or traits), which 
determine direction of activity, are the smallest units of personality, and reveal 
differences in intensity and content. It is also composed of the categorization of 
characteristics into types, which identify styles of life, patterns, and characterize 
how people are. The three models (conflict, fulfillment and consistency) are 
presented by Maddi for discussion of the periphery of personality.
In treatment of the conflict model, Maddi again pursues the psychosocial 
(Freud, Murray, Erikson and Sullivan)and intrapsychic versions (Rank, Angyal 
and Bakan) (pp. 229-271)
Freud's peripheral characteristics are according to stage of development, 
or type of which there are four: oral, anal, phallic and genital stages. At the oral 
stage, incorporative characteristics are those of receiving, while the aggressive
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characteristics are those of taking, expressed bipolarly (pessimism / optimism, 
for example), Attributes of the anal stage are expulsive and retentive in nature 
(stinginess/generosity), at the phallic stage are sexual (chastity / promiscuity), 
and at the genital (considered the mature stage) they consist of being capable, 
socialized and adjusted; this is the ego-ideal.
Maddi submits that because Freud's environment was rigid to the extreme 
regarding sexuality (pp. 240-242), the wholly sexual nature of his theory was 
perhaps an attempt to deal with this. The character type (oral, anal, phallic and 
genital) expresses the pattern of defenses, conflict, and response to conflict, or 
any combination of these. The successful progression through each stage 
depends upon the success of the preceding stages, and Freud maintains that 
frustration or indulgence at any stage results in fixation with that stage, and the 
person will therefore display thoughts, emotions and actions which reflect the 
character of the conflict, parental reaction or emotions shown at that stage. 
Damage at any of the four stages leads to an effect on the fourth; any 
breakdown leads to immaturity, and if severe enough will lead to 
psychopathology. At the oral stage, defenses include projection, denial and 
introjection (incorporating or becoming another person to avoid the threat from 
that person). At the anal stage, inteilectualization (loss of consciousness of the 
instinctual), isolation, reaction formation (substituting opposite wishes and 
Impulses) and undoing (actions are performed to cancel out anxiety-producing 
wishes) are acknowledged defenses. The major defense at the phallic stage is 
repression, and at the genital stage, it is sublimation, which is a changing of 
wishes and desires to those more socially acceptable, and Involves the least 
"damming up" (p. 240),
Murray's types are parallel with Freud's stages, are called complexes and 
include two additional; the claustral and eurethral. Defenses at each complex
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are similar to those of Freud. Defense of the clasutral complex is denial 
(passivity / withdrawal), and of the eurethral complex resemble the anal 
character type, expressed in competitiveness or acquiescence.
Needs (learned conditions which are motivated and involve goals) are 
aroused by real or perceived deprivation. Murray's /cf serves the role of housing 
the needs, which are either those of activity (process / action ore mode / 
excellence) or those of the need for desired effect, These are classified to 
mental or mind needs, viscerogenic needs and sociorelational needs (Murray 
and Kuckhoin, 1956, pp. 13 - 21, in Maddi, 1968, p. 247). Later, two more needs 
were added to the categorization; creative needs and negative needs (need to 
avoid unpleasantness) (Murray, 1954, pp. 445 - 452, in Maddi, 1968, p. 247). A 
further categorization involves qualities of the needs: proactive / reactive; 
diffuse / focal; latent / overt; conscious / unconscious (Murray, 1936, pp. I l l -  
115 and Murray, 1954, pp. 447 - 450 in Maddi, 1968, p. 248). Needs, according 
to Murray are related to the ego and superego, in that Murray's ego and 
superego are sets of functions which are abilities In various domains (p. 244), 
and have a causal role in the development of needs.
The need integrate refers to habits which solidify overtime, and accounts 
for behavior in dealing with the needs. The combination of the need and the 
arousal trigger, or press, results in an interactional until called the thema. The 
press can be subjective (beta), or objective (alpha). When the need ! press 
interaction is established early and is pervasive, it is referred to as the unity 
thema.
The stages proposed by Erikson are eight in number, the first four being 
more social in nature than biological. At each stage, the amount of conflict 
determines whether the positive characteristics or the negative are learned. The 
first stage Is like the oral, and involves development of general trust and basio
76
mistrust; the second, a like-anal stage, either autonomy or shame and doubt are 
learned. The third stage is like Freud's phallic stage and involves either 
initiative and responsibility or guilty functioning. Traits of inferiority or industry 
are learned at the fourth, or latent stage, and at the fifth stage, characteristics of 
identity or role diffusion are learned in adolescence. Stage six involves 
attributes of intimacy or isolation; stage seven, generativity or stagnation and 
stage eight, ego integrity or despair (in later life).
Like Freud, disturbances in the previous stages, affect the latter, and like 
Freud, fixations involve the expression of negative traits at each stage.
Sullivan, whose theory suggests that man tends to maximize satisfaction 
and security, determines ten stages of development: Infancy, characterized by 
prototaxis and parataxis and notions of good I bad; Childhood, accompanied by 
traits of cultural awareness and manipulation; Juvenile Era, associated with 
syntaxis, logical interrelatedness and reputation; pre-adoiescence, in which the 
person moves from egocentrism to love; and Late Adolescence.
Disruption and damage at various stages may result in what Sullivan calls 
a syndrome, of which there are ten, related to defensive characteristics which 
are stage - associated. Five are pre-juvenile and five are post-juvenile. The first 
syndrome is associated with self-absorption and fantasy; the second, 
incorrigibility; the third, negativism and cynicism. Non-integrative and 
psychopathic behaviors comprise the fourth, and the fifth syndrome is simply 
referred to as "stammerer" (p. 264). The first four post-juvenile syndromes 
display characteristics of ambition - riddenness, asocial nature, inadequacy and 
homosexuality, respectively, according to Sullivan, and persons presenting the 
last syndrome appear chronically adolescent, and tend to pursue ideals without 
ever finding them.
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For the intra-psychic theorist (pp, 265 - 271), conflict exists within the 
individual, rather than between the individual and his society. Rank's position 
(pp. 265 - 269) is that there is conflict between the desire for unity and the desire 
for individuality, resulting in one of three situations: individuality without unity: 
unity without individuality and a balance. Life foists upon us continuous 
separation, beginning with birth, which leads to an increase in differentiation.
The counterwill is the child's first expression of will, and If the child is permitted 
reasonable support in his expression at this stage, he should go on to develop a 
will which is mature, which leads to selfhood and the type of person who typifies 
Rank's ideal "artist" (p, 267). If the counterwill in the child is not respected, the 
functioning becomes characterized by ethical guilt, will versus union, moral guilt 
and need for societal approval.
Rank establishes three types, which are exclusive of one another: the 
ideal or artist; the neurotic man, who experiences moral guilt, separation, and 
who is fixated at the counterwill stage. The third type is called the average man, 
and typifies the individual who experiences union without individuality, and is 
considered most inferior of the three (p. 268).
Angyal (pp. 269 -270) promotes three dimensions of personal structure: 
the vertical dimension, through which acts can be both concrete and inner; the 
progressive dimension referring to surface actions organized to achieve goals, 
and the transverse dimension, concerning the coordination of discrete acts to a 
larger effective unit (p. 269). Acts can be described through all three 
dimensions, and relate both to core and peripheral areas. For example, Maddi 
suggests that the writing of an exam (overt) fulfills the need to prove intellectual 
ability (inner); it reflects the progressive in the way that an exam moves one 
toward a further life goai, and is transverse in that it expresses an organization 
of many discrete facts in the learned content of the exam (p. 270). Angyal
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proposes that the symbolic self (sum total of self-concepts) operates through 
systems or structures of behavior (setting) to achieve goals. The changing of 
these systems if referred to as shifting.
Maddi states that Bakan's position ( pp. 270 - 271 ) is referent to the core 
of personality only (approaching agency or communion), and merely provides 
three resultant kinds of persons; those who maximize agency; those who 
maximize communion and those who balance.
In discussion of the fulfillment model of personality, Maddi discusses the 
perfection (Adler, White, Allport and Fromm) and actualization (Rogers and 
Maslow) versions of the model, and that which they contribute to our 
understanding of personality. The fulfillment model provides understanding for 
the way in which man responds to one force, whose direction Is growth; the 
perfection process directed toward the achievement of an ideal, and the 
actualization process directed toward continues expansion and growth of the 
individual.
Adler's (pp. 279 - 282) position is that the tendency of man is to transcend 
inferiority, doing so actively (competitively) or passively (cooperatively) by 
means determined primarily through the family atmosphere, developmentally. 
The styles of life (or types) resulting from individual approaches are four in 
number, each with its own characteristics and goals. The active constructive 
style, whose goal is the attainment of attention and service, is characterized by 
ambition; the passive constructive, whose goal is the abrogation of power, by 
charm. The less ideal types, which are psychopathological, are active 
destructive, whose goal is revenge; and passive destructive, whose goal is to 
be left alone. They embrace attributes of rebellion and viciousness, or laziness 
and passive aggression, respectively. The goals are described as those of
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fictional finalism, as their attainment, being ideal, is never attainable, and so 
achievement of them (finality) is fiction.
White (pp, 282- 286), according to Maddi, gives only sketchy "lines" (p. 
282) along which we might understand his view of periphery, rather than a 
comprehensive assessment of what he means by it. We are, according to 
White, motivated by tendencies to be effective and competent, experiencing 
shame or guilt if we are not. Effectance incorporates the need for information, 
and competence invoives the need for both actual competency and the sense of 
competency. Trust and mistrust are characteristics evolving out of interactions 
for achievement of the goals.
Allport ( pp. 287 - 292) advocates the tendency for man to satisfy propriate 
needs, to express the self, in a proactive manner, and to satisfy opportunistic 
needs, which are those of survival. He describes stages of development as 
four in number, involving sense of self and body at the first (age 1) ; a sense of 
self-esteem and extension at the second (age 2-3) ; at the third, a sense of 
rational coping and self-image (age 6-12) ,  and finally, the capacity for 
propriate striving (full self-expression). Though the need for opportunistic 
functioning is essential to the satisfaction of the needs of propriation, it is 
necessary to shift from the former to the latter, the shift being known as 
functional autonomy. Two types of personal disposition are posited by Allport: 
the dynamic, which is motivational in nature and is more expressive of the 
needs, and the expressive, which is more stylistic, and intent-oriented.
Fromm's (pp. 292 - 293) account of tendency is desire of man to express 
his human nature (as distinct from his animal nature, and appearing to be 
transcendent of it). Core characteristics express the needs for relatedness, 
transcendence, rootedness, identity and frame of reference. Development is a 
function of the type of relationship experienced with the parent, as opposed to
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the stages expressed in other theories. The type of relationship might be one of 
three; symbiotic (related without individuality): withdrawal ■ destructiveness 
(negative relatedness or distance) and love (mutual respect, support and 
admiration).
Personality types or styles of life are called orientations by Fromm, and are 
five in number. The ideal type is learned from a love relationship with his 
parents, and is called the Productive Orientation. It involves a values of self, 
peace, confidence and loyalty. The remaining four comprise the less ideal 
types, and come out of less ideal relationships with parents. The Receptive 
Orientation is related to masochistic patterns of symbiotic passivity. This person 
must receive all good, which exists outside of him. He appears passive and 
cowardly. The Exploitive Oriented person evolves from symbiotic dominance, 
and feels the necessity to take the good, all of which exists outside of him. He 
displays aggressiveness. The individual expressing the Hoarding Orientation 
learns destructiveness evolving from parental withdrawal, has no faith in the 
outside world, is stingy and possessive. The Marketing Oriented person 
experiences withdrawal learned from parental destructiveness and displays 
behavior opportunistic and wasteful in nature, with a self-value that is of a supply 
and demand nature.
The theories of Rogers (pp. 272 > 277) and Maslow (pp. 277 - 279) are 
used to discuss the actualization version of the fulfillment model. Rogers 
purports the tendency to fully actualize one's potentialities (which are inherent). 
He indicates no idea of stages, but indicates that characteristics are functions of 
development and come out of conditions of worth. The types resulting are the 
fully functioning person and the maladjusted person. The characteristics of the 
former include an openness to experience, existential living (which implies 
flexibility and adaptability), organismic trusting, experiential freedom and
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creativity, The characteristics of the latter include defensiveness, 
restrictiveness, a disregard for organism, commonness and conforming attitude 
- those of maintenance.
Maslow ( pp. 277 • 279 ) establishes a needs hierarchy, which is reflective 
of the tendency to actualize inherent potentialities and satisfy biological and 
psychological survival requirements. He, like Rogers, does not adhere to stages 
of development, but proposes that if the survival requirements are satisfied, the 
person will go on to express actualization. The ideal type expressed by Maslow 
is the self-actualized person, who displays characteristics of realistic orientation, 
spontaneity, acceptance of himself and the world, task orientation, a sense of 
privacy, independence, appreciativeness, spirituality, identity with mankind, 
intimacy, democratic values, distinction between means and end, humor, 
creativity and non-conformist behavior.
The peripheral characteristics of the cons/sfency model (expressing the 
tendency to get from the world the particular kind of information that is best 
suited for him to interact with the world) is lastly considered by Maddi (pp. 302 - 
324), the two versions of which are cognitive dissonance (Kelly and McClelland) 
and activation (Maddi).
Kelly (pp. 302 - 304) describes sets of personal constructs (small units of 
behavior unique to the individual, determining the direction of behavior) which is 
organized to hierarchical systems ( which describe the personality type, and 
determine the style of life adapted by the individual). They are used to satisfy 
the tendency to minimize discrepancy between that which one expects and that 
which one experiences. These constructs are bipolar abstractions of experience 
(such as one would abstract an experience to be sad / happy), The periphery of 
personality includes the types of constructs best suited to the individual for logic 
and function, and can be diagnosed by observation and discussion with the
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person. Constructs are, in nature, loose or tight, constellatory, propositional, 
preemptive, superordinate and subordinate to one another, incidental 
(subsuming narrow events) or comprehensive,
McClelland ( pp, 304 - 316 ) cites the tendency for man to minimize only 
large discrepancies, and the need to maximize the smail, in order to avoid 
boredom, and enhance growth. The core is comprised of the tendency, and 
characteristics known as expectations, which entail what the person believes will 
be the future event. Concrete peripheral characteristics include motive, traits 
and schemata. Man is motivated by anything that arouses him to anticipate 
change causing pleasure or pain, affecting approach (need to achieve) or 
avoidance (fear of failure). He displays the trait of repeating continual 
successful reactions and repeating successful styles of functioning. The effects 
of motive, according to McClelland can be positive or negative, and include 
increased task output, increased need for interrelatedness and sensitization. 
Patterns learned with small discrepancies lead to success and approach; 
patterns learned with too little discrepancy teach boredom and indifference; and 
patterns learned with discrepancies that are too large teach avoidance. The 
traits are a collection of habits, differing from motive in that they are learned and 
repetitive as opposed to directional. Collections of traits or habits form styles of 
functioning. The schemata is a unit of cognition concerning culture, 
communicated socially, are not intentional in nature, but include prescriptions for 
action. They include ideas about ideas, about values and about social roles.
in the activation version (Maddi, in Maddi pp. 316 - 324) the focus is upon 
what Maddi refers to as the curve of activation (level of stimulus) individual to 
each person, and the tendency of man to maintain the level to which he has 
become accustomed or which is characteristic of him. The curve differs between 
and within people with respect to level and type of activation, and in ways in
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which people react to it (approach or avoid). Compositions of individual 
differences account for type and traits. Traits at the peripheral level are varied, 
and include four ideal types and four counterparts (less ideal types) of 
personality, the difference between the ideal and less ideal resting in whether 
the person is active or passive in his approach. Each type has a favored 
attribute (level of intensity), a favored source of influence (internal / external) 
and a favored activation position (active / passive), The active person will 
pursue needs satisfaction, while the passive person will act from fear. The 
person who is high activation, active and external or internal; the person who is 
low activation, active internal or external are the more ideal. The personality 
displaying high activation, passive internal or external; the personality 
displaying low activation, passive internal or external are the less ideal. High 
activation requirements will be reflected in needs for stimulus intensity, 
meaningfulness and variety while low activation levels will be reflected in fears 
of intensity, meaningfulness and variety. The active personality will tend to 
anticipate behavior and either impact-increase or impact-decrease, whereas the 
passive personality will tend to use correctiveness measures once these 
experiences are already too high or too low.
Maddi leaves the comprehensive investigation of models of personality 
and proceeds to analysis. Maddi's analysis of peripheral considerations include 
a rational analysis (pp. 325 • 352) and an empirical analysis (pp. 353 • 444). In 
the rational analysis, Maddi addresses characteristics, motives, traits, schemata 
and types, and the problems of the unconscious and individuality, concluding 
with discussion of the theories as expressions of the three models of personality. 
The empirical analysis commences with a concept of the ideal strategy for 
theorizing personality, followed by the actual strategies in various theories. The
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work concludes with discussion of the formal and substantive characteristics of a 
good theory of personality ( pp. 445-461 ).
Examination of the kinds of characteristics required of the portion of theory 
dealing with periphery, he says, must include the nature and the function of 
those characteristics. The theory must provide a sense of what is needed to 
explain the phenomena of behavior. One kind of characteristic concerns goals 
and strategies of and for behavior (such as Murray's "need": McClelland's and 
Maddi's "motive"); another concerns unselfconscious habits of performance 
(Allport's stylistic disposition), and a third include characteristics of values, ideas 
and principles of thought (McClelland's "schema"; Kelly's "personal construct").
Motives and traits, he says, tie characteristics and behavior, distinguish 
the motive and the trait as distinct or mutually exclusive in order to distinguish 
directed behavior from repetitive behavior. Repetitive behavior must be seen as 
experienced before, and directive behavior as self-conscious and decisive. 
Behavior can be thought of as wholistic, he says, but must be categorized in 
order to understand it in the way that psychologists are obligated to understand 
it (p. 329). Thought cannot be observed, but the behavior that went before or 
seems designed for a new goal can be observed.
What constitutes motivation? Motivation best describes personal goals 
and strategies yet to be achieved. Motivation, unlike traits, are not causal, 
however, therefore, the theory mujt provide an understanding of core 
tendencies but there is no need to include motivation at the core ievel. That 
which is not considered proactive or intellectual enough to be a motivation is 
more like a drive (like McClelland's approach - avoidance). Rogers' 
actualization, he says, is more like a genetic blueprint than a motivation, yet can 
develop into a motivation, much like Adler's drive for perfection gets translated 
into a motivation (fictional finalism). Psychoanalytical motivation is dual in
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nature and locus-determined, At the one level, it can be Instinctual (avoid - 
approach source), and at the other level the objects and wish to obtain them 
relate to goal states, and are therefore motivational.
Problems exist regarding how to explain goals about which we are 
unaware, or unconscious. They can start by being conscious, he says, and then 
if there is a defense, they retreat to the unawareness. Organismic needs, he 
says, are too universal to be unconscious goals, and not all behavior has to be 
unconscious, nor does all behavior have a component of unconscious 
motivation.
Schemata are needed, according to Maddi, because there is the need for 
theory to describe all kinds of behavior, in order to be complete.
He submits that conceptualizations of personality types serve the function 
of higher level explanation of behavior, subsuming characteristics into patterns, 
and determining flavor. Some theorists don't type (McCLelland) because they 
wish to respect the individuality of the person, and not restrict him to one or 
another type. Some consider type to be superfluous (in Rogerian theory one is 
either actualized, or he is not, and therefore, typing is unnecessary).
There arises from this discussion the problem of whether to accept the 
concept of individuality or of type. Maddi says one can use a morphgenic (use 
of data across aggregates of people to predict individual behavior) approaches 
and still be loyal to the individual, because specific concepts can turn out to 
apply to other people. The nomothetic approach involves the use of specific 
kinds of concepts and their content at the peripheral level so as to classify 
behavior. In this way. differences can be recognized, but in a standardized way. 
Differences, says Maddi, are "relative, not absolute" (p. 346), and so it is helpful 
for a theorist to postulate as many kinds of peripheral characteristics and types 
as possible and as are practical, thereby having the optimum number of possible
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combinations, and therefore, more differences, finally, more respect to 
individuality. For example, in Maddi's theory, there are twenty-four types, which 
may be more useful than two or three.
How do the theories express the three models? The content of the 
peripheral personality should help to explain what constitutes the life of the 
person. Types express the concrete ways adults lead their lives. The kinds of 
content emphasized in a theory is resultant of the kinds of concepts employed, 
and helps to distinguish the ideal from the non-ideal personalities.
The conflict model (pp. 347 - 349) he says views all behavior as defensive, 
and society as powerful over the person, while the intrapsychic views the 
individual balanced with commitment to society, as opposed to the defensive 
and negative. The fulfillment model (pp. 349 - 351) emphasizes spontaneity, 
acceptance and openness in the actualization version, as opposed to conformity 
and duty. The perfection version emphasizes a concern for more than survival, 
as opposed to biological concerns. In the consistency model (p. 352), the 
cognitive dissonance theorists do not state much that is conclusive on this point, 
whereas he says the theory of Maddi offers statements about procedures for 
correcting activation and discrepancy levels, and describing the passive 
character as the non-ideal.
In viewing the empirical studies completed regarding the theories of 
personality, Maddi says that ideal studies have not, as yet, been completed, 
because of the nature of personality itself, and difficulties therein. However, he 
says, "modest" and "tentative" (p. 353) conclusions can be drawn. Difficult as 
it Is to satisfy empirical demands in this field, empirical study is required as 
satisfaction and support for the existence of peripheral characteristics. 
Satisfaction by reason alone is not sufficient. Empirical evidence is needed to 
show which characteristics are peripheral, how they are organized into larger
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groups or types, and the amount of behavior explained by them. He concludes 
that pure psychosocial theories of conflict: and pure cognitive dissonance 
theories of consistency lack any "empirical promise" at the peripheral level (p. 
443). There is less empirical support for the perfection version of fulfillment.
The ideal empirical strategy, he says Is in three parts. First, the concrete 
peripheral characteristics must be measured to show the empirical existence of 
the characteristics, and, though the ideal can't be achieved, the evidence will 
support the need moderately. This is achieved by creating operational 
definitions for the characteristic, observing and asking. The theory is better If it 
begins with empirically genuine concepts.
The second step Involves showing interrelationship among the measures 
to provide evidence concerning placing characteristics Into types. This is 
achieved by taking all reliable characteristics, determining the relationships 
among them, and correlating to show how strong the relationship is among them. 
Like characteristics are then clustered. Within the theory, the clusters should 
occur as the theory predicts, and concerning other theories, it can be shown how 
overlap exists between theories [for example, one can compare Fromm's 
hoarding with Freudian anal type (p. 359)].
The third stage demands that the construct validity of peripheral theory be 
tested. The relationship between the needs and variables must be tested (fro 
instance, the greater the frequency of variables, the higher the need). The 
construct has validity If the number of relevant variables correspond to the level 
of construct. As each peripheral characteristic Influences the variety of life, 
there must be moderate intercorrelation with sets of relevant variables. Sets of 
constructs must correlate for information about range and intensity, Practical 
problems exist in terms of time and complexity, and Interpretational difficulty.
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Actual studies that have been completed have been factor analytic studies 
wherein factors are combined to show how clusters cluster to larger groups, and 
then to show how larger groups interpret personologically. There is weakness 
with inductiveness and with crude interpretations. There must be distinction 
between traits as habits, as cognitive (values, etc.,) and as motivation. Cattail 
(1950, In Maddi, 1968, p. 372) is able even to distinguish between two kinds of 
traits; urges ("ergs" ) and traits. Similarities between the factors of Cattell 
(1946; 1957, in Maddi, 1968 pp. 365 * 377) and Guilford (Guilford and 
Zimmerman, 1956; Guilford, 1959 in Maddi, pp. 365 - 377) shows empirical 
evidence that "an adequate peripheral theory of personality must realize its 
concrete peripheral characteristics content concerning a number of areas of 
human functioning" (p. 373).
Maddi concludes with discussion of the ideal composition of a "good" 
theory of personality (pp. 445 - 461). it must, he says, consist of an explanation 
of the core of personality, or what is common to people as Individuals and part 
of the nature of the person, and provide for explanation of the tendencies of the 
core, and characteristics implied in the tendency. It must provide understanding 
of the peripheral personality, or that which is distinctive, learned, and cannot be 
subdivided. Differences in intensity and content must be clarified, and should be 
able to be quantitative. There should be consideration of the interaction of the 
core and periphery of personality, or how the core tendencies "come to be 
expressed" (p. 450) in the peripheral characteristics of personalities. Also, there 
should be "data language" (p. 450) specifying what the theory needs to explain, 
and how to observe and measure same.
Important issues arising from Maddi's work with respect to MPD concern 
needs and the satisfaction of those needs. Throughout the theories there 
appear to be human needs which require satisfaction in some way and to some
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degree, This appears best done In some positive, encouraging, balanced, and 
forward-moving manner, If these needs are consistently thwarted and denied, 
the individual seems to develop coping mechanisms, which may be practical to 
survival and development of the individual in some ways, but could damage the 
development. MPD is thought to be a coping strategy. It may be wise to look 
upon it with respect for the intricacy of the developmental process.
We may accept that accounts of generalities and category can be given to 
explain ways we develop. Regarding the Individual, what may be said of the 
context of his particular process. How does this person's relationship with 
himself and others shape who he is /,id who he becomes? How does this go 
awry? The next chapter will deal with the work of R, D, Laing, to explore these 
questions.
Chapter 3
How Do the Self and Others Form the Self? - The Work of R. P. Laina
Laing Is examined in order to provide an appreciation of the person as a 
result of his or her interactions with others, With respect to MPD, it appears not 
enough to attempt to know the person in isolation. His or her context is essential 
to an understanding of him or her as a person. This idea is of educational 
Importance, as well. Also, through an investigation of Laing, we may come to 
know how disorders may evolve as a result of this context.
Freud refers, in his account of Dr. Breuer's encounter with a young 
disturbed female in which the doctor used hypnosis and association, as the 
"talking cure" and "chimney sweeping" ( Hutchins, 1952, pp. 2 - 3), and alludes 
to symptoms vanishing "permanently", thus "cured". A simplicity is implied here 
with which Laing takes position. He expiains the complexity involved in the 
development of one's idea and relationship of the self with others, and in so 
doing, shows that disturbances in these ideas and relationships result over time 
and in many subtle and compound ways (Laing, 1960,1962 & 1969). 
Disturbances in the process cannot be therefore addressed in isolation from 
others and life circumstance, nor in the fashion of a "chimney sweeping".
Main ideas covered in this chapter concern three of the works of R.D. 
Laing; The Self and Others, The Politics of the Family and Other Essays, and 
The Divided Self. In the first, Laing examines the role of interpersonal 
relationships in development and the knowing of self. He highlights the 
complexity of the nature of the process, cautions that investigation must involve 
context, and involve a human aspect. As a second major idea, he warns that 
there is limitation In the knowing of ourselves, and the knowing of others, an idea 
especially important, he thinks, to incorporate in the perspective of tne 
psychologist. Thirdly, he examines the manifestations of certain interactive
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phenomena: phantasy, the "social phantasy system", false positions, illusion, 
collusion, positions, place, attributes and injunctions. Three key issues in The 
Politics of the Family and Other Essays are present in discussion of the role of 
family in development and knowing of self. He discusses the family as distinct 
from the "family"; the roles, operations and rules of the family; and medical 
versus social models of treatment. Again, there arises the sense of 
investigating within a context, and with a respect for the human and the 
multidimensional aspect necessary in any approach. The Divided Self examines 
the process through which splitting occurs. Three key ideas of this work also 
Involve a multidimensional approach. The first advises that persons are beings 
in context, and that a multidimensional perspective is necessary in any approach 
to understanding. The role of security In the development of personality, and 
finally, the elements of a split, receive comment.
In The Self and Others (1962) he uses two sections to explain the 
experience of the person with himself and other people, and how the actions of 
the person consequently relate. He shows the realm of situations which affect 
the well-being and the reality of the person, and that disruptions in this reality or 
well-being are the compiex results of many intricate, interrelated things. His 
discussion involves self, other selves, society, families, roles or positions in 
families and society and with others. It can be seen that an individual's 
disturbances then do not belong totally to the individual in a certain sense, nor 
can they be treated without consideration of a complex temporal, behavioral and 
Interpersonal web.
He begins the discussion of ways we experience the world ("modes") with 
the premise that the best we may do as human beings is infer the experience 
that the self has of another person by observation and assignment of attributes 
to that behavior. The self assigns structures, laws, etc, to account for and
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understand the meaning of the behavior for him. Ali he has is the same process 
to appiy to others in his attempt to understand how it is that others see and 
experience him. This limitation prevents persons from being "outside" (p. 16) 
enough to objectively and scientifically analyze this experience from any other 
perspective except their own, and therefore, prevents persons from applying 
any scientific systematic criteria or structure to which he may draw ail others, 
compare and identify. It prevents us from fully analyzing that which is happening 
to us, as we cannot be removed from ourselves, and so, even if we have a 
personal private relationship with self, we cannot allow that our interpretation of 
It is the total reality.
Laing cautions that analysts would do well to acknowledge that this is a 
limitation in the relationship they carry on with their clients, and therefore, be 
careful not to view statements and attributes made by themselves and other 
analysis as laws, or objective structures any more than they can be in human 
reality. Therefore, the observations and Interpretations of us ail, including 
analysts are restricted to our own experience.
The way in which we experience others and ourselves may be real, 
imaginary or "phantasy" (Chapter 1 ). He says that phantasy is a very basic way 
in which we experience ourselves in relation to ourselves and others, and Is 
related by mental construct or mechanism to primary instinct. It is mostly 
unconscious, though, if subjected to reflection may not necessarily be, nor may it 
necessarily be all that is unconscious, and can be observed by another through 
inference of the meaning of observations (pp. 24 -26). There are structures of 
phantasy which Laing calls a "social phantasy system" (Chapter 2). When 
immersed in systems of groups' understanding of self, others, individuals and 
the group, individuals understanding and experience of themselves may be 
altered. The private world of the individual (as opposed to that which he shares
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with others) consists of his individual perceptions and evaluation of those 
perceptions. A loss of these perceptions through the process of immersion in 
the social phantasy or the social mode of experience may come about, thus 
affording the person the loss of his identity, or his understanding of himself, 
others, and himself for others. He is (Laing, 1962 & Bion, 1955 in Laing 1962) 
through this loss, alienated or placed in a "false position". In other words, the 
way in which a group experiences itself and its members is social phantasy. If 
members' private phantasy of the experience is immersed in this, the private 
experience of the person is altered. He is alienated from himself because of the 
loss of his private experience and interpretation of that experience. If the 
member agrees to this process then he is rewarded with membership, though his 
experience may still be not his own, and therefore, not his reality; nevertheless, 
he contributes to the survival of the group. If a person begins to understand he 
has been placed in a position alienated from himself, and begins to perceive and 
express this state ( a "derealization of the prior false sense of reality, and a re- 
realization of a new sense of reality") (p. 22), then he is in conflict with the 
group perception, and is on the "outside". He is seen as different by the group, 
and Is said to be "out of contact with reality" (p. 24).
Families can be nexus groups operating from social phantasy. Its 
members may never remove themselves from the system; may never rereaiize a 
new reality, and therefore live in alienation from themselves. Its members can 
be placed in positions of conflict, and therefore live in untenable (no-win) states, 
or its members may only partly successfully perceive the reality of the situation 
for them, and therefore experience internal crisis in the internal conflict and 
distress.
When faced with a position of untenability, a person may attempt to act 
upon his position to make it more bearable for himself with the dismissal or
94
denial of reality and the creation of elusion. He may, for purposes of security 
(Sullivan in Laing, 1962, p. 36) or sincerity create a replacement reality with 
false, dramatized or histrionic actions. Dysfunction may arise from the person's 
relationship with his elusion, or Imagined perception of reality. He speaks of 
Tillich's (1952, in Laing, 1962, p. 35) identification of three states of possible 
"non-being": the person faces ultimate meaninglessness as a spiritual being; 
faces ultimate condemnation as a moral being or ultimate annihilation or death 
as a biological being. Laing adds the fourth possibility and says that a person 
faces non-being when he experiences partial loss of "synthetic unity with self 
and concurrent loss of relatedness with the other", and is then placed in a state 
of chaotic non-entity and a loss of reiatedness with other. This non-unity 
involves elusion of experience, and pretense of reality. If a person imagines 
himself away from reality and then back Into it, he effectively is not experiencing 
the pure reality, and is creating something synthetic — perhaps a "going through 
the motions" feeling that persons report. It is a simulation only of reality because 
of the double pretense Involved in the removal from and the reentry into the 
original reality. He lives "behind an invisible veil which separates him from the 
naked apperception of the reality and the truth of the position he is in relation to 
himself and the other" (p. 29). A person may have greater sense of experience 
In imagined realities than in real ones. Using other real persons with whom to 
interact, he creates an Imagined reality In which to Interact with them, perhaps 
because the real reality "dissolves" his phantasy (p. 32).
To adapt to insecurity he may pretend to be what he Is instead of being It. 
It may be that this is like the initial feeling that interns get when they first practice 
the practice of teaching or medicine or soldiering, before the feeling of being a 
"real" doctor, teacher, etc. grows. Perhaps there will be a lack of a sense of 
himself as the "agent o f his own actions and perceptions (p. 35).
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He illustrates complexity In use of pretense and elusion as applied to the 
subject of masturbation, making the distinction between "good" or "honest" use 
of masturbation which occurs when there is no sexual alternative, and a "bad" 
or "dishonest" use of masturbation as a preference to reality (Sartre, 1952a in 
Laing, 1962, p. 42). Laing adds that masturbation can be very honest in another 
manner; if the person intends it as a private investigation of his real desires. He 
goes on the illustrate elusion and substitute experiences, saying that the 
masturbator can substitute experiences with the real person with masturbation, 
therefore making masturbation a counterfeit intercourse; or, in being with a real 
person can substitute a masturbatory "shadow" reality of that person, thus 
making intercourse a counterfeit masturbation.
He uses the dream of Rasklonikov (Dostoievsky, 1951 in Laing , 1962, 
Chapter 5) to illustrate how phantasy can shut off or preclude realness, 
imprisoning the individual in phantasy, making it impossible to perceive reality.
Turning to discussion of interpersonal action, he begins with a caution 
against any structure which seeks to analyze through fragmentation of the 
person. He says that person's experiences often are fragmented, but that the 
parts of self cannot be separated out; that the person cannot be taken apart for 
inspection by "piece" because of the wholeness of the person, nor can the 
person, by reductivism, be associated with other processes such as comparison 
with animal behavior, for Instance, because of the uniqueness of the person. If 
this is done, he warns, the human reality is lost In the process, that being that 
the person is a person with others and interactions. He addresses the concepts 
of complimentarity, confirmation, collusion, existential position as a function of 
self and others, untenability, ambiguity and incompatibility.
That said, he goes on to show that persons' identities often depend upon 
others; that the identity can be actualized (good) or imposed (he gives the
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example of the cuckolded husband). He says that between us there Is the 
feature of complementarity by which the other fulfills or completes the self, 
biologically (as parent) or by choice, at many levels. Complementarity involves 
interaction of giving and receiving, and when this Interaction Is interrupted, 
hatred and envy occurs. Attempts to hurt or destroy the object of the hatred 
leaves the person with more emptiness. He uses the example of sexual 
gratification In this case, by explaining that part of the gratification involved is the 
knowledge that one has given the other pleasure, or has caused a change in the 
other. Should the other refuse to be gratified, then the ability to give has been 
taken from the other; the Interaction of giving and receiving has been 
interrupted. Complimentarity has been made negative.
He proceeds with the notion that the Identity one has for self is composed 
of the identity others have for him and the identity he ascribes to others. When 
one is young, one Is what others say he is, but becomes more autonomous In 
the choosing of what he is as he becomes older. Sometimes, there Is conflict in 
this choosing, and his sense of identity is disrupted. Dysfunction results.
Shame occurs, he says, when there is a combination of frustration (when one 
must accept an identity one would rather not) and confusion (when collusion 
must occur to not talk about the Incompatibility of the Imposed Identity). If the 
created Identity Is destroyed then all sense of reality is destroyed. The person 
must redefine reality, identity and self. He may "dereallze" and "restructure" (pp. 
82 • 83) his own experiences. Sometimes, collusion allows for smoothly running 
situations, causing them to appear normal, and attempts to express the conflict 
felt with imposed Identities causes the appearance of disruption. What we 
perceive to be abnormal may well be the person's struggle for sanity and control 
of Identity, and the opposite may be true. Laing Illustrates this concept with use 
of case study, and says that there Is psychosis in certain states of sanity, and an
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"attempt at sanity" In certain madness (p. 87). We must be cautious In 
Identifying what we perceive to be happening then, and be cognizant of the 
subtleties and layers of Interpersonal action.
It Is an aspect of humanity and human desire to be confirmed and to 
confirm others (Buber, 1957a in Laing, 1962, p. 88). Dysfunction and confusion 
are created when there Is conflict In confirmation, such as when a child is 
confirmed for an action at one time, and disconflrmed for It at another (this 
characteristic is often found in the families of schizophrenics) (Speigel & Bell. 
1959 in Laing 1962, p. 90), or when there Is pseudo-confirmation. Pseudo- 
confirmation may be either pretend confirmation; confirmation of a false child 
which does not really exist; It may be the consistent subtle mutilation of the 
authenticity of the person or a failure to recognize the person as the agent of his 
own actions. It may be tangential, falling to endorse what the person actually 
says or does, where the reply is an inadequate fit for the statement. As it is not 
geared to the intention of the original statement, or as It emphasizes incidental. 
Inconsequential statements not Intended for confirmation, it has a frustrating 
effect (Reusch, 1958 in Laing, 1962, pp. 37 - 48). Conflict and confusion results, 
causing Interruption In the Individual's relationship with others and with himself 
as others see him. Reality Is affected.
Involved with complimentarity and confirmation Is collusion, which Is 
"mutual self-deception" (p. 98). If a person is involved in a relationship which is 
positive, collusion may feed the complimentarity of one to the other. If 
counterfeit acts of confirmation or pretense occur, if there is mistrust and 
despair, then there is dysfunction In that the person's self-identity and his 
Identity for the other person can be reactions of despair, anger, etc, Such 
collusion can fuel or bind the relationship, and "trap" the persons within. This 
happen* when there Is discrepancy between the persons' perception of the
98
compliment that is between them. The needs of the one may not fit the needs of 
the other, and the one may find the need to induce in the other the cooperation 
required to compliment as the one perceives the particular identity. This distorts 
the reality. A collusive dyad is created when the other will confirm the reality 
which the one is trying to make real, and will cement the phantasy. Persons' 
behavior must be considered then, in light of their relationship with others, and 
their perception of relationships with others. They are not Isolated from others, 
and do not take shape in isolation.
Another caution Issued by Laing to analysts is that to analyze in light of 
obsen/able behavior alone is not complete, and that observations must be 
complimented by some attempt to understand the person's relationship to his 
own actions and the actions of others (which may enable him to place himself or 
cause him to be placed by the actions of others in an untenable position). He 
points out that If one is to make the effort to consider the relationship of the 
person to actions, than there is no structure of valid criteria with which to 
determine the meaning of same. He goes on then to explain the importance of 
person's understanding of experience, and dysfunction caused by disruptions in 
the truth of those understandings.
He distinguishes between two truths. There is the truth of natural 
science which is the structure by which we symbolize the reality of the world, 
and which involves the difference between the reality and the intellectual 
representation of that world, and the "Greek" truth (Heidegger, 1949, in Laing 
1962, p. 120) which means "without veil or secrecy". This has importance to his 
topic because he states that the latter truth Is the truth involved in "true to 
oneself", and involves concept of self and actions forthcoming consequently. He 
says that If a person's actions and words disclose his real self, then he may be
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said to be genuine, but a person who has "never been disclosed to and/or 
confirmed by others" may turn to a false modeling of self-disclosure (p. 122).
A person for instance in a false position may dospair, having lost the 
starling point from which to project himself into his future, of having a future, and 
therefore may purposefully intend not to be himself, and project that to everyone 
else. He may also choose to take the role of "outside observer" (p. 124), 
therefore not having to take responsibility for any actions. A person who has not 
been revealed to nor "seen" by others may adopt false modes of disclosure or 
substitutes for self-disclosure. Disruptions in the truth of who he sees himself to 
be, or in the truth of his reality may cause disruption or distortion in action. It 
would be necessary to acknowledge this in any investigation of behavioral 
disturbance.
In order for a person to fully understand truly and fully the experience of 
his position, he must understand the actions of others, his own actions and 
understand his understanding or phantasy of others; this, because the self can 
be placed into false or untenable positions by the actions of others, The space 
of the self is affected and molded by the influence of others ail the time, by the 
necessity to have "place" or significance in the world of others for the dual 
purpose of giving and receiving gratification, Most people seek a "first" place (p. 
128) in the world of another (for example, a spouse).
When understanding of that role is distorted, by either the self or another, 
dysfunction may result. Fears of never occupying a space for anyone, or of 
being expected to occupy the central space for everyone may result in paranoia. 
Persons then either seek a place or develop a delusional one, Laing (1960 in 
Laing 1962, p. 129) illustrates the case of a young man who responded to the 
negligence displayed by his parents by fearing that he would have to be so 
outrageous in order to attract attention and a place, that no one would want him
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anyway, and therefore, became a "nobody" by choice, shameful that he made no 
difference to anyone.
The place for the other may be distorted, and Laing speaks of several 
ways this can occur; processes creating schizogenesis; double binds; and a 
biological theory. The person's position may be rendered untenable by others.
Searles (1959 in Laing 1962, Chapter 12) explains how the position of 
the other may be rendered untenable and refers to the process as "driving the 
other crazy", a process, he points out, that may be intentional but is mostly an 
unconscious process for both the person and the other who is placed in the 
position of untenability. Schizogenesis occurs, says Searles, when conflict is 
created: if attention is drawn to areas of the other is only dimly aware, which are 
in direct conflict with the view the other holds of himself; when stimulation 
(sexual for example) is initiated under circumstances which make it impossible 
for gratification to take place; when simultaneous exposure to stimulation and 
frustration, or to rapidly alternating stimulation and frustration is initiated; when 
the person relates to the other at unrelated levels, or switches the emotional 
wave length while on the same topic, or conversely switches the topic to an 
inappropriate one while on the same wavelength. In other words, dissension is 
created when areas in direct opposition to one another are stimulated. Laing 
extends the discussion of conflict to include "conflict which fosters confusion" 
about who the person or the other is or about the situation, and makes 
distinction between integrative, "authentic " conflict and disintegrative 
"inauthentic" conflict. When there is conflict and confusion, doubt about the 
person or the situation's definition, then there is "interpersonal disjunction" (p. 
133).
The ultimate confusion occurs when no matter what meaning he gives the 
situation, his feelings are invalidated, when his own acts are "stripped of
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motives, Intentions or consequences" (p. 135), and/or when the situation Is 
robbed of meaning for him. This having occurred, the person Is in an untenable 
position, and Is obliged to comply with the other person's view of him.
Double bind situations are noted as common patterns in the lives of 
schizophrenics, and are thought to be capable of developing schizophrenia if 
they are very specific and intense. A double bind process develops when there 
exists a victim person and one or more others in a situation where there is a 
repeated habitual expected experience (not necessarily traumatic). Learned 
punishment avoidance occurs when a primary negative injunction is implied or 
stated [do / do not do or punishment (withdrawal of love, abandonment, etc.) will 
result]. Conflict follows when a secondary injunction is implied or stated which is 
in opposition to the first injunction ( damned if you do and damned if you don't 
situation), but related to it. Frustration follows this when a tertiary injunction then 
is involved, prohibiting escape (a promise of love or threatened annihilation, for 
example). The victim perceives the universe in terms of double bind patterns 
precipitating responses such as panic or rage (Bateson et al 1956 in Laing, 
1962, pp. 137-138).
In the biological theory (Bowlby, 1958 in Laing 1962, pp. 142 -143) it is 
proposed that a human child will take flight from danger to the mother, but when 
the parent (mother) is in some way tense, she transmits this to the child 
physically or psychologically, causing stress, and therefore becomes an 
unpleasant danger herself. The child, more frightened, clings harder, but finds 
more danger the harder he clings, creating a vicious circle of instinctual 
response systems in the human which does not meet an appropriate terminating 
response, thereby creating anxiety.
Laing concludes the work with discussion of further types of ambiguous 
and incompatible attributions and Injunctions which serve to place persons in
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situations that are false, untenable, in conflict or confusing, thereby extending 
understanding of the complexity of human distress and dysfunction. He 
discusses attributes and injunctions.
The purpose of attributes is for the definition of a person by an other, to 
piace him or put him in a position. Though some attributes can be tested, many 
cannot, and the motives and intentions of the first person may become trapped 
in the definitions and attributes of an other, thus creating conflict or a false 
sense of the person's reality or understanding of himself. If the attributes of 
another are taken as imperatives, the person may experience guilt at non- 
compliance with these attributes. Laing distinguishes between this guiit (calling 
it a “false guilt") and a true guilt which involves the obligation one has to oneself 
to actualize.
Distress may occur when two mutually exclusive roies are attributed 
simultaneously to be executed simultaneously, having the same effect as an 
injunction. An example used by Laing is the directive to "be spontaneous".
Firth (1957 in Laing 1962, pp. 153 -157) discussed ways in which 
language can subtly imply attribute or injunction, and render the implication 
unable to be validated or invalidated through its subtlety, thus creating conflict 
and confusion. Ostensive statements may be used as injunctions, facts as 
implied threats or attributes, accusations may be concealed in sympathy, orders 
may be implied in statements of fact, and so on. These types of statements are 
easy to deny, difficult to label as an attack and may be uses as a collusive 
alliance by a social nexus against anyone who implies threat to the existence of 
the group. Contradictory attributions have a double bind effect, and if there is 
attempt to break the double bind, then badness or madness is implied. The 
statement "Paranoid people are right" has been used in various social situations 
as a joke, but in light of Laing's attention to these types of linguistic subtleties,
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may be more fact than funny. Finally, he says that the withholding of attributions 
is not seen as an attack, but can strip the person's behavior of intent, purpose or 
any agency at all.
In The Politics of Famiiy and Other Essays (1969), Laing again sets out 
to show that the development of the person is interrelated in a highly complex 
manner with other individual, with networks of individuals and with each other 
individual's understand and interpretation of the interrelatedness occurring, in 
addition to the relationship with the self and the self understanding. This also 
takes place over time, and In ever-changing, ever-evolving situations.
Therefore, dysfunctions which develop in development are subject to extremely 
intricate paths of investigation, are not ostensibly validated, and area not with a 
structure of infallible and Immovable solid criteria by which to evaluate them. In 
understanding Laing's point of view, any idea of "quick fix" notions involving 
personal development and dysfunction are cast aside as ludicrous.
In the first section of his work, Laing defines "family" as distinct from 
family to be involved in a set of operations which are reciprocal, and which are 
its life. He speaks of intervention in family dysfunction and distinguishes the 
social process of ongoing understanding of the "story of" the family and 
intervention from the medical model of more structured, isolated identification 
and intervention. He examines the family in the social context, discussing the 
behavior of the family in the context of the family, in the context of the larger 
society and points out that sometimes families and individual within those 
families have to go through a process which appears to be psychotic in order to 
transform itseif from mystification, in forcing a return to "normalcy", he says, 
sometimes psychiatry hinders the family, and prevents the transformation.
In the second part of the work, he examines the roles, operations and 
rules which maintain the family, and which are the functions by which it lives. He
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talks about how invalidation occurs, the operations used to insure membership 
In the famiiy (social nexiflcation mentioned in The Self and Others), the rules and 
metarules by which the family and its members exist, and how these rules are 
mapped (projected) interpersonaily, interfamiiiariy and between famiiy and 
society.
“The Family" to which he refers (as distinct from the famiiy) is the 
internalized family of the members Involving a set of reciprocal relations and 
operations between the people in the famiiy that make It a “family". He explains 
the constructs of the "famiiy" in terms of fantasy (having defined previously 
fantasy as the intellectual set of symbols by which we understand the real 
world), in terms of transformation and externallzatlon, and as a defensive 
function. As fantasy or the way In which it intellectualizes the real experience, 
the family Is a system, Internalized by Its members. The system Is composed of 
sets of elements which have certain relations and operations between them, 
which are different for inside the family than outside of It. The system is 
Internalized when the members map the outer elements into an inner set of 
constructs and begin to define the selves by these constructs, and begin to allow 
actions to be functions of the constructs and position within family. The Internal 
group may condition a person's relation to self. The group itself is internalized 
and the operations of the group repeat in the selves of the group. The group 
presence exists as a family as long as each member has it Inside himself, and so 
as a defensive function It preserves itself against disintegration or the infiltration 
of other family constructs by new members (In-laws, for instance). Not only does 
each member Internalize the “family”, but there is reciprocal internalization of 
each other's internalization of the concept of family, so as to preserve through 
change over time. This reciprocal mapping of the family of each member onto 
the common family allows for the nexiflcation of the group. It can be seen then,
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that to attempt to identify problems and dysfunction of one member of a family is 
an impotent gesture unless one undehakes to understand the story of the family, 
which may never be able to be done because the group is closed against such 
infiltration. Acknowledgment of the complexity of the familial situation is 
imperative in understanding personal problems of the members. Given the 
operations in place discussed in Laing's aforementioned work, the struggle of 
the individual who may clash with the "phantasy" of the family which is in conflict 
or in confusion, thus making positions of the member untenable or false or 
negated, is an almost overwhelming one in terms of intricacy and elaborateness. 
When conflict and dysfunction occur, intervention is undertaken in many 
instances. Laing discusses the medical model upon which much intervention is 
based, saying that it is the medical model of a social situation, construing the 
situation through a structured definition of what it may be. Instead, he says, the 
complicated network must be examined for the story of its history, environment, 
interactions, linguistics, and other Intricacies, in order to understand the 
individual therein. The difference, he says, between tfie social and the medical 
diagnosis is that the training is in a sequential process of treatment after 
investigation and diagnosis, whereas in the social intervention the professional 
meets the situation in a reciprocal relationship which overlaps, tolerates change 
and redefinition, and in which intervention Is phasic. The social situation (the 
"family") cannot be approached with a medical process.
Laing discusses the family in social contexts with respect to treatment of 
schizophrenia, indicating primarily that no one can really agree upon what 
schizophrenia Is, venturing that sometimes when attributes of schizophrenia are 
ascribed, then schizophrenic behavior is Induced, thereby affirming the 
diagnosis. He ponders that if some behavior is said to "cause" schizophrenia, 
then to what extent does schizophrenia "cause" subsequent behavior; how
106
much does the symptomology of a disease increase as the person is treated as 
if diseased (pp. 46 - 47), He ventures that the behavior of the schizophrenic, In 
light of his discussion of groups and families and their influence upon individual 
perception of reality and development of the individual, is much more intelligible 
if placed in the context of the environment In which it exists. Rationality begins 
to surface as the famiiy context of the schizophrenic is investigated, irrationality 
is often the child of an Irmtional network (Speck, 1966 in Laing, 1969, p. 50).
Cooper (1967, in Laing, 1969, p. SO) indicates that perhaps the 
environment of treatment enhances schizophrenic behavior, that because the 
person may be in hospital he is therefore treated as a "patient", i.e. one who is 
sick, and therefore, perhaps behaves more like "one who is sick".
Consequently, if one is treated in a home-like environment in an everyday 
manner, behavior rises to meet the inherent expectations of such an 
environment. Bateson (1961 in Laing, 1969, pp. 50 - 52) suggests that perhaps 
transformations are a natural growth, or evolution up out of conflict, and that they 
would be best left to go on unhindered if psychiatrists were not consulted.; that 
there is a sequence of events through which a person must transform, regress 
and then grow again. If a process is introduced (psychiatric, for example) which 
may "stick or stop the person from proceeding through the transformation.
When this occurs the schizophrenic may not know how to move ahead. He 
submits that the term "schizophrenia" itself may be restrictive.
Laing begins the second part of his work with consideration of the famiiy 
and invalidation. He says that families are structures which are products of 
behaviors and experience, perhaps unknown to those who generate and 
perpetuate it. Certain adherence must be made for the survival of the famiiy. 
Events which happen with persons are composed of the experience of the 
person of the event (which Laing refers to as "A") (pp. 66 • 74), and the public
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view of the event ("B"). He uses the example of Jack and Jill marrying to 
Illustrate his point, saying that the marriage Involves the feeling of married and 
the public marriage ceremony or ritual. "A", he says Is "mapped" onto "B" (which 
he says Is the function of ritual In the family). If A fits B, and both the getting 
married and the feeling married are reality, then all Is well. If, however, one's 
experience of married does not match the event which took place, then It 
becomes necessary to disavow the experience, or Invalidate It to preserve the 
marriage. If the self disavows "A" and takes refuge In "B" (I.e., there was a 
ceremony so it must be real, therefore the being married is the reality and the 
not feeling married is not reality) then there Is disavowal and excommunication 
of the reality of the felt experience. If the Individual cannot tailor A to fit B, then 
he Is seen as In need of help, and perhaps a psychiatrist or therapist is called. 
The message is that If the public explanation of the event cannot be accepted, 
then labeling takes place. Invalidation of the experience of self occurs. The 
personal dysfunction is a retain to a more intricate external situation.
In order for families to survive, Its members must Internalize its 
phantasies and its structures; must become and maintain certain "ways". 
Families employ certain techniques In order to mold its members to suit the 
understood definition of that particular "family"; they often employ them 
unconsciously. Sets of elements or relations may be projected or mapped onto 
an Individual which may temporarily or eventually permanently maintain or alter 
him. Laing gives the example of members internalizing that "Johnny Is the 
image of his grandfather" (p. 77). These projections are of little use unless the 
Individual complies In their "truth", and so, members are Induced to embody 
these projections or maps, to "become" this entity. The person is Induced by use 
of attributes which are told to the person (he Is told what he Is; I.e. Johnny Is the
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smart one, etc.); by instruction, or by Injunction (order to behave in ways that 
are like what is desired).
One generation "projects to the next, elements derived from a product of 
at least three factors; what was 1 ) projected into it by prior generations 2) 
Induced in It by prior generations 3) its response to this projection and 
induction" ( p. 77). If an individual begins to find himself in conflict with these 
projections, mappings and induction [Laing refers to the process as awakening 
"from an induced trance" (p. 82)], he may find himself to be in a situation of 
transition, and may either be identified as crazy by the family or fear he is crazy. 
Because of the complexity of the projection and induction process, because the 
process is very smoothly, and often unconsciously run, and because it exists 
temporally through generations, families are difficult to study, and individual 
problems are difficult to "see" in terms of the context of the family. It may be 
tempting, for these reasons, to treat them in isolation.
James quotes Hagel (p. 89) as saying that the world "is a unity of the 
given and the constructed"; that is to say, a unity of what is experience and what 
is made from it. A person meets what is given, and construes it in terms of 
distinctions or categories, according to ruies. He performs operations on his 
experience in order to comply with the ruies. Experience is categorized 
according to good /  bad, real / unreal, inside / outside experience, myself / not 
myself, etc. Normally, this helps him to understand the world and helps his 
experience to make sense.
If difficulties arise with the categories of good / bad, for example, the 
person will perform certain operations upon the categories to conform, to 
normalize his experience: through introjection, he places what is outside of him. 
inside; through projection, places what is inside of him, outside. In 
psychoanalysis, these operations are called defense mechanisms, and also
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include denial, splitting (the division of a set of categories Into two subsets with 
no traffic between), which appears to be the opposite of Identification (the 
merging of two separate sets of categories as one); displacement or "taking out 
on"; scotomlzation (not seeing); replacement; rationalization; repression; 
regression; mystification or misidentlflcation; and reversal ("I hate him because 
he hates me) (pp. 95 - 96).
The operations are necessarily performed to normalize experience. If an 
experience ought to be pleasant, then It Is operated upon to make it so; if the 
experience, says Laing, Is forbidden, then It is sacrificed for a higher value, all of 
these In ways that are for the most part, unconscious. The rules of families may 
require this process of operation, and this requirement demands another 
requirement that all members co-operate. A "transpersonal system of collusion" 
(p. 97) Is then developed, In which the person Is complying with others who 
comply with him, etc.
Systems of rules and metarules (rues about rules) are r Iso present In the 
family structure and offer opportunity for conflict between and within persons. 
Values are the starting point, and are labeled positive or negative, optional or 
neutral, and are Involved in appropriate times for all expressions of these values. 
When positive values are mapped onto a positive range, then there Is support.
If negative values are mapped onto a negative range then there Is support. If 
cross-mapping occurs (positive values to negative range /  negative values to 
positive range) then there Is conflict. There are rules about rules, rules Involving 
experience, rules about attributes, about knowing about rules, about situations, 
what can be spoken about and what rules can be spoken about. Metarules 
Involve times, where, when, to whom. In what context what is verbal and non­
verbal and what can be thought about. A vast field of possible conflict and 
disruption exists.
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The system of “mapping" Is involved in family dynamics, and takes place 
when elements and relations between elements from one set of categories 
(domain) are mapped onto the elements and relations between elements of 
another set of categories (range). Elements can be mapped set to set or set to 
itself. Families project (send elements) and map elements outside of themselves 
from themselves: from outside to themselves, and within from themselves to 
themselves. Processes of induction are present when sets of elements are 
received having been sent by another; processes of introjection take piace 
when sets of elements are received, having been sent by self. Processes of 
projection, re-projection and re-re-projection, etc. take place. It is important, 
when looking at individual to be aware of and to understand how the content of 
these processes exist, how the structure of the processes are designed, and the 
techniques employed.
With every explanation of process offered, the complexity of human 
conflict becomes more evident. It becomes impossible to look at individual 
conflict and dysfunction out of these contexts: impossible to imagine 
approaching them in an isolated, quick fashion. Any process which attempts to 
deal with dysfunction in this way should be suspect.
This focus Is maintained throughout The Divided Selfil 960). An 
existential - phenomenological attempt to explain the nature of the experience of 
a person with the world and the self should be found within the context of the 
person. Consequently, an explanation of the nature of a split in the personality 
ought to be sought In the context of the person. He says that the language of 
psychology further isolates an individual already isolated; though necessary to 
understanding the predicament of the individual, should not be used exclusively. 
The manner in which a person is perceived determines the type of Information 
forthcoming, and therefore, a human perspective is necessary. A purely
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psychopathological account of "depersonalization and disintegration" (p. 23) 
only serves to perpetuate dualism, and a way must be sought to discover the 
patient's way of "being himself in this world" (p. 25). In order to achieve this, the 
patient's way of being must be appreciated and it must be understood that both 
separateness and relatedness are essential to being.
Understanding psychosis from an existential - phenomenological 
perspective avails a different perspective: instead of seeing schizophrenia In 
negative terms (I.e. maladjustment), one may interpret that the schizophrenic 
perhaps sees things that others do not. Instead of seeing "signs of a disease"
(p. 31), one may see sense in the actions of the schizophrenic as related to his 
feelings. If the person's actions are purely seen as functions of a disease or as 
functions of his past, the understanding of him may be restricted. He must be 
understood with an attitude of human caring.
Laing says that we should discover who the person is for him, who he is 
for the other and who the other thinks he is: the degree of "conjunction or 
disjunction" regarding these, between two people when one is "sane by 
common consent", tests "sanity or psychosis" (p. 36). In all of us is the desire to 
reveal ourselves to others, and the desire to conceal, the latter desire 
exacerbated by vulnerability.
Laing outlines the process of the splitting of the person, beginning with 
the concept of security, defenses against a threatened security, and the creation 
of new "selves". In the presence of Primary Ontological Security, a person feels 
their presence as alive, whole and continuous through time; in addition, he sees 
others and the world as so (p. 39). When this security is absent, ordinary life 
experiences are a threat to the person, and because others are not perceived to 
be this way, he cannot share his experience of life with others. Anxiety results, 
of which, there are three types. Enguifment anxiety occurs when there Is no
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state except either complete aloneness or complete enguifment. Every 
relationship (being seen, loved, understood, etc.) threatens loss of identity. 
Though isolation is painful, enguifment is perceived as deadly, implosion 
anxiety occurs when the person feels empty, but because this is the identity of 
the person, contact would be implosive and destructive. Depersonalization or 
petrification anxiety exists when there is dread of being turned to stone.
Constant confirmation of the self as a person is necessary. Paradoxically, the 
characteristics of these three anxieties can be employed to prevent the 
anxieties. The oerson, in turning himself to stone, in engulfing himself, 
consuming himseif with iove or depersonalizing others may prevent him from 
being so changed by others. However, this consequently increases the 
Insecurity, and the vicious circle continues. If the person cannot feel 
autonomous, he cannot feel related either. Conversely, he may also use 
complete merging as a defense as well.
How is security related to a split? Security breeds a feeling of unity; 
conversely, insecurity exacerbates the anxieties and the defenses, breeding 
disunity between the mind and the body, with the person usually more 
associated with the mind. An embodied person feels in the body; feels a sense 
of unity, aliveness, vitality and substance. His body is the base of reference for 
his experiences and relationships between himself and others. A person 
experiencing disunity, experiences feelings of detachment, wherein his body is 
just another object in a world of objects and is outside himself as opposed to 
being his own being. His inner "true" (mind) self looks on and observes his body 
or "faise self"; a relationship is set up between the two as two entities, and he 
therefore does not experience the world in reality. The body does the 
experiencing, the impersonating, while the true self observes in a hyper­
conscious manner, and is experienced as a mental entity. Any attempt to be
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autonomous is therefore, futile, as it is only a mental construct. It objectifies 
itself and others or is indifferent for safety's sake, and therefore cannot be 
enriched by the outer world or by others and becomes impoverished. The more 
the self is defended this way, the more, paradoxically, it is destroyed (p. 77).
The split, then, consists of two elements; the mental, or unembodied self 
which is the executor of functions of the second element - the false self system. 
The false self system is that housed in the body, and is involved with body 
experiences and actions. The mental or unembodied self is dissociated, a 
condition normal in life for most. In situations of danger, for instance, it is natural 
to depersonalize until the danger has passed. The distinction involved in 
schizoid dissociation is in its function as a basic "orientation to life" (p. 79) in 
response to the perception of life as a threat, as opposed to a temporary coping 
device. All actions are delegated to this false self, and the world cannot 
therefore be experienced in a real way, and therefore, is unreal. This situation 
exacerbates the emptiness felt by the person, making matters worse. Laing (p. 
82) illustrates the normal personal relationship involving the self and body 
together interacting with the "other" or other things and people in the world. The 
relationship of the individual having undergone the split is such that the self 
stands apart, interacting with the body and the world and considering them both 
outside as such; (self / body ) <r¥ other; self <-> ( body + other ).
The isolation of the self has been set up as a means for control and 
protection against both the fear of love destroying them, and their love 
destroying others. Since the reality of the self in the world comes from the 
relationship between the self and the world, the isolated self experiences 
emptiness, and therefore may create another split in the inner unembodied self, 
setting up a relationship with the self, to mitigate the emptiness. The freedom 
and control of the isolated self has been only a phantasy. The person, at the
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same time he creates the isolation, may "long for and envy" (p. 91) what he 
imagines that others have, but he cannot participate without the overwhelming 
loss to himself (enguifment, implosion, petrification) and therefore, out of this 
conflict arises devastating fear, anxiety and guilt.
The second element of the schizoid condition is the false self system of 
which the body is the center, and operates in response to the direction of the 
inner or umembodied "true" self. All persons have, to some degree, "masks", 
and operate to some degree in mechanical state or role; the person who has 
split, however, requires the process to survive, even if the state makes the 
person miserable, it is seen by the person as a separate entity. The false self 
may respond to the will of others, complying (being whatever the other wants of 
it, i. e. perfectly "good" or perfectly "bad") out of fear of the consequences of 
being his true self. He, in concealing the possibilities of his true self, also 
restricts and denies them, There is, according to Laing, hatred involved for this 
necessity, but the hatred cannot be directly revealed lest it upset the 
compliance, and so subtle expressions of the hatred may occur in such actions 
as deliberate or compulsive, total or partial, temporary or permanent 
impersonation of the hated person, or exaggerated compliance (p. 100). He 
may develop a whole system of impersonations, and may use them to evoke 
from others the hatred he himself cannot express. The inner self may hate the 
caricature (s) if it (they) take over, and if there is too much threat from the 
caricature, the inner self may strip the self of ail behavior (catatonic withdrawal) 
(p. 105). He may, as well, suddenly unveil the false self entirely, revealing the 
true self, which has during the process of the splitting, been accommodating the 
split condition with increasingly insane methods, and so, when revealed, reflects 
this.
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Self • consciousness consists, according to Laing, of the awareness of 
oneself by oneself, and the awareness "of oneself as an object of someone 
else's observation" (p. 106). Both are related, and in the person experiencing 
the split, there is an enhanced awareness of both the self for the self and the self 
as the object of the attention of others. This awareness is compulsive, and 
needed to sustain the security of his existence. It serves as a way of making 
sure he and others exist, but at the same time, this visibility is an exposure to 
danger, and so he tries to make himself more detached and invisible, which is in 
conflict with the need to be seen to secure the truth of his existence. Both states 
are then dreaded, making a precarious dilemma. He may split once more in 
order to allow part of himself to see himself, but this again sets up the dilemma 
in that the part seeing is feared to persecute.
Laing sees the sane schizoid individual as distinct from the from the 
psychotic one in the progress of the process of increasingly elaborate means 
required to maintain the false self system, which increasingly damage the 
person. The need for autonomy and reality are in conflict; the more the identity 
is preserved, the more it is lost. The person is therefore anything he wishes in 
"phantasy... nobody in reality" (p. 142). Compliance may increase to a state of 
belief in actual possession by or of others, and "magical” (p. 145) ways of 
acquiring reality may be adopted (such as touching, copying, imitating or 
'stealing'), The person may subject himself to pain or terror in order to feel, or 
may reveal the real self (which has not been In touch with reality through the 
process of the split) suddenly. He may try to "kill" his real self, as a defense or 
through guilt, by denying it. The logic here is if the self Is "killed" it cannot be 
destroyed. The inner self, in this "killing" may become itself split, losing its 
identity and integrity. The person may approach "a state - of • death " in life (p. 
176).
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As the basic split fails to do the trick, the process increases In complexity 
reaching the status which Laing refers to as "chaotic nonentity" (p. 162), in 
which the person displays unusual order of speech and actions, perhaps to 
confuse others to preserve its own secrecy; in trying to be outside of everything, 
has become someone who doesn't know "who or what he is" or who "has 
become something or someone other than himself" (p. 172).
To simplify the analysis of the situation then, to remove it from the 
individual human context, is to miss the understanding of the complexity of fears 
and insecurities precipitating the phenomena.
We may accept that the investigation of a person's thoughts, and the 
processes necessarily involve a respect for diversity, context, and a range of 
factors. Behavior resulting from the thinking processes are complex, and 
deserve a recognition of this fact in any attempt at understanding. Laing has 
provided insight regarding the role of others, both in society in general, and 
those others deemed significant to the person.
if we consider Laing's ideas when examining MPD, we may find several 
important issues. It seems fragmented to investigate the person in isolation.
The person is a part of a whole story, a whole family and a whole society. To 
examine the phenomenon of MPD, one must include related others, their 
relationships with the person, the rules of that relationship, etc. These are all 
important to a broader and closer understanding of the person. Absolute 
understanding appears impossible. This is a critical view with respect to 
education as well, whether dealing with persons exhibiting MPD characteristics, 
or any other student.
Sexuality is also involved in MPD literature. To understand some of the 
nature of sexuality and its role in the development of personality, the work of 
Sigmund Freud will be discussed.
ÇhâBtera
Personality and Sexual Development - The Work of Sigmund Freud
Research on Multiple Personality Disorder has suggested a correlation 
with abuses (Ross & Miller et al, 1991 : Wilbur, Multiple Personality and Child 
Abuse: An Overview, Kluft, 1987; Curtis & Fraser, Fifth Draft, F3 - 31 #5; 
Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Rivera, 1991; Curtis, 1988; Frye, Nov., 1990), 
sexual abuse being one type (remembering that correlation cannot be confused 
with causation). Freud provides us with the idea that sexuality in a broader 
sense, concerning pleasure needs, is incorporated thoroughly and throughout 
our lives, from infancy. Our sexuality is involved in our general needs, in ways 
In which those needs are satisfied or not satisfied. Damage done to the 
developing personality involves satisfaction or deprivation related to needs, and 
it is therefore that damage done relates to sexuality. Therefore, it would be 
appropriate to address the process of sexual development as related to 
personality development in the discussion of the disorder. A mature, balanced 
personality necessarily involves a mature, balanced sexuality, it is wise to 
understand the nature of sexuality as it relates to one's entire life span, and the 
importance of healthy needs satisfaction, if we are to understand the student as 
a whole, at any given age. It is especially important to understand sexuality as it 
relates to MPD for a more complete appreciation of the phenomenon.
This chapter will commence with discussion of general ideas surrounding 
Freud's work, most importantly to this topic, the impact of sexuality as related to 
the development of the personality. His theory of personality will be reviewed, 
involving discussion of the id, the ego and the superego, and how psychic 
energy is concerned with them. Regarding the role of conflict, next 
addressed in this chapter, issues of balance, growth and problems will be 
examined. Finally, the role and development of sexuality will be considered.
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Convinced that the sexual process originated early In life, was life-long, 
and had Impact upon human behavior and experience, Sigmund Freud (1856 - 
1939) suggested that "...neurotic anxiety arose from sexual sources...[and] ...had 
a physical basis in dammed-up sexuality" becoming converted to anxiety 
through repression (Roazen, 1973, p. 5) According to Freud In "Sexuality and 
the Aetiology of the Neuroses" (Freud in Strachey, 1953,22 : 263, in Roazen, 
1973, p. 5) "...the most significant causes of every case of neurotic illness are to 
be found in factors arising from sexual life". His personality theory was unique in 
that it allowed for an unprecedented notion of infantile sexuality, already formed 
in the child by the age of four or five, the ensuing years just bringing "to light 
what is already within him" (Freud in Strachey, 1953,16: 356, in Roazen, 1973,
p.6).
In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1901 - 1905, in Stafford- 
Clark, 1966, p. 105) Freud gives an account of neuroses, repression and the 
libido associated with sexuality.
influenced by Darwin, Fechner and von Hemholtz (Hall, 1954, pp. 11 - 
21), Freud accepted that man was a being of nature whose mind could be 
studied scientifically, and whose energy could be quantified. He created a 
"dynamic" psychology involving the study of the "transformation and exchanges 
of energy within the personality" (p. 13), developing a theory of personality and 
sexual development.
What is the structure of the personality? According to Freud, the 
personality is organized into three systems: the id, the ego and the superego, 
which, when balanced in their efforts, result in adjustment; when in conflict, 
result in maladjustment.
The id is a reflex apparatus which operates on the pleasure principle, 
results in impulse and deals in the reaim of phantasy. It is unconscious.
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instinctual, and has no values, nothing corresponding to time or space or 
category, It has no idea, no organization and is the mental expression of 
somatic processes (Freud, 1932 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 837) Its energy is from 
the instincts of the body; it exists to alleviate tension produced by need. It 
releases energy through impulsive motor activity (such as sneezing), and 
through creating image of that which is required to fulfill the need when the 
immediate motor release is not sufficient (as with hunger). This creation of 
image is subjective, and is known as the primary process or wish fulfillment 
(Hall, 1954, pp. 22-31).
When the id fails to satisfy needs with motor response, it creates image 
and wish fulfillment. Since it cannot tell the difference between real objects and 
images, and since the image of a necessary object (food for hunger) does not 
satisfy the need, something further Is required. The ego is developed up out of 
the id for this purpose, using energy from the id (Hall, 1954, pp. 22 - 31). It is a 
perceptual conscious system which mediates the external and Internal (Freud In 
Hutchins, 1952, p. 838) The ego operates on the reality principle, and solves 
problems in the real world to acquire for the Id that which it demands. This 
process is called the secondary process. The ego uses reason, logic and a 
knowledge of the real world to set a plan of action to solve the problem. The 
ego uses its energy to serve the needs of the id, to master the impulses of the 
Id, and to improve its own skills of memory, logic and knowledge of reality (Hall, 
1954, pp. 22-31).  In many respects the ego of one person forms like that of 
another (usually the parent) through identification with that person (Freud in 
Hutohins, 1952, p. 832).
The world reacts to the operations of the ego in the world, with either 
punishment or reward, and a part of the ego splits to deal with this reaction. It is 
called the super-ego, and is formed from experiences with parents and other
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models (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 830-833). Controlling the domain of 
morality, it has two subsystems; the ego • Ideal, resulting from praise, leading to 
pride and self-love (secondary narcissism); and conscience, resulting from 
punishment, leading to guilt. Inferiority and self-hate. It enforces physical and 
psychological punishment and reward on the system as a parent would. Where 
the id operates upon wishes and phantasy, and the ego in reality, the super-ego 
operates upon the ideal (Hall, 1954, pp. 22 - 31).
How does the structure operate? The driving force operating the 
subsystems Is the psychic energy, or energy from the Instincts [in the broader 
sense, the libido (Hall, 1954, p. 59)]. Psychic energy is transformed bodily 
energy for the psychologic purpose of reducing tension either directly, to fuse 
instincts, to compromise or to defend. Two instincts exist for the person; those 
of life (body needs and sexual instincts) and death (aggression and 
destruction). The energy used In the life Instincts, or the libido (used in the more 
general sense), is taken by the ego to serve the body needs and to transform the 
death instincts to those more appropriate for life (for example, changing 
aggression to competition).The seat of the instinct Is the Id which provides the 
whole system with the energy to move the being from a state of tension to a 
state of relaxation, or non-tension. The Instinct has a source (needs); an aim 
(removal of need); and object (means by which need Is removed); and an 
Impetus (force). It is characterized by conservatism (move to relaxation), 
regression (return to pre-need state) and repetitiveness.
The psychic energy Is distributed throughout the system. When 
completed in a smooth and balanced manner, there Is an efficient use of the 
limited energy creating a synthesized system and a mature ego, Each part of 
the system uses the energy in a different manner, When the id needs, it invests 
the energy in a reflex action or in the creation of an object choice or object
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cathexis to fulfill that need. If that object does not fulfill the need, the energy is 
used to travel form one object to another to locate the fulfillment, a process 
known as displacement. Not able to differentiate, it equates one object with 
another (predicate thinking). Its energy is also used to break through restrictions 
created by the ego (impulsive and wanting the ego to see what the id wishes) to 
discharge itself in phantasy or action. When this occurs, reality has been lost 
(Hall, 1954, 39-48).
The ego uses energy to satisfy the id safely, to restrain the id by 
postponing or blocking the discharge of the id (anti-cathexis) and to synthesize 
the three systems. It checks reality (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 838), changes 
wish fulfillment to logical thought, and chooses objects to fulfill needs (ego- 
cathexis). It uses energy also to develop memory, discrimination, judgment, etc.
It sees what is realistic.
The superego creates the ego-ideal or the conscience, which denies the 
id as opposed to postponing its discharge, concerning itself with goodness and 
badness as opposed to truth and falseness. Very young children are amoral, 
with no superego developed (Freud In Hutchins, 1952, p. 833). It seems to 
operate against the id, but the id can satisfy itself by turning the superego 
against itself through self-aggression, or through masking true motives (ultra- 
moralism masking cruelty). The superego wishes the ego to see what should be 
- the moral ideal. (Hall, 1954, pp. 46 - 49).
Conflict created in the operation of the three systems result in frustration, 
anxiety and coping mechanisms (defenses), some of which are positive to the 
person and some of which distort and are negative for the individual. What 
precipitates frustration? The superego and the ego may block the discharge of 
tension, causing internal frustration {versus external frustration as the result of 
privation or deprivation). The process is known as anti-cathexis, concerns either
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the id • ego or the ego * superego, and operates In the execution of repression.
If anti-cathexis opposes a thought, then the memory is repressed, and no 
conscious memory of the thing exists. This is opposed to forgetting, which takes 
place when the force to remember is weak, causing memory to not occur in the 
first place. Repression occurs with experiences of pain, and those associated 
with pain forcing them to the realm of the unconscious, which Freud defines as 
"what is unknown" (Hall, 1954, p. 56). We are not directly aware of that which is 
unconscious, but we know of it in that we are "obliged to assume...[it, because 
we]...infer it in some was from its effects" (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 835).
Painful emotions resulting from the excitation of internal organs is known 
as anxiety, and alerts the person to danger. Either the ego handles the anxiety 
or is overwhelmed by it, creating a nen/ous breakdown. Three kinds of anxiety 
exist; reality anxiety (fear of real things); neurotic anxiety (fear of the object - 
choice of the id) and moral anxiety (fear of the superego and punitive effects). 
When experiences are overwhelming, a trauma occurs, which reduces the 
person to helplessness, which are the origins of all fears (Hail, 1954, pp. 61 • 
69).
The earliest experiences of life, according to Freud, can be traced to the 
adult personality (Stafford - Clark, 1966, p. 116). Coping mechanisms designed 
to alleviate anxiety and conflict in the person become stabilized over the course 
of the person's life, resulting in a personality type. How does the personality 
develop?
Maturity, external frustration, internal conflict, perceived personal 
inadequacies and anxiety all initiate change in the personality. Methods used to 
resolve conflict are employed. The person may identify with or incorporate the 
qualities of an object or person in a narcissistic way (wanting to be the object); in 
a goal'Oriented way (identifying with someone achieving the goals desired by the
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person): in a way that substitutes for a loss (becoming like that which is lost or 
that which rejects); or out of fear (identification with the aggressor). The 
individual may displace, or substitute another object for that desired, or he may 
deflect or sublimate the desire to another object (Hall, 1954, pp. 72 - 85).
Problems of the individual are either solved or reality is distorted and 
falsified by means of defense mechanisms (Hall, 1954, pp. 85 • 96; Stafford • 
Clark, 1966, pp. 44 - 45; Bruner in Roazen, 1973, p. 28). Generally, these 
mechanisms, especially if used in excess to respond to overwhelming 
circumstances, waste energy and are dangerous if allowed to dominate the 
individual's behavior.
Conflict may be dealt with by repression, seated within the ego, but 
possibly instigated by the superego. Primal repression is that of the race of 
mankind, as seen in taboos against incest. Repression proper is the individual 
barring or disguised discharge of a dangerous memory or idea, especiaily those 
traumatic or associated with trauma, it is a necessary mechanism, but is 
damaging when used exclusively to problem solve.
in the course of projection, the causes of anxiety are foisted upon the 
external world, and justified in the transformation of a neurotic or moral fear to 
one of supposed reality. Masking of reactions (as opposed to substitution) is 
called reaction formation, and conceals the true reaction of the person, it 
distorts reality, and wastes energy.
When fears of failure, insecurity and punishment overwhelm. 
Immobilization may occur In the form of fixation at a certain stage in one's life 
(infancy, childhood, adolescence or adulthood); in the form of fixation upon 
certain objects; or in the form of fixation at certain developmental stages in the 
personality (i.e. wishful thinking). Regression is In the same arena, but rather 
than involving a failure to move on, is performed by a running back after certain
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stages have been passed, to a previous stage. Any departure from the rational 
is considered regression.
What is the role of sexuality?
Freud attributed young children with a sexual nature, naming it infantile 
sexuality (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 119 -152; Stafford - Clark, 1966, p.
107), proposing that the causes of many conflicts in later life were originated In 
the sexual nature. Inferiority, for Instance, he submitted, had a "strong erotic 
basis, in that the child feels unloved, transferring the parental rejection or loss to 
the superego, which expressed the "unloved" in guilt, which is parallel to moral 
Inferiority (Freud In Hutchins, 1952, p. 833).
How does the sexuality develop? The genital and other body zones 
(erogenous zones) are involved in the expenditure of energy for pleasurable 
purposes. These zones are the oral, the anal and the sexual zones; they are 
the first sources of excitation and pleasure for the child, and also involve the 
greatest sources of conflict with parents and society, therefore, become very 
important. Experiences are created around each, and habitual behavior or 
prototypes develop out of these experiences in varying degrees. Prototypes 
arise from the original methods of dealing with pain Incorporated Into a trait, and 
each action can be involved in reaction, projection, fixation and repression. (Hall, 
1954, pp. 102-111).
Erotic tactual (sucking and stroking) and aggression through biting are 
associated with the mouth area or oral zone. Personality types paralleling 
actions are the acquisitive, or taking-in; the tenacious or holding on; the 
destructive or biting; and rejection and refusal arising out of spitting and closing 
the mouth. The anal zone involves expulsion and elimination. Conflict is created 
in early life with toilet training. Prototypes involve primitive discharge (of rage, 
for instance), compulsive neatness, creative production, or retention.
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The sexual zone Involves a preoccupation with the genitals and the 
phallic stages of both the female and the male, slightly different In each (Hall,
1954, pp, 109-112). In the male phallic stage, the male loves mother and 
Identifies with the father, eventually wanting mother exclusively, becoming 
jealous of the father. This complex Freud called the Oedipus Complex Freud in 
Hutchins, 1952, p. 834). In time, the son begins to fear punishment for this 
desire, mainly in the form of fear of castration. Fear of castration arises from the 
observation that females, having no penis, may have lost theirs in such activity; 
and that father's penis, being larger, denotes more power. The desire for mother 
weakens with this fear, with the realization of the impossibility of this with 
maturity, and with disappointments one naturally finds in mother as time passes. 
Desire for the mother is renounced, replaced with either an Identification with the 
father ( perhaps out of fear of the father), or identification with the
mother (out of the loss of possessing the mother totally). Since Freud believed 
we are all constitutionally bisexual, he believed that the stronger of the 
characteristics (male or female) would emerge as the main component here, and 
that heterosexual or homosexual development would be related. In the female 
phallic stage, the love of mother Is the primary state, with no early identification 
with the father. Discovering she has no penis, she blames mother for this, 
begins to prefer and Identify with father. The wanting of the penis she is without, 
Freud called penis envy. Eventually, the daughter loves the father, wanting him 
exclusively for herself, and feeling jealous of the mother; the state Freud called 
the Electra Complex (Stafford-dark, 1966, p. 126). This state passes with the 
realization of the Impossibility of the possession of father, with maturity. With 
the female as well, the Identification process following may be related to the 
development of heterosexual or homosexual traits, depending upon which parent
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Is the model for Identification (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 859 - 860; Hall, 
1954, pp. 11 -112).
A latency period follows the phallic stages of both the male and female, 
lasting from approximately five years of age until adolescent sexual 
development. Heretofore the stages of the developing sexuality have all been 
pregenital. In the pregenital period, the focus Is that of body pleasure and 
primary narcissism or that of self-love (distinguished from secondary narcissism 
which is involved with pride of the superego when the person identifies with the 
ideals). The object Is the body of the self and the parents who are involved also 
In giving body pleasure. Narcissism, Freud proposes, leads to a normal interest 
in others of the same sex, socially acceptable, and acting as a transition stage 
from the person's love of himself to the peiaon's love of an unknown sex (the 
opposite sex). At adolescence the person cathects or desires the opposite sex, 
and the focus is upon these object choices, versus narcissism, the aim being 
reproduction. Sexual or love objects are those to which the libido is directed. All 
pregenital cathexis become fused with the genital, but still can be traced In 
experiences of stroking, sucking, foreplay, etc.
Displacements, sublimation and transformations of these desires become 
part of the character of the person. Sexual partners in adult life, for Instance, 
may be parent figure similar (Stafford - Clark, 1966, p. 128). Perversions occur 
when there is "incomplete maturity of sexual object and aim which prevent full 
union of any kind with another individual (p. 119). Freud offered examples of 
voyeurism and exhibitionism as parallel states of fixation at a child-like state; 
sadism and masochism as another parallel set of states involving aggression. 
Fetishism concerns the abnormal object selection, chosen because it is a symbol 
of the possibility of completion (p. 123).
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At the period of adulthood (after approximately two decades), their 
personality becomes stabilized (Hall, 1954, pp. 116 • 122). Not necessarily the 
same as well-adjusted, the concept simply means that routine consistency has 
developed In the way a person Interacts with the world. It could, and hopefully 
does Involve balance and adjustment. Well-adjusted persons use problem 
solving techniques, logic; they use anti-cathexis against the object cathexis of 
the Id and the idealized cathexis of the ego - In other words, establish realistic 
procedures as opposed to ideal or wishful ones. They Insure prevention of 
distortion and falseness. Stabilization may focus around defenses, coping 
patterns, fixations or withdrawals, or a combination of these. Sublimations, 
displacements, fusion and transformation of instincts have been established at 
adulthood, and though change occurs until the person dies, most change after 
adulthood involves a variation of the established patterns. The stabilized 
personality Is one in which the "psychic energy has found more or less 
permanent and constant ways of expending itself In performing psychologic 
work" (p. 122).
When development Is denied or repressed, abnormalities arise. 
Acceptance and encouragement, love and Inclusiveness seem here, as in other 
theories of development, to induce a balanced maturity, involving and Including 
a balanced sexual maturity.. There is but a limited amount of psychic energy, 
needed for smooth operation. The greater the cathexis to one thing, the less is 
left to the individual (Stafford - Clark, 1966, p. 129).
We may understand from this chapter that sexuality, broadly and 
erotically considered, in a life-long process, incorporates the need for pleasure 
and the drive to satisfy this need. Experiences discovered in the process of 
satisfying these needs teach and shape the person. Love, self-love, pride and
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love of others are Involved, as are self-esteem, pride, identification, and fuli, 
mature union with another; ail related aspects are vital elements of the person.
Several important ideas in Freud's work may relate to MPD. Sexuality 
appears inclusive of more than intercourse. It seems important to a great deal of 
our broader pleasures and needs throughout our lives, and follows a course of 
development based upon an adequate and encouraging satisfaction of those 
needs. If those needs are denied, or satisfaction depends upon damaging 
coping mechanisms, then harm is done to the person. MPD appears to be a 
coping mechanism, and so, may involve harm to both sexuality in the broader 
sense, and in the more matured, focused sense.
From aspects of an internal nature, the next segment will move to 
external forces upon human development, with examination of the social theory 
of Émile Durkheim.
Chwtyg
The Person and Thought in the Context of Society - The Workof Émile
Durkheim
A full consideration of MPD entails a deeper appreciation for society's role 
in the development of the individual. How does that which the individual is, 
depend upon society? How does the individual's knowledge, and truth for the 
person depend upon society? It is important educationally, to understand in 
what way each student is a product of his or her society, and how alienation from 
that society affects that student. How the relationship with society has 
influenced the development of the student exhibiting MPD characteristics, is 
therefore critical to any educational interpretation as well. The question of how 
the school system itself is shaped by society Is an interesting inquiry. A study of 
Durkheim will provide Insight.
In the context of his or her environment, the person develops; positive 
development seeming to take place in surroundings of acceptance; less 
desirable developmental patterns occur In surroundings of alienation.
Durkheim's view of society aids in understanding the place of the individual in 
the structure of society; the sociai becomes an point of view from which to 
understand human behavior (NIsbet, 1965).
The context of the perspectives of Durkheim was one of great social and 
Industrial flux. The first part of this chapter will deal with three aspects; the 
duality of society and man; the function of society, and the function of authority 
as a mediate between man and society. The second part of the chapter will deal 
with Durkheim's response to popular pragmatist theories of the time, and will 
point out that the duality of society and man is reflected in the structure of truth.
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At the turn of, and during the first part of this century, Durkheim 
responded popuiar perspectives, to the environment created out of the French 
and Industrial Revolutions, and to the intellectual structures of the day.
Three perspectives were popular; analytic Individualism, blologism and 
moral progress. The first presumed that reality lay in man and society was 
deduced from the individual. Man was driven to liberate himself from the 
"tyranny" of Institutions in an attempt to avoid alienation from his true nature (p. 
12). Durkheim proposed that society did not begin with the individual, but was 
the source itself, irreducible and inseparable from man. Biologism sought to 
understand human nature through physiological and psychological origins, citing 
them as direct causes of human behavior. Instincts, drives, racial diversity and 
biogenic forces created personalities, which operated within a culture to make 
that culture. Durkheim proposed that it was the society that formed the 
individual. The popular idea of moral progress stated that from the nature of 
man follows progress; a forced forward movement of man resulted in an escape 
from tradition. In Durkheim's not-so-linear view, society's change resulted from 
the weakening of past authorities and order.
These notions were created in the environment of a society resulting from 
the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Sudden and encompassing 
economic and democratic changes created new language and new ideas, and 
fostered the attempt to put new elements into some kind of structure.
Four themes are carried in Durkheim's work. He traced the movement of 
the focus of society from family, community and religion to the individual, money 
and contract in Gemelnschaft und Ôôl/eschaH (1887); and discussed the 
process of social atomization, or the creation of isolated individuals in society.
He followed the replacement of monarchy, status, class, marriage and property 
with "utility, rationality and efficiency"; the move from the scared and traditional
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to the secular and rationalist (Nisbet, 1965, p. 22). He examined the 
displacement of church by state in an environment of mass democracy.
The application of science to nature and society to foster understanding 
(positivism), and conservatism (involving intellectual attitudes in opposition to 
change) influenced his study and methods. Principally, he viewed the nature of 
society as primal; that man depends morally and psychologically upon society, 
and separation from it caused anguish and Isolation. He proposed the necessity 
of authority, and observed that the morality of society was related to sacred 
values as opposed to a utilitarian morality. He asserted that society was 
organically developed, and not created and re-created.
Perspectives that formed the substance of his ideas included discussion 
of society, personality, authority, the religio-sacred and development (pp. 29 - 
112).
He saw the nature of society as primal, as everything above the physical 
and biological. More than intraindividual, it "expresses itself and becomes 
known" (p. 33) through the collective knowledge, concepts and representations 
of peoples. From the common action of society comes a collective conscience 
expressing the values of the community.
In The Division of Labour {^QQ3), he proposed that the function of society 
was to integrate and cooperate, rendering social constraint unnecessary. 
Primitive society was homogeneous, consisting of collective, repressive laws, 
with little room for the individual. Religion, cult, ritual and the whole drives and 
determines the will of the individual. This society represented a type of solidarity 
he called mechanic solidarity. The second society, a natural continuance of the 
first represented a transition to a type of solidarity he called organic solidarity, 
wherein the individual was free to pursue functions and to unite in
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"complementary roles", and wherein justice was more restitutive (Nisbet, 1965, 
p. 35). This was a more heterogeneous society.
In The Rules of Sociological Method 895), he proposed tnat all study of 
human behavior must begin with the context of social facts; that behavior was a 
function of social facts, and must be sought in "relation of that fact to some 
social end " (Nisbet 1965, p. 31). Social facts of exteriority, constraint, and 
tradition (prime elements of mechanical solidarity) are irreducible to individual, 
psychological or biological elements. He continued, according to Nisbet, these 
themes in Suicide (1897) and in The Eiemental Forms of Religious Life (1912); 
the crux of his work being that human behavior emanated from or was 
conditioned by society, society being the sum total of "groups, norms and 
institutions" (Nisbet, 1965, p. 38) forming the environment of the human being. It 
was these things, according to Durkheim, and not the instincts of man which 
were influential to human behavior.
He addressed three social problems; the question of the nature and 
substance of morality; analysis of contract and an analysis of suicide in order to 
illustrate the truth of his proposal.
Moral life cannot exist without social life. Morals come out of society, 
reflect society and operate within the context of society, as opposed to 
individually. In Moral Educatioti (1925) he proclaimed three elements of 
morality, these being the spirit of discipline; the ends (goals) of morality and 
autonomy, He saw discipline (duty) as necessary for moral conduct, Its source 
being society's sense of what ought to be. An elemental force, it Is incapable of 
reduction. Morality is useless unless it is for something (ends), These ends 
have their context in the goals of groups. A person's "rational awareness of 
reasons for what he does" (Nisbet, 1965, p. 42) provides self-responsibility.
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Contract, tie said, is not a simple "atomic act" (p. 42) between two people, 
and Is not Individual. It is the model of societal relationships made possible by 
the mores of society. It reflects the scared, and is a ritual of same, symbolizing 
man's contract with God, his society and his neighbour: the breaking of same 
equaling a sacrilege.. All of these must be prior to the notion of contract, making 
it a idea of societal influence.
Durkheim analyzed suicide, considered most individual and personal, and 
showed it to be of the larger society. In the same category as crime, economic 
conflict, etc., it reflects a pathological societal state. Three kinds of suicide 
emerged in his work; egoistic, anomic and altruistic. With egoistic suicide, the 
group cohesion declines, failing to provide support for the ego, and is 
preventable, according to Durkheim, by strong integration of society. Anomic 
suicide occurs in an environment of breakdown of system and values. Altruistic 
suicide results when social involvement is very great, and the individual feels 
some act of his has damaged the group. He accepted suicide as an individual 
act, but insisted that it reflects the moral state of a society , moreover, certain 
societies have an "aptitude" (p. 47) for it.
Behavior reflects society, and society is "indistinguishable from the 
observable data of human conduct" (p. 48). Personality, authority, religio-sacred 
and development are all manifestations of society.
In his discussion of personality, he says that society and man are 
inseparable, that man has a dual nature; social and individual. Society and 
man are fused, and society is In man, not outside of him. Man's actions are 
founded in the organism but are reflections of society, and are performed in the 
context of society. Society is interpreted by individual acts, but the individual is 
formed by the society, which Is prior to the individual. Two types of personality 
are mentioned by Durkheim: that sensitive to traditions, rules, authority and
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duty, and that which Is less bound to duty, and is more "expansive and ardent"
(p. 52). These reflect eras which are comparable; disciplined societies and 
those in flux. Man is formed through society and society through man, the one 
not able to exist without the other (Durkheim, 1915, p. 347 in Nisbet, 1965, p.
53).
By authority, Durkheim meant the discipline over the mind, which, he said 
enabled the existence of true society and true morality. Through the practice of 
moral rules, one becomes self-governing and emerges to a true freedom. 
Authority, then is necessary to freedom. Authority, Durkheim saw as the first of 
the three elements of morality, rooted in moral values, and put into action 
through discipline. The absence of authority produced the absence of a sense 
of duty and robbed real freedom. Since individual Interests may not be those of 
society, or may be in conflict with those of society, a system is necessary to 
bring the interests of society to mind; a system of moral discipline or a code of 
rules (Durkheim, 1957, p. 61 in Nisbet, 1965, p. 60). This code of rules has the 
function of forming the personality and character, leading to true freedom and 
liberty. Authority is not the collective repression of the individual, but has the 
opposite function of liberating the individual; yet it reflects the solidarity of the 
society. It is the mediate between man and society, and gives society its 
pluralism, and is manifest in church, kin, gild, etc., and receives its legitimacy 
because it originates from moral values of the society. Suicide is a reflection of 
problems with social authority and a decline in same.
The groups of society originally powerful enough to weld authority can no 
longer fix these problems. The family no longer commands authority, the 
education system, being only a reflection of society and not an influence upon it, 
cannot weld authority, political forces are too far removed from the individual to 
command authority. Durkheim's solution to the problems with authority were to
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set up collective forces outside the state, give them legal authority recognized 
by the state (Durkheim, 1951, p. 380, in Nisbet, 1965, p. 60). He viewed the 
state, the Individual and secondary authorities (family, etc.) as members having 
a triangular relationship. The rote of the state was to protect secondary 
authorities from the individual and vice versa, creating social stability. In 
primitive societies, he saw the secondary authorities as sovereign, with the state 
and the individual less well-established.. As the individual became stronger, a 
break occurred, the state assisting the individual in the break. War and 
commerce helped to strengthen the state, developing an "affinity" (Nisbet, 1965, 
p. 71) between the individual and the state. The state, able to free the 
individual, also has the power to repress him, and the role of the secondary 
authorities balanced the power with the development of civil liberties (Durkheim, 
1957, p. 63 in Nisbet, 1965, p. 73).
We may see that according to Durkheim, society is in man and man is in 
society. Man Is formed from society and it is necessary to him; that distress is 
created out of man's isolation from it. The function of society in Durkheim's 
mechanic solidarity \b restraint, and collective good, whereas the function of 
society in his organic solidarity is a fostering of interaction of individual 
freedoms. His theme of duality carries to his notion of authority, which he says 
is necessary to freedom, and lives in it. Authority, he says, functions as a 
mediate between man and society. He proposes that there is a triangularity to 
society in the individual, the state and the secondary authorities, and that, 
through the Interactions of these three, society evolves.
The duality of man is a key idea with respect to MPD. Isolation from 
society causes anguish for the individual. Any attempt to know the person 
necessarily involves a knowing of the person in the context of his or her society.
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This notion extends to a duality Involved In truth and knowledge for the 
Individual, and that for society. People come to know and believe things In the 
larger structure of the knowledge and truth for society. Durkheim's work with 
theories of pragmatism offer another insight as to how people know themselves, 
others, and truth in general. How and what the person with MPD, and how and 
what persons In the school system In general (teachers and students alike) 
know, necessarily entails knowing what that has to so with society.
Part II - Pragmatism:
Durkheim discusses truth and ways of knowing truth. He responds to the 
pragmatist theories of his time, appearing to agree with them in part, but 
appearing to want more structure for truth and knowing than that truth is 
whatever man wishes. Truth, for the pragmatists, is human, varied and variable; 
a growing, living thing. Durkheim proposes that truth has elements of moral 
obligation, necessity and impersonality, and sets about to show how this Is so in 
his responses to other theorists. In applying concepts of truth and knowledge to 
society, he says that individual thought Is needed for societal thought, and that 
societal thought Is a collective conscious, continuing the notion of duality 
discussed In his societal theory. He says that societal truth Is close to objective 
or Impersonal, and uses mythology to show truth as a higher reality which 
Imposes Itself on and is a representation of society. It Is distinct and continuous, 
he says, and obligatory.
Durkheim's lectures on pragmatism and sociology ( Allcock, 1983) will first 
be discussed as a means of determining his philosophy of ways of thinking and 
knowing, which enhances the approach to his social theory. Particular Durkheim 
lectures argue William James, as well as John Dewey and Ferdinand Schiller), 
accepting portions, and rejecting others. From this point of departure, the social
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theories of Durkheim will be reviewed (Nisbet, 1965 and Gehike, 1968), with an 
eye to exacting the nature of the person's growth or alienation within his society. 
Discussion of Durkheim, then, will provide some insight about the questions of 
how we know' how we know ourselves and the role society plays in the knowing 
process.
Three basic pragmatist theses are that truth is human; truth is varied and 
variable; and it is impossible to copy a given reality (Durkheim, 1955, in Aiicock, 
1983, p. 37). The basis of the pragmatist philosophy is that "thought creates 
truth" (Aiicock, 1983, p. xiv), not a fixed truth, but a growing and living truth more 
severe than "logical utilitarianism". Introduced in 1878 by O.S. Pierce, it became 
the basis for theories of truth developed by John Dewey, Ferdinand Schiller and 
William James. Ideas, according to James (1907, In Flew, 1979, p. 284)
"become true just so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with 
other parts of our experience". Durkheim's major criticism of truth of this nature, 
the "created" truth, what passes for truth, a " what-one-wishes" kind of truth, is 
that it is not regulated, and is the "fulcrum" (Allcock, 1983, p. xxxvii) of his 
discussion on pragmatism, The truth of pragmatists is tested in the value of It in 
action [("what is true is what is useful") (Allcock, 1983, p. 2)], but Durkheim 
calls for criteria to be placed upon such testing. Truth, he says, contains three 
necessary elements; that of moral obligation, that of necessity and that of 
impersonality (Allcock, 1983, p. xxxvlll). He sets out to show how these can be 
in the face of pragmatist arguments that they are not. Out of his treatment of 
pragmatism comes a way of knowing.
He presents the origins of pragmatism. Nietzsche, (Nietzsche, 1909 - 
1915, In Allcock, 1983, pp. 2*3) maintained that truth is determined by utility. 
Propositions and ideas are not truths or false, but are tools for inquiry, are tested 
by experience, and can only be judged to be effective or ineffective (Fiew, 1979,
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p. 173). Nietzsche allows a rarer type of truth called liberated truth, held by 
artists, for example, which Is found beneath experiences, but features the idea of 
utilitarian truth. Durkheim explains the way in which Pierce (5.308,5.401, 5.402 
and 5.407, In Durkheim, 1955, In Allcock, 1983, pp. 5-6) says the process 
occurs. Thought, says Pierce, occurs as a result of doubt. Doubt produces 
tension, and belief satisfies. Doubt gives rise to the idea, which gives rise to the 
action which makes it possible to have belief. Having belief then lessens the 
need for doubt and thought, becoming habit. A return to equilibrium is 
established, if one wishes to get a sense of the idea, one examines the habit, 
and the Idea of it will be found therein, In the event that two effects of ideas are 
the same, then the ideas are the same. In opposition to pragmatism, however, 
Pierce allows for the moral obligation of truth, or that which obliges us to believe 
it.
William James (1911, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, pp. 6-7) submits that 
we set out two types of questions: those of science and those of life. We 
cannot wait for the type of process Involving the exacting of scientific truth with 
life, as our life needs are pressing. We therefore must choose a hypothesis for 
our life and then act (as in religion). Therefore, he says, truth has a "personal 
character" (p. 7) and is inseparable from life, a characteristic upheld by Schiller, 
who calls his pragmatism, humanism (Durkheim, 1955, in Aiicock, 1983, p. 7).
Given the general nature of the concept of pragmatism, Durkheim moves 
to focus the three main points of the theories of James, Schiller and Dewey. 
Pragmatism is not a "fixed system", but a movement in a direction, and can be 
used as a method or "attitude of the mind"; as a theory of truth or as a theory of 
the universe (James, 1907, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 10).
Discussion of the criticisms by pragmatists of rationalist thought, provides 
a way of knowing the nature of pragmatism.
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In the dogmatic sense, the true Idea is the one which conforms to things, 
in which the mental representation of the object adequately fits the object - a 
direct interpretation of sense objects. Absolute Reason is copied by us. Is 
external and ready-made, "Imposing itseif", or in us imposed by God (Durkheim, 
1955, in Aiicock, p. 12). Pragmatists see the copying of reality a valueless 
exercise, and submit that the importance in our relationship to reality is in the 
way the person sees and adds to it (James, 1907, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 
1983, pp. 13 -14 )
What Is the function of truth in knowledge?
According to James, If we only think the copy of a thing, we cannot prove 
Its reality because the thought is ail we have. Therefore, thought and reality are 
separate, but Schiller and Dewey (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 16) 
solve this difficulty by proposing that thought and reality are one, and that they 
participate In one another, "linking thought and existence to life" (p. 16), a 
fundamental pragmatic notion.
If we see truth as external to us, the fact that we are obligated in some 
way to seek it is unimportant. It would still be external to us and therefore 
unable to be understood by us, Therefore It is necessary to see truth in the 
context of actions, as situational (Schiller, 1907 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 
1983, p. 17), If truth is accepted as being pure and objective and impersonal, 
then we have to accept that there is something In us, a "pure Intellect" (p, 17) 
which enables us to grasp it, but pragmatists deny this. We seek, they say; we 
choose and select for a desired end, the knower purposefully actualizing 
potential in the context of his interests and for the realization of his goals 
(Schiller, 1907, p. 186, In Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 17). Truth is 
human, and made for man, not to be isolated from him in itself or in the way it is 
grasped.
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In the same way that truth cannot be an external purely intellectual thing, 
it cannot be an absolute thing. Truth is changeable, and not fixed; it cannot be 
absoiute, because then it is not attainable. Why do we seek absolute truths? 
Perhaps because real truths are less sensational, and cannot hold our attention 
because of their changeability; that the diversity of minds grasping real truths 
prevent a universal understanding of those truths. It is argued, however, that 
diversity in persons may correspond to a diversity in truth, a "necessity" (p. 20), 
and we ought not deny that diversity by seeking absolutes.
How is reality changeable and personal ?
The idea of a static reality, sanctioned by Spencer and supported by 
concepts of the conservation of energy, indestructibiiity of matter, etc. is 
contested by Schiller. (Schille/, 1903, chap, ix, pp. 225 • 227, in Durkheim,
1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 21 -22). Even if laws are immutable, if we discover 
them, they are our creation. The future and the universe are still potential; our 
belief generates acts that affect future reality, and therefore, reality is 
changeable. That thought is linked to action and in a sense "creates reality 
itself" (p. 23) is an essential idea of pragmatism, and involves the "structure of 
the universe itself" (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 25).
The notion of reality as pluralist Is also defended as being able to be as 
real as unity (James, 1909, p. 34, in Durkheim, 1955, in Aiicock, 1983, pp. 25 • 
27 ) There is no reason to necessarily believe that there is one reality, as there 
can as easily be more which are interrelated but distinct and autonomous and 
therefore allowing room for change, as opposed to one reality where the roles of 
all parts are determined by the whole, and therefore static. Plural realities may 
be continuous and therefore able to be thought of as one for purposes of 
discussion and cognition; abie to look like one in the way that they interrelate 
with one another, but can have separate parts, "uniting things and beings with
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one another" (p. 26), and being both united and autonomous, and therefore, 
changeable,
How is thought as a duplicate of reality useless, and how are thought and 
reality heterogeneous?
If thought gives rise to judgment, which then gives rise to concept, then 
thought can generate truth and must have a "natural affinity for" i t , but James 
(1911, chapters Iv, v, & vl, pp. 47 -112 In Durkheim, 1955, In Allcock, 1983, p. 
28). and Bergson Insist that this Is not so. Concepts are distinct and 
experience-born, and are separate from other concepts, with, therefore, "no 
contact or confusion among them" (p. 28). There are simple things, which, when 
compounded can be of the thing, but as themselves are only of an aspect of the 
thing. A concept is what it is. Conceptual thought requires that reality be the 
same; James argues that reality Is changing, and shows It to be so. Reality 
needs an Infinite number of concepts to translate It, and In this Infinity Is 
therefore unfinished, therefore demanding It be divided Into units [which he calls 
"discrete pulses" (p. 29)] to accomplish change. Each time there Is a pulse, 
there Is something more or something less given to reality In the translation. 
Durkheim challenges James on this point, pointing out that the focus Is not with 
the number but whether the concepts are distinct. If the parts are distinct, then 
there Is a stopping and starting, and therefore a static, with no change. If parts 
are distinct, then they are divided, by the nature of distinction, into 
"discontinuous elements" (p. 30) and therefore, there is no change, if the parts 
are distinct, then they cannot act upon one another, contrary to any explanation 
about networks of Influence. Durkheim concludes that the Isolation of concepts 
Is an artificial construction of reality.
Radical empiricism and pluralism are secondary aspects of pragmatism, 
and discussion takes place regarding how this Is so.
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If nothing takes place outside of experience, as is the empiricist view, and 
things have a distinct relationship among them Imposed from outside, then this Is 
not reality, but logic. Therefore, this goes beyond experience, and the pragmatic 
view has no business associating itself with an empiricist view. On the other 
hand, the world is a continuous, all-linked, interpenetration of all things by all 
others, including relationships between them, so we can experience things by 
moving from one to the other. Therefore, because pragmatism allows for links 
between things, it is distinct from simple empiricism, which separates mind from 
things, but can be radical empiricism, which does not demand the separation. 
(James, 1909, pp. 238 and 280 In Durkheim, 1955, In Allcock, 1983, pp. 33-34)
In discussion of pragmatism as pluralism, James (1909, pp. 325 and 328 
in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 35) Interprets pluralism not as an 
absence of unity, but as a unity which is "untidy". Reality is flexible and 
interrelated, being able to separate and unite changing its context and its nature. 
Multiplicity and flexibility are elements of reality; Its parts can come together as 
a specific kind of unity which is at once "variable and lasting" (p. 36).
What has thought to do with reality?
The value of an idea, the truth of an Idea, lies before the reality, giving us 
choice, and orienting it to the future. The role of thought Is not to copy but to 
change reality (p. 38). Rationalists argue that whatever we do to reality merely 
is an addition, not a change, but pragmatists say that as soon as one reflects, 
one modifies reality, and in this, thought is causal. Thought and reality are one 
In the same process, and are on a continuum.
James (1890, in Durkheim, 1965, In Allcock, 1983, pp. 41 - 42) says that if 
the object and the subject are separate then knowledge Is impossible. For three 
reasons, James proposes that thought Is not separate from the objects of 
thought. . If our consciousness exists by itself, then Its role Is just one of faculty.
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There are attributes which exist both in the object and in the subject, sometimes 
as part of thought and sometimes as part of things. Thirdly, thought takes up 
what he calls "subjective space" (p. 41), in that the mental image has the 
extension of the object, which itself has physical space. If space were not 
already a part of our subjective interpretation then we couldn't make a notion of 
it. There is, rather than a separateness, a duality, in which things can be part of 
my experience, or of functional importance, at the same time that it is part of the 
physical existence unto itself, or of practical importance), and these realities 
overlap as two lines may intersect (pp. 42 -43).
Durkheim points out that if the subject and the object are the same, then 
the theory is monism, and not what it claims to be. Where, he asks (Durkheim, 
1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 43) is the knowledge which comes out of the need for 
the subject to project itself into the object in order to know it, if it is the same as 
the object? It could be in the way in which thought precedes reality, and 
therefore the sameness is in the continuity. Truth is established when 
consequences of action present themselves. False ideas bring different 
consequences, and truth is a "way in which our experiences most profitably 
combine" (James, 1909, p. 73 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 44). Truth 
is attributed to ideas out of experience, therefore, and not an absolute. Hence, 
experience gives our truth its value, and thereof, there Is unity in truth and value. 
Since the moral is, like truth, to serve us, it can no longer be distinguished from 
truth. Similarly can we compare what is true with what is real; what is true with 
what is good, etc. Differences among them are of degree and not kind, making 
all judgments value judgments, and making utility the only value, as these all 
serve utility.
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If action Is the only way through which knowledge can be considered 
((Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 44), then how is knowledge an instrument 
of action?
The extension of an object is brought to us by sensation, and can 
therefore be in us. Images cannot be part of us in the same way. There is a 
distance between the subject and the object with respect to images. There may 
be a series of images between the subject and the object, and thus, the two do 
not have to be one, but the distance between them does not have to be void, but 
the continuity of the images. How can the Images be verified ? If the series is a 
true one, and we follow the series, we arrive at the object. (James, 1912, p. 29, 
in Durkheim, 1955, In Allcock, 1983, p. 46). Concepts of the object let us be 
general, and move through these image series more quickly. Abstract ideas are 
as real as sensations because they represent experience, and the return to 
reality is a return to the representation of an act rather than the representation to 
the object, because the verification of the object is found in the success of the 
act. The true ideas then, puts us "into a relationship with the object" (p. 48) and 
arrives through the act. The criterion for the true idea is that it must be specific 
to a reality and no other; it must yield a satisfaction that fits the situation.
The pragmatist criteria for truth involve satisfaction, verification and 
verifiability, necessity and freedom. The mind as a living thing has the practical 
need of "being In agreement with ourselves" (p. 51). Therefore new Ideas must 
agree with our internal things, plus ideas already suited to us (satisfaction). 
Verification takes place when we see the acts the idea leads to, and whether 
these acts are harmonious, but In addition, even then, the Idea Is not true 
without use. Therefore, says James (1909, p. 192, in Durkheim, 1955, In 
Aiicock, 1983, p. 52), truth "happens to an Idea", and is a collective name "for 
the verification process". The idea must be verified, or potentially verifiable, or
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verified by someone you trust. Truth then Involves necessity and freedom, at 
once. Necessity with respect to the "Internal and external order of sensations 
and perceptions" (p. 53), plus the truths we already have; freedom in the way 
we may choose, arrange and categorize from the chaos of things.
If truth happens to things, and if we create our own reality, how do we do
this?
If we make reality In cooperation with the world, our reality could be 
illusory. Constructing reality Is not the same as constructing truth, and the two, 
says Durkhelm, (p. 54) must be separated. Dewey (1903 and 1916 in Durkhelm, 
1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 55) says that there are two types of truths: truth 
developed from doubt, which is of reflective consciousness; and truth accepted, 
which is of Instinctive consciousness. One arranges and organizes reality and 
one reorganizes reality. Doubt however, is not the distinguishing factor, as It 
can be in both; rather, satisfaction is the factor. In humanism (Schiller, 1907, 
essay ill, para. 9, p. 90, cf. essay xvl, para 9,361 In Durkhelm, 1955, In Allcock, 
1983, p. 56) judgments must be affirmed and must be from a mind, "motive (and) 
purpose". Therefore, the personal factor is in all thought, and one cannot Isolate 
the logical / empirical from the real / personal thought. Though there are 
different aspects involved, they are not separate.
The problem of agreement and value for many, among infinite personal 
truths and realities can be explained by knowing that though ideas are Individual 
in origin, they do not remain that way. They become the objects of mental 
agreement, and finally, reach the "stage of common sense" (James, 1907, p. 170 
In Durkhelm, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 57). Truth does not Impose Itself. 
Because we have needs of logical necessity, we recognize and construct it.
Durkheim points out that if logical thought Is not separate, then, it Is a 
lower form of thought, and we need to replace It with something. The Intention
146
of his lecture, "Pragmatism as a Method", was to discuss the replacement, but 
the lecture has been lost. Therefore, the editor summarizes Durkheim's intent. 
Pragmatism as a method, he says (p. 59) was to renew empiricism (in radical 
form), to express attitudes against rationalism: abstract thought and 
intellectualism; express attitudes against dogmatism and absolutes; and to 
focus upon consequences as opposed to first principles. The method would 
show that the value of ideas is seen in how realities are changed by them.
How does the pragmatist notion of thought and reality account for 
religious thought?
Pragmatism, rather than being a doctrine of morality asks value of 
religion. According to James (1902, Lectures III - VII, in Durkheim, 1955, In 
Alicock, 1983, pp. 60 - 61 ) there are five kinds of individual consciousness: the 
reality of the unseen; religious optimism (faith); religious pessimism ('sick 
souls'); states between doubt and faith; and conversion. Truth here does not 
depond on any states or anything "organic" but on results and products. Our 
own realities are evolving all the time. If we look to the saint as an example of 
the product of religion, we see that the saint does not quite fit the definition of 
the man of action necessary to pragmatic thought. James says that however, he 
does have a role, which is to arouse the goodness in us that we “carry around" 
(James, 1902, p. 358, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 62), and so has a 
functional role in the evolution of our prejudices, etc., mentioned above. 
Mysticism is a continuance of another side of our consciousness which has 
effects in us. Polyttieism is in that it satisfies (pragmatic criterion of truth) , and 
does not have to be a oneness to satisfy. Things are therefore important for 
their worth, and applied to this concept, religious thought is possible and real.
Pragmatism comes under criticism for its gaps, however, and its too- 
liberal license of interpretation. Its abstract nature, says Durkheim (p. 65)
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clashes with Its empirical orientation. There are conflicts in the theory, in the 
way that pragmatists say that consciousness does not exist, yet say that thought 
creates reality. The purpose of pragmatism, he says. Is to free the will to 
construct reality. Whereas rationalism places thought above the human, and 
makes it unto itself and absolute, pragmatism wants thought to be " 'naturally' 
(Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 444, in Durkheim, 1955, in Alicock, 1983, p. 
67) part of reality and life", able to be understood and analyzed humanly.
Durkhelm says that pragmatism does not take the opportunity to broaden 
the view to society; does not recognize the duality between mentality arising 
from the individual and mentality arising from collective experience (p. 68).
Just as man creates his reality, mankind creates his destiny, and collectiveiy 
may be in a better position to explain truth, reality and morality.
As another criticism of pragmatism, Durkheim says that it has not shown 
how truth either changes or is diverse. We do not necessarily have to say that a 
changed truth implies there was a wrong before, and diversity does not 
necessarily imply that all is different from the other. Truths may be relative, he 
says. The social world is formed in cooperation with the organic world, and is a 
combination of different elements which are fused. The various syntheses are 
different from one another depending upon the institution in which they are 
present, and depending upon when in history they are found, but they fulfill the 
same roles (for example, family, government, etc.) Each history and each 
people in each history has its own aesthetic, and therefore truth is variable. A 
truly homogeneous world, he says, would not grow.
Tolerance is an outcome of the respect for this diversity, and therefore, 
pragmatism is justified from a social perspective.
How do pragmatists account for the utility of truth?
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The characteristics of truth as traditionally seen, are those of moral 
obligation; necessity and objectivity or Impersonal nature. Pragmatists dispute 
this opinion, saying that since the truth is at our human level, we have no need 
to rise to it, so it does not oblige us to rise to It. However, we do have need of Its 
usefulness, so the truth does not impose Itself on us, but we Impose ourselves 
on truth. Impersonal truths, say pragmatists, may be the final stage at which all 
personal truths converge, but Is not inherent In Individual truths.
Durkheim says that since society is greater in extent than individuals, 
then the truth of society is a greater truth then that of the individual, since it 
Involves the collective. It is therefore more close to an objective truth. Perhaps 
the fact that historically, persons had more agreement among themselves meant 
that they adhered to impractical truths.
Durkhelm confronts the pragmatic view that thought has no speculative 
value because knowledge exists for the sake of action. Dewey (1907, vol. xvi 
(2), pp. 37 - 38 and 55, in Durkheim, 1955, In Allcock, 1983, p. 79) says that 
reflection comes when equilibrium is disturbed; consciousness awakes when 
habit is disrupted as social conscious awakes when it is disrupted. Therefore, 
action Is the only motivator of thought. Durkheim says (pp. 77 - 79) that thought 
involved in mythology evolved to become philosophy, morality, sciences, history, 
etc. In part, these things are practical, but sometimes become speculative In 
that they engage in problems for the sake of the search. Further, consciousness 
is not always for the sake of action, as sometimes it can hinder action (as in the 
piano player who does not perform well because he concentrates too Intently 
upon the playing), and sometimes action can paralyze thought. He rather thinks 
that consciousness requires inaction, and the release requires action. These 
two states of inaction and action travei as places each between the other, the 
one being when the other ceases and vice versa. Therefore, says Durkhelm,
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thought and action are not alike, thought is not only for the sake of action and 
there is room for speculative thought.
He goes on to say that especially as knowledge become of a higher order 
the "antithesis notes as between truth and action....[becomes]...all the more 
marked" (p, 82). He accounts for this. The role of consciousness, he says, is 
not to run the action of the body, but so the body can know itself, to "produce 
beings" (p. 83), and stops are needed In action to produce knowledge. 
Pragmatist view denies aii of this, and Durkheim allows that a practical role of 
thought does exist, but is not the only role. Habit no longer needs conscience, 
but conscience is necessary at other levels.
To explain how this relates to truth, he uses mythology as an example, 
asking why it was accepted as true. An idea is accepted as truth not because it 
"conforms to reality, but by virtue of its creative power" (p. 84). Mythology was a 
collective representaticn of truth, and therefore fulfilled the role of creating, as 
well as possessing a greater energy and psychological force than the individual. 
It was therefore accepted as truth, not because it suited anyone's experience or 
action test, but because it presented Itself as a creative power, as a 
representation of truths that existed in society, and with the strength that 
collectivism gave it. Things of this nature impose themselves upon our 
conscience. This, he says, is pragmatism at a different level in that it Is a 
ccliection of individuals, and in its collectiveness has a unity not present with 
individuals, though it originates from the model I copy unity, and the co-author 
belief of pragmatists. Collective representations exist to make a higher reality 
which is society and "does not exist simply to direct practical affairs" (p. 85).
There are different types of truth. Mythology expresses "ideas which 
society has about itself" (p. 88), and people accept it without verification 
collectively. They are truths that are more than necessary, objective and
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satisfying, though these are part, the sum of these truths is more than these. 
These truths correspond to a reality which is that of society itself, which can't 
know itself unless it can express Itself In relation with things. Therefore, 
mythology is a truth, and is so as a way of expressing experiences.
Scientific truths express the "world as it is" (p. 88), and are a collective 
representation. If they are impersonal, so too are collective truths (as explained 
before), because they are "outside and above" the individual (p. 88). They fulfill 
a need (dialectical, for example, in search to find agreement) for agreement, 
and "turn the mind" to higher truths, eliminating contradiction.
Durkhelm says that for purposes of achieving and reconstituting the 
common consciousness, science Is too fragmented and philosophy too personal 
for the task. To do so, and therefore reach understanding, perhaps sociology 
could master the job, because It Is a more common philosophy. He says that it is 
difficult to express ideas of society In an objective way, and society can only 
know itself from within through representations like mythology (i.e. in ways that 
express a unanimous conception" and impose selves without doubt (p. 91) ( for 
example, in ideas such as "democracy "). This kind of thought seems needed by 
society as much as scientific thought. There is room in this former type of 
thought for "undivided diversity" (p. 91) which is encouraged by the "diversity of 
objects found in the world" (p. 91); further, each object Itself presents an 
infinite diversity in points of view from which it may be examined. Therefore, no 
one mind can embrace all things in all ways, and therefore, Individuals are 
needed. Truths are partial until they are collective, and therefore, collective 
thought is needed. Therefore, Durkhelm says, Individuals are not as arbitrary as 
James thinks, but rather, perform different tasks. The role of tolerance in this 
collective concept is one of respect for the complexity, and the role of
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speculation Is to provide "nourishment to the collective consciousness" (p. 92); 
truth adding something to truth.
Pragmatists view thought and reality as being heterogeneous. Truth 
implies a distinction and continuity in reality that reality itself does not imply, and 
therefore, distorts reality when representing it. Durkhelm says that when 
expressing change you must break down the continuity. He says that though 
reality was fused in the beginning, there are breaks and discontinuities over time 
(early family, law, religion, etc. became more distinct over time). It does not 
distinguish its parts against its wishes, but as a natural part of a degree of 
evolution (as opposed to absolute evolution). Therefore, he says, thought and 
reality are not really heterogeneous. Motion and change are not fixed either, 
stops and rests are required for knowledge and achieving. Therefore, becoming 
is a series of consecutive fixed states, the new being relative to what was. The 
Idea of change subsumes three elements; what was, what is yet to be and the 
link between the two. The link can be represented by a concept, and therefore 
is never isolated. Therefore, both distinction and continuity exist in both things 
and in the mind.
He concludes that truth is social and human; living both In cooperation 
with reality and modeled on It. It Is therefore obligatory In that It Is a norm.
Certainty, he says Is said to be the state of believing we have truth, but. It is 
neither objective, nor can we know when we do have It. Certainty carries with it 
the entailed or conditions' disposition to act, and conformation to 
representations of sensation, Image and concepts. Certainty can attach itself to 
concepts of that which has already been achieved (practical) and that which is 
yet to be achieved (theoretical). It imposes itself by the authority that comes 
from the collective representation of a right way to act, and a right way to think;
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this authority given strength by the collectiveness. We therefore can have two 
types of certainty; practical certainty and theoretical certainty.
Thinking generally Is |ust a certain way of thinking particularly, and involves 
continuity between the individual and the genus; allows for the existence of 
individual concepts (God, for Instance); has the quality of Immutability through 
language, and has potential for universality. It got to be this way because 
collective thought is the same as collective experience, and in its collectivity it is 
fixed, impersonal and imposed upon us. Durkhelm thus accounts for his 
statements about the elements of truth in the beginning of his discussion. It is 
proven in the fact that if it were not adequate with respect to truth then it wouldn't 
be general, fixed and verified by the masses.
As Durkheim moves through his discussion of thought and truth, via his 
critique of pragmatism, he has established a connection between the individual, 
and society. His establishment of these foundations of his Ideas about thought, 
individuals and society lead to a greater appreciation of his social theory.
Society and the Individual appear, according to Durkheim, to create one 
another, in a manner of speaking. They appear to need one another. Isolation 
from society, its authority, its rituals, its Institutions may cause anguish and 
unhappiness. Educationally, and in general, we may ask how MPD and other 
psychoses may be manifestations of isolation from society, and how this 
happens to people. Care must be taken to look at the person In context, and to 
look at the truth for that person In the context of his or her society.
Çb«p<va
Common Themes and Questions for Educational Con»(deraüQP
Far from simplifying matters, the investigation has suggested more 
difficult questions of larger proportion, and has revealed complexity in the 
issues. This chapter will deal with four questions. What is the importance of 
MPD to educators? What is apparent, in summary, about MPD? What key 
ideas have the authors surveyed, contributed? Based upon questions of 
importance to education, known nature of MPD, and the framework for 
perspective suggested by the authors, what are the conclusions we may draw — 
the larger issue?
What is the importance of MPD to education? If a student has learned 
that he or she cannot rely on perceptions as reality or truth, or is significantly 
preoccupied with internal problems, then learning will be interrupted. MPD is a 
new issue for education, involving truth, reality and conflict. That concerns 
education directly.
What is apparent about MPD, in summary?
Certain behaviors seem to present themselves in certain persons. These 
behaviors seem to be related and are accepted as a syndrome (Dunn, 1992, p. 
22) in that they are collectively labeled MPD. These behaviors appear to be 
splitting (Curtis & Fraser. Draft F3 - 31, #5), with amnestic qualities, and the 
state appears to affect other daily behavior (Kluft, 1987). It appears to involve 
intensification of everyday dissociation, normally experienced (Bernstein & 
Putnam, 1986, p. 728; Kiuft, 1987, p. 293), and appears to coexist with other 
characteristics of other disorders (Horevitz & Braun, 1984, in Kluft, "High 
Functioning Multiple Personality Patients; Three Cases, p. 722; Fraser & La 
Pierre, 1986, in Kluft, 1987, p. 90). It seems associated with psychological 
reaction to trauma (Rivera, 1991, video; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986, p. 727), and
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may be a coping mechanism In response to stress (Rivera, 1991, p. 10). It may 
be a means of survival (Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 31, #5, pp. 1-12). (These 
coping and survival mechanisms are spoken about in Freud's work in response 
to overwhelming stimuli and helplessness.) Some skills and / or levels of skills 
appear to be involved that are unconscious or amnestic to the majority of the 
dimensions of the person (Sager & Smith, Sept., 1971, pp. 717 - 719). Frye 
indicates that safety seems to assist the persons with the experience of MPD 
(Frye, Nov., 1990, p. 1013 -1022), and the fact that vulnerability seems to be 
involved is espoused by Ross and Miller e ta l ( March, 1991, pp. 97 -101).
That culture is involved is proposed by Dale, Witztum, Mark and Rabinowitz 
(1992). Speigel suggests that the disorder is related to a sense of inferiority and 
difficulty orienting (1984, p. 101). Sandberg and Lynn (1992) mention an 
association with other problems, and Wilbur {MPD and Child Abuse: An 
Overview, pp. 3 - 4) suggests that forms of abuse are linked.
What key ideas have the authors presented?
Key ideas from the literature regarding persons, human development, and 
issues involved with the damaging of that development will be considered. This 
development is far from simplistic. Therefore, understanding and responding to 
its damage is also far from simplistic. This complexity is a dominant feature of 
the framework through which we may understand MPD. This affects how 
education may need to respond.
Though it is necessary, for the sake of practicality, to try to fit summary to 
the literature, it is unwise to attribute to such, any notion of oversimplification, or 
to infer some "quick fix" solution. Grasping "in part" solutions leads only to 
further confusion because the issues involved are much deeper and more 
serious in nature, so demand attention to their detail and respect for their 
complexity. With this in mind, however, it is useful to attempt to locate some
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"road marks" for the sake of practicality, remaining aware that these "road 
marks" do not constitute the sum of the issue; nor do they infer a unilaterai 
solution. To this end, some common themes arising from the work of the authors 
will be suggested, Several phenomena appear to be related throughout the 
areas of psychology, sociology, epistemology and sexuality. Common themes 
appear and reappear in the works of all of the authors, For the sake of structure, 
these have been assigned three categories: general themes, those reflected in 
areas of human need and themes related to coping strategies. General themes 
may be considered against the question, "What characteristics seem to be 
involved in the nature and development of persons?" Themes related to need 
may respond to the question, "How do the needs of people seem to reflect these 
characteristics?" Maddi (1968, p. 76) uses the term "crippling", which gives an 
encompassing sense to the idea of the various kinds of damage done to persons 
in each realm. The third category of themes may relate to the question, "What 
characteristics seem to be involved in the 'crippling' of the 'self'?"
People employ a variety of mechanisms to cope with situations which do 
not foster their growth and development in a positive way. Freud, Laing and 
Maddi all mention some form of fixation, projection, repression, regression, 
substitution, illusion, collusion, distortion, dissociation, splitting, avoidance or 
asocial behavior. These may be expressed in degree and in varying 
combinations. They may travel on a spectrum from a healthy, efficacious and 
minimal use to a more energy-depleting and damaging manner. Durkheim, 
concerned more with the focus upon the dynamics of society and the individual, 
and upon the essence of thought as it relates to those dynamics, does not 
expound upon an inventory of characteristics, but mentions unhappiness, 
individualism which seems to be so In a negative sense, isolation and suicide. 
Similarly, the focus of James is more directed to discussion of the essence and
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dynamics of thought, and mentions hysteria, delusion. Insanity and alternating 
"selves".
The fact that these processes In some way resolve a given conflict or 
conflicts Is their strength and their life-giving force. The fact that they may be 
associated with degrees of misery, determines their status as problematic.
Involved in the nature of persons, whether sociologically, psychologically, 
sexually, or epistemologlcally are what appear to be seven informal categories; 
the concept of a "something greater"; dualism; wholeness; autonomy; a quality 
of genesis ( both developmental and creative ); a temporal / contextual attribute; 
and a feature of efficacy. How might these categories be seen in each author's 
work?
The "something greater" for Durkheim, is involved with the idea of society, 
and how it brings to the individual a sense of Identity and direction. Through 
authority, duty, limits and a quality of the sacred, persons find true freedom. 
Something greater than themselves, though invested with the features they 
individually, collectively and overtime have brought to it, determines back to 
them, their sense of morality. Justice and ways of being. Collective truths and 
collective ways of knowing, according to Durkheim are stronger. In them, 
individuals find and contribute their own truths. This present, persons are more 
free to choose the manner in which they will interact in this arena: freedom.
In the theories examined by Maddi, the essence of the "something 
greater" appears less metaphysical, and Involves the relationship that the 
individual has with society, how that shapes and forms the individual. For Laing, 
that beyond the person forms the identity of the person, in that it is composed of 
the identity others have for him, and that which he has for others. Members of a 
group define themselves through internalizing the definition and rules the group 
has for itself.
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For Freud, the Ego itself is created to deal with that beyond the needs of 
the person, albeit, in order to serve the instinctual needs of the person (Id), but 
formed and modified by determinants of that which is beyond the needs of the 
person to insure safety and acceptance.
James contends that the uniquely distinct feature of humanity is the ability 
to postpone, to wait, to choose and to operate from the "forward", to a goal, Man 
is a "fighter for ends" (James, 1892, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 92), able to move to 
that outside of himself in future direction.
The theme of dualism appears in the sense that persons have an 
seemingly ongoing struggle to find balance between their individuality and this 
greater, mostly expressed as society. Durkheim declares that man's nature is a 
dualistic one; that society is In man and man in society with an accompanying 
conflict. The behavior of individuals, according to him, reflects society, and 
society is composed of the collective truths of individuals.
The theorists selected by Maddi acknowledge the existence of a 
relationship between society and the individual; a relatedness • as does Laing. 
For Freud, the Ego mediates that relationship. For both James and Laing, the 
knowing of those others is only possible In a subjective manner, and a 
relationship builds between the self and the known to form the truth for that 
person.
Unity / wholeness is a key concept. For Durkheim, the unity of the person 
is inherent in the unity of the society in which the person finds membership. In 
Maddi Is found the notion of unity with self, and Freud expresses this unity as 
the way in which the Ego strengthens the systems of logic and reason to 
establish a smoothly run system of interaction. For James, thought or 
consciousness Is whole, primal and irreducible. Laing cautions those attempting 
to know another that they should look for that knowledge in the context of their
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whole story and interrelatedness with others. Any other process, according to 
him, leads to fragmented pictures.
Autonomy figures greatly In the works of all. James indicates that the 
very essence of who we are as human beings involves choice, power to select 
and name. He notes the autonomy of conscious in his concept of the Stream of 
Thought or Stream of Consciousness, and says that Thought can educate itself. 
Our very reality is made by us in the way in which we know objects in a 
subjective manner; Durkheim acknowledges that this making of our reality leads 
to action and determines future, and says that autonomy results from authority, 
in that we can choose how to contribute individually to the societal, Freud's Ego 
has, invested in it, the power to choose, select and form plans of action, albeit, in 
the context of restrictions placed upon it by the world, the Id and the Superego; 
nonetheless, it remains the executive, more or less, depending upon the quality 
of the distribution of energy throughout the systems. Laing indicates that the 
very direction of insanity may be to find a way through phantasy and untenable 
positions to a sanity that is real and true. Though a wounded autonomy, it 
nonetheless implies the person assuming power.
In Maddi's work, the concept of autonomy is involved in ways in which the 
person deals with conflict, seeks fuifillment and maintains consistency. Angyal 
names it as a state which persons are driven to maximize; Keliy cites the control 
of events as a goal, and Bakan refers to it as agency. In other theories, 
autonomy is named as a feature of positive development.
Genesis may be a feature of development, in what appears to be two 
distinct senses; in the sense of development and in the sense of creativity. The 
person becomes in a developmental fashion. Most of the theories of personality 
involve stages, all involve growth over time, whether the term "stages" is 
specifically used or not. Durkheim's view of society arises from a premise of the
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evolution of society, organic, he says, In nature. Laing speaks of growth, 
complexity and change over time, and James' Stream of Consciousness involves 
a knowing always developing, changing and different. Freud insists that the 
early affects the later, and that sexuality is life long, developmental and far 
reaching.
Regarding genesis in the creative sense, It appears not enough that persons 
develop and grow; there appears to be a feature of persons creating or 
generating. For Durkhelm, in the sense that individuals contribute to society 
their notions of that which is sacred, and collective agreement is reached. This 
creates for the individuals in that society a sense of what is truth for them, and 
also creates the type of society for those persons. Adler in Maddi speaks of 
growth to perfect power, and White of producing effects. Allport proposes 
propriété behavior, one feature of which is to express. "Express" is also a term 
used by Fromm. The Ego of Freud appears to need to create in problem solving 
ways, and creativity is cited by James as a need. We create our reality and our 
truth.
A temporal / contextual feature seems prevalent, not only in the sense of 
development, as discussed previously, but as something more. Characteristics 
of changeability, metamorphosis, non-absolutism and contextuality are involved. 
The individual exists in the context of the society, says Durkheim, organic and 
changing over time. Collective truths are different for different societies 
depending upon their time and their context. The features of the theories 
analyzed by Maddi tend to indicate that certain contexts enhance development 
and others deny or delay It. Laing insists that understanding of the person can 
only be so in context and in the knowing of complexity over time and 
changeably. The Ego of Freud exists in the context of the outside world, of the 
biologic or instinctual needs, and in the context of the environment in which
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reward or punishment is delivered. James posits that we can only know others 
In the context of ourselves, and that this is non-absolute and changing. Truth 
and reality evolve in the context of new information, and new Thoughts. This 
happens in the midst of the way we resee ourselves and things of ourselves; in 
the ways in which others see us, and we come to know those ways; and in the 
ways we come to know how we feel about this. The temporal nature then, 
involves the non-absolutism and changeability - different in a way than 
developmental, though inolusive of it. The changeability seems to involve the 
context and both the changing ways we see the context, and the changing of the 
state of the context itself.
Lastly, the element of efficacy appears of importance throughout. James 
says that what we come to know and understand, seems to be that which is 
necessary and useful to us, and in ways which are necessary and useful. 
Consciousness is efficacious, according to him, and causal. We can only know 
and use what we have, making choices for reasons that make sense and have 
validity for us. Durkheim, when speaking about pragmatism and truth, submits 
that the value of an idea is in how reality is changed by It, and that truth involves 
satisfaction, action and is affected by consequence. Personality theories imply 
that ways we become fulfill needs we have, positively or negatively. The striving 
for balance between opposing desires or forces mentioned in many is efficacious 
in itself, creating equilibrium.
The needs themselves reflect these themes. We seem to express a 
requirement for them. Needs included in the concept of "something greater" are 
those such as Durkheim's needs for authority, duty limits, ritual, rite and cult. In 
not quite the same way, but still involving a "something greater", Rogers' and 
MasivW's (in Maddi) need for actualization, and the "man as artist" concept of 
Rank (in Maddi), in a sense illustrate this feature.
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Dualism Is reflected In the needs of membership and individualism, 
expressed by Durkhelm, and In the theories In Maddi which propose 
simultaneous needs of agency and communion, autonomy and surrender, and 
the sense of self and of society. In Laing's implied needs for Identity and 
membership, unity with self and relatedness with others, agency and 
acceptance, a dualism Is present. Freud's alleged life and death needs 
Involving demands upon the physic energy si.pply Imply a dualism; need for 
balance entails opposing forces, and therefore involves dualism.
Wholeness is reflected in Durkheim's need for Identity both for the 
Individual through society and for the society, and In the collective truth of a 
society. Wholeness is expressed In the need for both parts of the struggle in the 
conflict theories analyzed by Maddi; in the need for survival plus something 
more, in the actualization theories, and in the need for adequate stimulation for 
the person in the consistency theories (involving meaningfulness, intensity and 
variety). Laing advocates that knowing a person in context Involves wholeness, 
and is seen in the needs of the person to belong, and be accepted, form a unity 
with self and relatedness with others. Agency and a "place" Imply wholeness, as 
does the knowing of the person through the context of the whole. The safe 
balance of all the needs undertaken by the Ego advocates wholeness, if, as 
James says, we need to choose, label and create truth for useful and necessary 
ways for us, then we are, in a sense, part of that truth, and the truth part of us. 
Dualism Itself is implied in wholeness.
Autonomy needs appear to be those like Durkheim's need for freedom 
and Identity, our need for agency, actualization, power, competence and control 
(Maddi), and Lalng's reference to being, agency and identity. The Ego 
represented a form of logical autonomy. In response to the need for same by the
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organism, James’ reference to our choice and will, our conscious selection and 
naming may represent a need to do so, because we do so.
We have needs that Indicate genesis; Durkheim's creation from the 
scared; needs to create, express, actualize in Maddi; Ego need to develop Its 
own skills; needs of people to create truth and meaning, and the need of 
Thought to educate Itself.
Efficacious needs are reflected in the ways in which what we do and think 
and know are useful to us: need for collective truths; our need for balance and 
control; Instinctive needs keep us alive; we have need to know In ways that are 
available to us, ways in which nature allowed us.
Freud's life needs encompass all of these needs.
The development of people, then, appears to have features, and people 
seem to have needs related to a sense of "something greater", dualism, 
wholeness, autonomy, genesis, a sense temporal and contextual, and efficacy.
How do "crippling" and damage take place ? Related to these categories, 
eleven kinds of actions or absences seem to affect negative growth. These 
types are not clearly distinctive of one another, and may overlap, but informai 
categorization aids Iri some clarity and elimination of repetitive detail.
Alienation takes place in the context of society and groups; for Durkheim, 
this Is the focus from which everything else develops. Because society forms 
the individual, it can alienate. Separation from the society causes anguish 
Speck (1966, In Laing, 1969, p. 50) points out that "Irrationality Is often the child 
of an Irrational network", and Laing provides that social phantasy results from 
the individual not fitting in with his group or family. Freud proposes that 
defenses arise when rejection takes place, as do other theorists in Maddi,
James points to inconsistencies as foundations for disbelief, and altered truths.
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Separation and rejection need not take place from society as a whole, and 
provide for another category of means of damage. Theorists in Maddi's work 
cite rejection as cause for Interrupted and thwarted development. Laing cites it 
as cause for harm to the identity, and for perverted ways of seeing reality he 
cites negative complementarity as a form of this, and also relates it to the losing 
of "place", a need of the person.. Freud connects it to development of an 
unbalanced conscience, involving shame and a poor self-image.
When identity \e removed, denied, altered or destroyed, Laing proposes 
that distortions are created to cope with a finding of another truth. Personality 
theorists suggest it is related to less than ideal behavior and development.
Deprivation can be seen as manipulative, and removing of autonomy; it 
can also threaten safety needs, preventing actualization (Maddi), and leaving us 
without the power to meet our environment with power, causing inability to 
maintain consistency, or to balance conflict. From a Freudian perspective, it 
may affect the Id, causing regression or fixation, and the inability of the Ego to 
develop In an efficient manner.
Loss of love is a form of deprivation, and can be a from of manipulation, 
but is categorized distinctiy for purposes of this paper, as love appears to be a 
powerful feature in our lives. Lack of growth (Maddi), untenablitiy (Laing) and 
other abnormalities may correlate (Freud). Passion (perhaps not the same as 
love, but related to it) has a function in belief or in the suspension of belief 
(delusion and insanity) for James.
Actions and situations producing conflict, doubt, confusion and great 
discrepancy seem present to damage. Though not the same concepts, they are 
related, and therefore categorized together. Overwhelming conflict appears to 
thwart the autonomy and security of the person, and is involved in states of 
helplessness; as are states of major discrepancy and confusion (Maddi).
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Confusion and doubt for Laing, Involve untenability and double bind, for 
example, and lead to distortion and false truths. Inconsistencies for James are 
involved in disbelief, but in the presence of excitement and motivation can lead 
to delusion.
Actions shaming, producing guilt, ridicule and condemnation are 
mentioned in Durkheim's analysis of suicide; and In the analysis of Maddi are 
Involved with the inability to balance conflict, actualize and maintain consistency. 
For Laing, these actions may involve illusion, a counterfeit identity, and false 
roles, to name a few; and for Freud, a hypercritical Superego, robbing psychic 
energy otherwise needed to smoothly and safely operate the system, and to 
develop the skills of the system to ensure the smooth operation.
We appear to require a balance of stimulation, and limitation. Over or 
under-stimulation or overindulgence seem to arrest our growth, as pointed out by 
Freud (as an imbalance of the power of the Id, or the Superego). Theorists of 
Maddi (especially the consistency theorists) point to requirements for variety. 
Intensity and meaningfulness, as well as the stress required for and stemming 
from learning. For DuM<helm, the dynamics of a society stimulate its evolution.
The final three categories {overwhelming situations or helplessness, fear 
and loss of safety, and meaninglessness /  loss of validation) appear to have the 
same effects. That is to say, they seem to be related to the person's inability to 
balance conflict, actualize or maintain consistency (Maddi) ; they seem to be 
related to the formation of delusion, illusion, phantasy, counterfeit roles and 
false truths for Laing; and to an overdeveloped Superego or Id which robs 
psychic energy for Freud. For Durkheim, the price may be higher: suicide. For 
James, an altered memory or delusion Is involved In insanity, alternating 
identities and blocks to truth.
165
it can be concluded then, that the nature of people seems to involve 
things “greater than" themselves, duality, wholeness, autonomy, genesis, 
temporal and contextual characteristics, and efficacy. Persons have needs in 
these directions. When certain actions related to loss, distortion or deprivation 
occur with these needs, resulting behavior and development may be less than 
ideal for the true empowerment and potential of the person. This may occur In a 
psychological context, a social context, a biological or organic context, an 
epistemological context, an interpersonal or intrapsychic context, and may be in 
combination with one another. It may occur for pragmatic reasons (as ways for 
the person to cope with his or her world), and occurs over time.
There is need to remain aware of complexity and context of situations. 
Because the person is not reducible or simple, the process of the development 
of the person is complex. Therefore, the understanding of the development of 
persons must be undertaken with a respect for individual context, complexity and 
human limitations. The same is true in an understanding of the damage to that 
development. This Is key.
As well as the need to examine In multi-contexts, there is need to examine 
from a multidimensional perspective: social, psychological, biological, 
philosophical, interpersonal and intrapsychic perspectives lend necessary 
information of varying nature. For example, the field of psychology may lend 
certain types of information, but as Laing and James both point out, can also 
have a detrimental effect, and Is not without limitation.
It is necessary to Investigate personal development and damage to same 
temporally. Tempting as it may be to cite, for instance, "the times" as causal, it 
is prudent to examine that as only one dimension of the phenomenon. Though 
possibly possessing effect, it is necessary to examine historically, the truths of 
woundedness for those persons at that time. For example, it is possible that
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Freud responded to a drastically punitive sexual environment in his time. His 
theories lend knowledge to present understanding, but had different meaning 
then, as did sexual woundedness at that time. There are similarities and 
differences that help us to comprehend a larger view.
Caution Is advisable in assigning causation to a phenomenon because of 
correlation, or determining reasons In Isolation. Laing warns against "quick 
fixes", saying the "situation has to be discovered" (1969, p. 33), and cites 
examples of how expediency and the medical model may have actually 
perpetuated damage (pp. 33 • 42). A structural remediation model may deny 
the full expression and understanding that flexible Interaction may permit. It Is 
likely that we may find educational parallels. For example, have we "treated" 
behavioral problems, for instance, rather than attempting to understand their 
underlying and precipitating events, and how has this affected the growth of the 
person?
We have looked at themes which appear related to development, needs 
and "crippling" of development. The sources examined In Chapter 3 are 
authored by males. Brilliance and compassion are reflected In their work. 
Nonetheless, a feminine perspective would add to the understanding of the 
Issues.
What conclusions can be legitimately drawn about MPD? What 
questions can we legitimately ask as educators about MPD, keeping In mind the 
complexity surrounding its nature, and the dangers of the "quick fix"? What Is 
the larger issue?
MPD Is a new issue for education, apparently not vastly addressed in the 
profession. It affects youth, and so it Is necessary for educators to be aware of 
what Is known about the disorder. It Is crucial to see the complexity in the 
awareness, and not to approach It quickly, or In Isolation.
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We must, as a profession, resist the temptation to label and remedy, 
because this may be the pathway of absolutes and generalities, through which 
the reality and truth for the person may not fit. We must, rather, take the time to 
try to understand the person with MPD, and to try to see how both the person 
and the phenomena were created. As James suggests, we must accept the 
limitations involved in this understanding.
Maddi has told us that behavior is learned in an attempt to balance; to 
resolve conflict. It is a response of coping, or survival or growth; a response to 
surroundings - adjustment. We cannot afford to attempt to understand a student 
in isolation, according to a preconceived structure. We have seen that we must 
try to see the individual In the context of his surroundings, with the complexity, 
rules, limitations and interactions involved in those surroundings. Most 
importantly, we must attempt to see the unique meaning the person attributes to 
them, and how this may contribute to the way the person is being.
We have learned from James that a convoluted environment may give 
rise to a convoluted reality. Laing has told us that disruptions in truth may lead 
to disruptions In action. Durkheim has indicated that Isolation from society leads 
to distress. We cannot view the person apart from the situation which bore 
these developments.
Laing, in Vie Divided Self, speaks of the need for trust between therapist 
and patient, and the need for the patient to sense that the therapist cares ( pp. 
164 - 165). Perhaps we may begin with this... an acceptance that the person is 
the product of many and complex intricacies. In this acceptance, we may trust 
the student to reveal his or her truth and meaning to us. A building of trust may 
begin. Growth may occur. Perhaps a limited understanding of the person's own 
truth and meaning of the world may be of more human value than a cure that 
isn't.
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